Problems of Communism

MAY-JUNE 1981

Book Reviews

Tadeusz Szafar
Robert H. Donaldson
Georg Brunner
Carlyle A. Thayer

Soviet Economic Slowdown
Abram Bergson

Moscow and the Western Alliance
Pierre Hassner

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Boris Meissner

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Problems of Communism

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Cover: N. A. Tikhonov, who replaced the late A. N. Kosygin as Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers in late 1980, reports on the 1981–85 economic plan to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev (far right) and Party Secretary K. U. Chernenko and foreign guests look on. Photo by TASS from Sovfoto.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

The 26th Party Congress and Soviet Domestic Politics
Boris Meissner

The recent 26th CPSU Congress showed clearly that the Soviet Union is undergoing a crisis of leadership as the Brezhnev era nears its end. The current Soviet gerontocracy did arrange to perpetuate itself in office, although recent personnel shifts may indicate maneuvering going on in anticipation of the succession. But it took no significant initiative to help alleviate the growing domestic and foreign difficulties that beset the Soviet Union. The congress ritual and the lavish praise for Leonid Brezhnev thus represent merely a substitute for actions needed to close the growing gap between the regime and Soviet society.

Soviet Economic Slowdown and the 1981–85 Plan
Abram Bergson

The 11th Five-Year Plan for the Soviet economy (for the years 1981–85) outlined at the 26th CPSU Congress set remarkably low growth targets. Yet energy constraints, increasing costs of inputs, low worker productivity, and general mismanagement on the part of an overly centralized system of economic planning and control suggest that the USSR economy will continue to decelerate. Such a development would present the leadership with painful choices among reductions in investment (already at historically low rates of growth), consumption (not a happy prospect in light of Polish events), or defense.

Moscow and the Western Alliance
Pierre Hassner

The months since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 have witnessed the dawning of a new era in Soviet foreign policy, with the launching of a major Soviet peace campaign. To some extent, this campaign represents an effort to consolidate previous gains and to counteract trends that Moscow percieves as dangerous in Western, and particularly US, policy. It is also an attempt to exploit opportunities that Moscow sees before it, particularly in Western Europe. The USSR seeks to turn Western Europe against US policy—although not in a way that encourages West European unity—so as to alter the American position or, alternatively, to drive a wedge between Western Europe and the United States. However, exploitation of these perceived opportunities sharpens the dilemmas that confront Soviet leaders in dealing with Europe, and especially with Eastern Europe.

Communism and Ethiopia
Paul B. Henze

Despite Communist rhetoric and a number of early radical social measures, the regime of Mengistu Haile-Mariam is finding Marxist solutions and Soviet-bloc influence of decreasing relevance to the domestic and foreign problems facing Ethiopia. Traditional nationalism (revitalized in response to the 1977 Somali invasion of the Ogaden) and resurgent Christianity and Islam are strong obstacles to the Marxist ideology purveyed by foreign-inspired and now largely disbanded leftist groupings in Ethiopia. Meanwhile, the military leadership shows no haste to develop a genuine revolutionary party.

* * *

Essay-Reviews (over)

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Essay-Reviews

Brinksmanship in Poland

Tadeusz Szafar

What began in Poland in the summer of 1980 as a spontaneous protest against arbitrary price hikes has now assumed the dimensions of a significant political transformation. Although the Communist leadership and its Soviet sponsors have not formally endorsed such a development, there appears to be emerging a system with a higher degree of social pluralism than exists elsewhere in Communist countries. As of June 1981, a number of labor unions and independent societal associations operate and maintain an adversary relationship with the Polish government, but they concede to the Communist party a monopoly of all matters relating to external and internal security, foreign affairs, and central administration.

Toward a Political Economy of East-South Relations

Robert H. Donaldson

An awareness emerged in the 1970's that alongside the military rivalry traditionally arrayed on an axis of East to West there exists a bitter economic conflict between the industrialized North and the developing South. However, the connection between the two conflicts has been largely ignored. At the same time that the Soviet Union is pursuing destabilizing bilateral relationships in the Third World through military means, the absence of any firm Soviet contribution to a North-South dialogue, for economic and ideological reasons, is having a deleterious effect on both East-West and North-South relations, and on the establishment of genuine global economic cooperation.

The Essence of Stalinism

Georg Brunner

The quest for a definitive analysis of Stalinism—fueled either by fascination with the historical phenomenon or dread of its re-creation—continues in our times. In essence, the Stalinist system combined total one-man dictatorship, supported by apparatuses using brutal means of terror, and the pursuit of a radical program of social change. The attempt to realize the utopian goals of Marxism-Leninism made the social deformations wrought by Stalinism a highly probable outcome.

New Evidence on Kampuchea

Carlyle A. Thayer

Most Cambodians clearly welcomed the ouster of the harsh Pol Pot regime, although recent evidence suggests that the most extreme characterizations of it were probably overstated. The Heng Samrin successor government, installed by Hanoi and backed by 200,000 Vietnamese soldiers, does not enjoy great popularity, but prospects at present are not good for creation of a unified opposition under the leadership of Norodom Sihanouk and encompassing Khmer Rouge and Third Force insurgents.

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The 26th Party Congress and Soviet Domestic Politics

By Boris Meissner

On February 23, 1981, the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) convened at the Kremlin Palace in Moscow. For the 4,994 Soviet delegates in attendance and the 123 delegations from 109 countries present as guests, the opening ceremonies began what must have been a grueling round of speeches, discussions, and receptions. General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev keynoted the first day with a long (three and a half hours) "Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Congress of the CPSU and the Subsequent Tasks of the Party in the Realm of Domestic and Foreign Policy." Over the next eight days, a series of leading party and government officials made appearances—most notably, new Premier N. A. Tikhonov on February 27 with his report on "The Basic Directions of Economic and Social Development for the Years 1981–1985 and for the Period to 1990." On March 3, the congress came to a close, again with a speech by General Secretary Brezhnev. Like all party congresses, it was an occasion to "sum up, and to determine tasks for the future." [1]

As General Secretary Brezhnev, in his report to the congress, looked back at the "road traversed," the assembled delegates might well have recalled two memorable party congresses of past years. Just 25 years ago, at the 20th Party Congress, First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, in attempting to destroy the myth of Iosif Stalin, set in train a process of "de-Stalinization," a limited liberalization of the autocratic-totalitarian Stalinist regime. Sixty years ago, the 10th Party Congress enacted even more far-reaching changes. V. I. Lenin, drawing the unavoidable conclusions from the country's disastrous economic situation and from the threat posed to Bolshevik one-party rule by the Kronstadt rebellion (which was crushed by force during the congress itself), proclaimed the New Economic Policy. This limited return to a market economy was terminated only in 1928–29, by Stalin's "revolution from above" based on economic planning. Both party congresses thus marked major turning points in the history of the Soviet Union.[2]

The 26th Party Congress, however, was of quite a different order. The current Soviet leadership is interested primarily in preserving the existing constellation of power, and it has consistently shunned any decision that could threaten the balance of forces inside and outside the Kremlin. At the congress, therefore, the order of the day was "no experiments," and the customary bureaucratic ritual and formulas prevailed. Brezhnev and the other speakers passed over the events of 25 and 60 years ago in silence, perhaps for fear that they might bring back memories of earlier reforms. Continuity was evoked only in terms of the last two party congresses, the 24th (1971) and the 25th (1976). In essence, the 26th Party Congress did little more than provide for the survival of the current Soviet gerontocracy.

In a narrow sense, the 26th Party Congress was a genuine reflection of Soviet reality, for it mirrored the goals of those who organized it. The present article, therefore, will use the congress as a fitting occasion to

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[1] The text of Brezhnev's report is in *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 24, 1981; the text of Tikhonov's report is in ibid., Feb. 28, 1981. Hereafter, all quotations attributed to Brezhnev and Tikhonov will be from the texts in *Pravda* unless otherwise indicated.

[2] For discussions of the party congresses since the death of Stalin, see, for example, the relevant issues of Osteuropa (Stuttgart) and *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC); and the author's analyses in *Europa Archiv* (Bonn), Nos. 9 and 10, 1956; No. 7/8, 1959; No. 3, 1962; No. 13, 1966; No. 14, 1971; and No. 9, 1976.

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General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev delivers the keynote speech to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on February 23, 1981.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

examine the current leadership and its policies. Specifically, there will be a general overview of the congress itself, a look at General Secretary Brezhnev and his position within the top leadership, and an analysis of the leading party and government institutions, especially the personnel changes made either before or during the congress itself.

In a broader sense, however, the 26th Party Congress was an inaccurate reflection of Soviet reality, for it indicated that the Soviet leadership has not truly come to grips with many of the actual problems it faces. Consequently, the second half of this article will examine some of the problems that the party congress tended to ignore. In so doing, it will highlight the few measures (half-measures really) which the Soviet leadership, at the party congress and elsewhere, has proposed to try to resolve these problems. The disparity between the magnitude of the problems and the timid steps the leadership contemplates to deal with them suggests a growing chasm between the Soviet regime and Soviet society—a chasm that will have a serious impact on the Soviet Union and the Soviet leadership in the coming years.

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The General Nature of the Congress

In staging the congress, Soviet leaders were obviously concerned to convey an impression of stability and continuity, even where stability and continuity might not exist. Virtually all the top leadership was reelected to positions in the Politburo and Central Committee (CC) organs. No new approaches were offered in many areas of internal policy; indeed, many serious problems were not even touched upon. In no case was there talk even of cautious domestic reforms. Only in foreign policy was a certain movement, however limited in character, evident.

In domestic policy, Brezhnev's report to the congress contained no sign of a serious response to the regime's problems, especially those in the economic sphere. Brezhnev, like Tikhonov in his statement on the economy, largely confirmed what was already known about the general tendencies and problems of the economy. Both attempted to depict it as growing steadily, although they did admit to a series of difficulties.

It is quite clear, however, that the Soviet growth curve has increasingly leveled off over the past several years. The targets of the 10th Five-Year Plan, which called for the transition from extensive to intensive growth and thus for greater efficiency and higher quality, were not met. And the targets set for the 11th Five-Year Plan, whose basic outlines were confirmed at the 26th Party Congress, hardly seem capable of being fulfilled, even though they have been adjusted to take account of the unexpectedly low results of the last plan period.[3] It now seems clear that the Soviet leadership will not be able to move much closer to its major objective of raising the country's standard of living.

Such economic difficulties will certainly persist as long as the Soviet leadership avoids undertaking major economic reform. Not only does the Soviet Union seem to be continuing its arms buildup at the current pace; it still clings to the planned economy. The recent measure to improve planning, adopted in July 1979, signified no real change in this respect, only an attempt to render the present economic mechanism more effective.[4] And so far the regime has been unable to decide upon any far-reaching economic reform, such as on the Hungarian model.

In foreign policy, however, Brezhnev's report did contain elements of flexibility and change.[5] With regard to relations with the West, a shift in the tone of Soviet foreign policy was evident as early as May 1980, during the anniversary celebration of the Warsaw Pact countries,[6] and in Brezhnev's and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko's reports to the June 1980 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee (CC).[7] Further shifts came after the events in Poland and the change of administration in Washington. But they received their clearest expression in Brezhnev's report to the congress, where, for example, Brezhnev indicated the Kremlin's readiness to continue the SALT process and to consider confidence-building measures that would extend across the European part of the Soviet Union as far as the Urals, provided, he said, there is reciprocity on the part of the West.

With regard to relations with the "socialist community," some movement was also manifest. In his report, Brezhnev revived the theory of "different roads to socialism," a revival that could presage a peaceful solution to the crisis in Poland. It is difficult to judge Soviet intentions on this matter. On the one hand, the congress was marked generally by a lack of revolutionary rhetoric and by Brezhnev's reticence about the cause of international revolution. On the other, it witnessed the discrimination against Giancarlo Pajetta, the representative of the Italian Communist Party, even as Cuban Premier Fidel Castro received lavish praise. Only time will tell whether mention of "different roads to socialism" is more than mere rhetoric.

Nonetheless, even limited shifts in the tone of Soviet foreign policy seem to have gone too far for some Soviet leaders. A more assertive stance was apparent in the precongress memorial address delivered by Defense Minister D. F. Ustinov on the anniversary of the founding of the Red Army.[8] Some opposition to the general congress line on foreign policy also appears to have come from Foreign Minister Gromyko.[9] Clearly, the proponents of a harder line are continuing to press their case.

In his report, Brezhnev himself presumably made a bow in the direction of the hard-liners. He greatly emphasized the role of the armed forces and the KGB, and he remarked on the severity of the international class struggle, which, he said, imposed special requirements on the "Chekists." In noting that the party congress had

[3] See Hans-Hermann Höhmann and and Gertraud Seidenstecher, "The Soviet Economy as Reflected in the 26th CPSU Congress," *Aktuelle Analysen* (Cologne), Mar. 12, 1981.

[4] See Hans-Hermann Höhmann and Gertraud Seidenstecher, "Soviet Economic Policy: Reform Measures But No Reform," *Osteuropa*, No. 11, 1979, pp. 936–42.

[5] See Boris Meissner, "Foreign Policy at the 26th CPSU Party Congress," *Aussenpolitik* (Hamburg), No. 2, 1981, pp. 130–44.

[6] See the declaration by the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee on May 15, 1980, cited in *Pravda*, May 16, 1980.

[7] See the declaration by the Central Committee on June 23, 1980, cited in *Pravda*, June 24, 1980.

[8] See *Pravda*, Feb. 23, 1981.

[9] As indicated, for example, by Gromyko's statements during the visit to Moscow by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the West German Foreign Minister, from April 2 to 4, 1981. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), April 5–6, 1981.

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Soviet party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev signs legislation on May 16, 1978, in his capacity as Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

opened on Army and Navy Day, he declared that neither the party nor the government had "for a single day neglected the strengthening of the country's defense potential and the Armed Forces."

Nonetheless, Brezhnev's report on foreign policy bears primarily his own stamp and that of his close collaborators and advisers. It showed a greater willingness to undertake discussions and negotiations.

The unmistakable shifts in the tone of Soviet foreign policy doubtless stem mainly from the international political isolation in which the Soviet Union found itself after its invasion of Afghanistan and from its interest in foreign trade, which owes much to its growing economic difficulties. Therefore, any movement in Soviet foreign policy must be viewed in light of the Kremlin's desire for a breathing space and a new phase of détente between East and West. It is not clear whether the Soviet Union is prepared to undertake serious negotiations—for example, whether it will agree to any reduction in its Euro-strategic superiority (the result primarily of its deployment of SS–20 missiles) unless, as Brezhnev called for in his report, the US halts its deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe.

In all, the lack of any significant initiative in the face of growing domestic and foreign difficulties clearly demonstrates that the Soviet Union has for some time been undergoing a leadership crisis.[10] Old contradictions remain, and new ones have arisen. In domestic policy, for example, the totalitarian features of one-party rule are incompatible with efforts to strengthen legality, attempts to improve the standard of living are incompatible with the forced program of armaments production, and increasing centralization is incompatible with efforts by individual social groups and the non-Russian nationalities to achieve emancipation. In foreign policy, the Soviet reach into areas outside the USSR's immediate sphere of influence and especially the Afghanistan adventure, in contravention of the "rules of the game" in East-West relations, have proved increasingly incompatible with the Soviet readiness to engage the West in "competitive cooperation," to expand East-West economic relations, and to strengthen Soviet influence in the Third World. Moreover, the complex situation in Poland hinders the Soviet effort to achieve integration with and within Eastern Europe and poses a serious challenge to the centralist-bureaucratic Soviet system internally.

Clearly, the Brezhnev era is nearing an end. A lifeless and listless congress would indicate it even if the man's age and health did not require it. It is thus the imminence of the succession that imparts a great interest to the 26th Party Congress—to matters concerning Brezhnev's personal status and certain personnel changes within the leadership.

The General Secretary

To all appearances, General Secretary Brezhnev dominated the 26th Party Congress to a much greater extent than he did the previous two party congresses, a preeminence that reflected his gradual acquisition of power and offices over the years. Brezhnev has been head of the party since the fall of Khrushchev, having been elected First Secretary in October 1964 and General Secretary in 1966. In the intervening years, he has acquired other offices and duties. One area of responsibility has been military, where Brezhnev has served as chairman of the USSR Defense Council since at least 1975[11] and has held the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union since 1976. Another has been as head of state, a position Brezhnev gained in succeeding N. A. Podgornyy as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Moreover, changes in the authority of other offices—for example, the changes introduced in the office of premier after A. N. Kosygin's resignation in 1980—have helped strengthen Brezhnev's position.[12]

[10] See Boris Meissner, "The Soviet Union Prior to the 26th Congress of the CPSU," *Europa Archiv,* No. 3, 1981, pp. 77–78.

[11] See Boris Meissner, "The Soviet Union Between the 24th and 25th Party Congresses of the CPSU," *Osteuropa,* No. 1, 1976, p. 28.

[12] See Boris Meissner, "The Soviet Union Between the 25th and 26th Party Congresses," ibid., No. 6, 1981.

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Brezhnev's gradual increase in power has been accompanied by the emergence of a kind of personality cult. In the five years since the 25th Party Congress, he has been awarded a flood of medals and other honors. He has also received a host of encomiums—for example, A. P. Kirilenko and V. V. Shcherbitskiy have on occasion referred to him not merely as *rukovoditel'* (leader) but as *vozhd'* (supreme leader), a term at one time reserved for Stalin.[13] Most recently, after Kosygin's death, Brezhnev alone signed the traditional New Year's message to the Soviet people.[14] Such public adulation of Brezhnev was evident in many discussion speeches at the 26th Party Congress.

The 26th Party Congress also attested to other gains by Brezhnev, notably in the promotion of a number of his relatives and close personal advisers. Among his relatives, his son, Yu. L. Brezhnev, the First Deputy Foreign Minister, and his son-in-law, Lieutenant General Yu. M. Churbanov, the Deputy Interior Minister, were made candidate members of the Central Committee. S. K. Tsvigun, the First Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB) and reportedly one of Brezhnev's brothers-in-law, was promoted to full membership in the Central Committee.

Among Brezhnev's personal aides and advisers, the foreign policy specialists were also honored at the congress. Promoted to full and candidate membership in the Central Committee, respectively, were two aides, A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov and A. I. Blatov, both of whom had had responsibilities for Germany in the Foreign Ministry. Also promoted to full membership were V. V. Zagladin, the First Deputy Director of the International Department and a man reported to be personally close to Brezhnev; N. N. Inozemtsev, the director of the World Economics and International Relations Institute (IMEMO); and G. A. Arbatov, the director of the Institute for the United States of America and Canada and a well-known Soviet *amerikanist*. It is known that these aides and advisers meet regularly with Brezhnev on matters of foreign policy, and it must be assumed that they, or at least some of them, played a major role in preparing Brezhnev's remarks on foreign policy at the congress.

Most important, Brezhnev's immediate followers and protégés in the top leadership itself played a decisive role at the congress, in both its preparation and execution. Perhaps the most prominent was K. U. Chernenko, a Politburo member and party secretary and a man whose career has risen rapidly over the past few years (despite certain fluctuations after Afghanistan),[15] presumably because of his close relationship to Brezhnev. Conversely, other Politburo members, such as Kirilenko and Gromyko, figured less prominently than might have been expected. Such signs of shifts in the Kremlin hierarchy are in some instances quite subtle and symbolic, but they may nonetheless point to developments of some importance.

One traditional indicator of the Kremlin hierarchy is the seating arrangement on the honor dais at the congress sessions. At the 26th Congress, Chernenko sat immediately to Brezhnev's left (M. A. Suslov sat to Brezhnev's right), a place held by Kosygin at the 24th Party Congress and by Podgornyy at the 25th Party Congress. By rights, that place should have gone to Kirilenko, the third Central Committee secretary, not Chernenko, the fourth Central Committee secretary.[16]

Another indicator is the sequence in which various party leaders assume the chairmanship of the congress's morning and afternoon sessions. Here again, Chernenko occupied a position higher than might have been expected. He did follow Suslov and Kirilenko, but he came ahead of Tikhonov and Gromyko. By contrast, Gromyko came out less well than might have been expected. He clearly held the fifth position in the Kremlin hierarchy, ahead of Chernenko, in the post-Afghanistan period. But at the 26th Congress, Gromyko suffered some "discrimination"—not in the seating arrangement (where, as in 1976, he followed V. V. Grishin) but in the fact that he chaired a session only after Shcherbitskiy and D. A. Kunayev (both of whom are particularly close to Brezhnev personally), as well as A. Ya. Pel'she, had already done so. Nor did Gromyko, unlike the two Brezhnev liegemen, make an appearance as a discussion speaker.

A third indicator is the wreath-laying ceremony at the Lenin Mausoleum, traditionally held during the congress, in this case on February 25. Here, Chernenko received no preferments, but Kirilenko suffered further disadvantagement. In contrast to 1976, when Kirilenko marched in the front row with Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Kosygin, and Suslov, the first row in 1981 consisted merely of Brezhnev, Suslov, and Tikhonov. Kirilenko was only in the second row.

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[13] See Boris Meissner and Georg Brunner, Eds., *Gruppeninterressen und Entscheidungsprozess in der Sowjetunion* (Group Interests and the Decision Process in the Soviet Union), Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1975, pp. 21–23, 32, 46; Boris Meissner, "The Soviet Union Between the 25th and 26th Party Congresses (I)," *Osteuropa*, No. 7, 1980, p. 553.

[14] See *Pravda*, Jan. 1, 1981.

[15] See Boris Meissner, "The Soviet Union Between the 25th and 26th Party Congresses (V)," *Osteuropa*, No. 5, 1981, pp. 394, 402.

[16] The hierarchy in the Kremlin arises out of the fact that the full members of the Politburo who form the "collective leadership" may hold more than one office in the party and state administration at the same time. While the full members of the Politburo, headed by Brezhnev, are formally equal in status, there is within the Central Committee Secretariat a clear-cut order of precedence, introduced by those CC secretaries who are at the same time members of the Politburo.

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

The military and party leadership of the Soviet Union seen on the Red Square rostrum for the May Day celebrations in the spring of 1981, from left to right: I. K. Bagramyan, S. K. Kurotkin, P. S. Kutakhov, A. I. Koldunov, S. K. Moskalenko, S. G. Gorshkov, V. I. Petrov, V. F. Tolubko, S. L. Sokolov, A. A. Yepishev, V. G. Kulikov, N. V. Ogarkov,

However, it is clear that Brezhnev was not able to achieve all he probably wanted to achieve at the 26th Party Congress. Appearances notwithstanding, the "collective leadership" continues to impose firm limitations on Brezhnev's personal power.[17] Indeed, this fact undoubtedly helps explain the slightly unreal aura of the praise heaped on Brezhnev at the party congress. The aging Soviet leadership, by crediting Brezhnev with qualities he by no means possesses, obviously thinks it can better instill a sense of unity, among both the party apparatus and the populace at large, and at the same time cover up its own inadequacies. Hence, the glorification of Brezhnev represents a substitute for true leadership, which, if it did exist, might be able to give a badly needed impetus to the Soviet system.

Thus, the natural tension between the General Secretary and the collective leadership has not been resolved. Brezhnev was able to increase his own personal power at the congress, but not to reach what is presumably his goal of sole rule. Indeed, such tension has been a characteristic feature of the entire Brezhnev era.

Moreover, there are now signs of increasing tension in the top leadership. Some have to do with the jockeying for position now going on in anticipation of Brezhnev's death or retirement. Such maneuvering has already resulted in significant personnel changes in leading party and government institutions. And the longer it continues, the more likely it is to move beyond strictly personal (and personnel) interests and to bring institutional, bureaucratic, and even "representational" interests into play, and to elicit debate on questions of policy. Other signs of tension concern an increasing divergence of views on issues of domestic and foreign policy. As we shall see, both types of indicators were in evidence, if in muted form, at the 26th Party Congress.

Party and Government Institutions

At the congress, Brezhnev gave special emphasis to the role of the Politburo. The Politburo, he said, is the "fighting staff (*boevoy shtab*) of our party of many millions."

In the process of stressing the Politburo's role, he also endorsed collective leadership. In the Politburo, he said, "the collective wisdom of the party is accumulated and the party's policy is shaped."

In these respects, Brezhnev's remarks were consist-

[17] For examples of Soviet press treatment of the subject, see A. Vodolazskiy, "The Higher Principle of Party Leadership," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 12, 1979, pp. 30–41; and "Important Tasks of Party and State Leadership," *Pravda*, Oct. 4, 1980.

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

D. F. Ustinov, L. I. Brezhnev, N. A. Tikhonov, M. A. Suslov, A. P. Kirilenko, K. Yu. Chernenko, V. V. Grishin, A. A. Gromyko, Yu. V. Andropov, M. S. Gorbachëv, B. N. Ponomarëv, M. S. Solomentsev, V. V. Kuznetsov, P. N. Demichev, P. G. Kapitonov, V. I. Dolgikh, M. V. Zimyanin, and K. V. Rusakov.

—TASS from Sovofoto (identifications not furnished).

ent with the actual constellation of power within the Kremlin, for the information he supplied about the work of top party and government institutions clearly indicated the preeminence of the Politburo and the subordinate position of the Central Committee as such. Since the last party congress, according to Brezhnev, the Politburo had convened 237 times, and the CC Secretariat 250 times. (In both cases, the figure was higher than it had been between the 24th and 25th party congresses.) The Central Committee, by contrast, had met in only 11 plenary sessions, each of which lasted no more than two days.

The preeminence of the Politburo is also manifest in the formal authority vested in it by the CPSU rules (*ustav*). Before 1966, those rules gave the Politburo the responsibility only for carrying on "Central Committee work" between plenary sessions of the Central Committee. Since the amendment of the party rules in 1966, however, the Politburo has had responsibility for all "party work." Thus, the Politburo can alter the "general line" on its own authority.[18] Since 1976, moreover, party congresses are no longer closed by a detailed and formally binding resolution. The 26th Party Congress "fully" and "entirely" approved only Brezhnev's report. The lack of any formal resolution makes it possible to interpret the report's general line—which by virtue of Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution of the USSR is binding for the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet state—in a manner consistent with the balance of forces within the Politburo.

The Politburo elected at the 26th Party Congress has 14 full members (see Table 1), down from 16 in 1976, the highest number in recent decades. Over the five years since the last congress convened, 3 Politburo members have died, 3 have been dropped, and 5 have been added. The 3 deceased members were Defense Minister A. A. Grechko (April 1976), F. D. Kulakov (July 1978), and Kosygin (December 1980). Those dropped were D. S. Polyanskiy (March 1976), N. V. Podgornyy (May 1977), and K. T. Mazurov (November 1978). The additions were Ustinov (March 1976), G. V. Romanov (March 1976), Chernenko (November 1978), Tikhonov (October 1980), and M. S. Gorbachëv (October 1980).

The fates of the three dropped were undoubtedly connected with both personal rivalries among party leaders and differences over policy issues. With regard to the former, Polyanskiy and Mazurov had been among the

[18] See Boris Meissner, "The Constitutional Development of the Soviet Union Since the Death of Stalin," *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart* [Neue Folge] (Tübingen), Vol. 22, 1973, p. 186.

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Table: The Soviet Leadership

Members of Politburo, CPSU CC	Dates of membership	Current responsibility
L. I. Brezhnev	Mar 75	General Sec., CPSU CC; Chm., Pres., Supreme Soviet; Chm., Defense Council
Yu. V. Andropov	Mar 75	Chm., KGB (State Security Committee)
K. U. Chernenko	Nov 78	CC sec.; head, General Department
M. S. Gorbachëv	Oct 80 ...	CC sec.; agriculture
A. A. Grechko	Mar 75 ... Apr 76[b]	
V. V. Grishin	Mar 75	First Sec., Moscow City Party Com.
A. A. Gromyko	Mar 75	USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs
A. P. Kirilenko	Mar 75	CC sec.; industrial management
A. N. Kosygin	Mar 75 ..... Dec 80[b]	
F. D. Kulakov	Mar 75 ..... Jul 78[b]	
D. A. Kunayev	Mar 75	First Sec., CP of Kazakh SSR
K. T. Mazurov	Mar 75 ..... Nov 78	
A. Ya. Pel'she	Mar 75	Chm., Party Control Committee
N. V. Podgornyy	Mar 75 ..... May 77	
D. S. Polyanskiy	Mar 75 .. Mar 76	
G. V. Romanov	Mar 76	First Sec., Leningrad Oblast Party Com.
V. V. Shcherbitskiy	Mar 75	First Sec., CP of Ukrainian SSR
A. N. Shelepin	Mar 75 . Apr 75	
M. A. Suslov	Mar 75	CC sec.; ideology, international communism
N. A. Tikhonov	Nov 79	Chm., USSR Council of Ministers
D. F. Ustinov	Mar 76	USSR Minister of Defense

Candidate members of Politburo		
G. A. Aliyev	Mar 76	First Sec., CP of Azerbaydzhan SSR
K. U. Chernenko	Oct 77 ... Nov 78[c]	
P. N. Demichev	Mar 75	USSR Minister of Culture
M. S. Gorbachëv	Nov 79 ... Oct 80[c]	
T. Ya. Kiselev	Oct 80 ...	First Sec., CP of Belorussian SSR
V. V. Kuznetsov	Oct 77	First Dep. Chm., Pres., Supreme Soviet
P. M. Masherov	Mar 75 ..... Oct 80[b]	
B. N. Ponomarëv	Mar 75	CC sec.; head, International Dept.
Sh. R. Rashidov	Mar 75	First Sec., CP of Uzbek SSR
G. V. Romanov	Mar 75 .. Mar 76[c]	
E. A. Shevardnadze	Nov 78	First Sec., CP of Georgian SSR
M. S. Solomentsev	Mar 75	Chm., RSFSR Council of Ministers
N. A. Tikhonov	Nov 78 .. Nov 79[c]	
D. F. Ustinov	Mar 75 .. Mar 76[c]	

[a] The present analysis traces primarily events between the 25th and 26th party congresses. However, we begin Table 1 with March 1975 so as to provide a continuation of Figure 1 in the Hodnett article mentioned below.

[b] Deceased.

[c] Promoted.

[d] Estimated date.

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From March 1975 to May 1981[a]

Members of Secretariat of CPSU CC

	Dates of membership	Current responsibility
L. I. Brezhnev	Mar 75	general
K. U. Chernenko	Mar 76	CC administration
V. I. Dolgikh	Mar 75	heavy industry
M. S. Gorbachëv	Nov 78	agriculture
I. V. Kapitonov	Mar 75	head, Dept. for Party-Org. Work
K. F. Katushev	Mar 75 ..... Mar 77	
A. P. Kirilenko	Mar 75	industrial management
F. D. Kulakov	Mar 75 ..... Jul 78	
B. N. Ponomarëv	Mar 75	nonruling Communist parties
Ya. P. Ryabov	Oct 76 ..... Apr 79	
K. V. Rusakov	May 77	ruling Communist parties
M. A. Suslov	Mar 75	ideology, international communism
D. F. Ustinov	Mar 75 ..... Apr 76[d]	
M. V. Zimyanin	Mar 76	ideology

Members of Presidium, USSR Council of Ministers

N. A. Tikhonov	Oct 80 ...	Chm., USSR Council of Ministers
I. V. Arkhipov	Oct 80 ...	First Dep. Chm., USSR Council of Min.
A. K. Antonov	Dec 80 .	
N. K. Baybakov	Mar 75	Chm., State Planning Commission
I. I. Bodyul	Dec 80 .	
V. Ye. Dymshits	Mar 75	general questions
K. F. Katushev	Mar 77	
V. A. Kirillin	Mar 75 ..... Jan 80	
T. Ya. Kiselev	Dec 78 ..... Oct 80[c]	
L. A. Kostandov	Nov 80 ..	CMEA affairs
A. N. Kosygin	Mar 75 ..... Oct 80	
M. A. Lesechko	Mar 75 ..... Oct 80	
V. N. Makeyev	Oct 80 ...	
G. I. Marchuk	Jan 80	Chm., State Com. for Science and Technology
N. V. Martynov	Jun 76	Chm., State Com. for Material and Technical Supply
K. T. Mazurov	Mar 75 ..... Nov 78	
I. T. Novikov	Mar 75	Chm., State Construction Com.
V. N. Novikov	Mar 75 ..... Dec 80	
Z. N. Nuriyev	Mar 75	
L. V. Smirnov	Mar 75	Chm., Military-Industrial Comm.
N. V. Talyzin	Oct 80 ...	USSR representative to CMEA

SOURCES: Grey Hodnett, "Succession Contingencies in the Soviet Union," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1975, pp. 6-7; CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, April 1981, CR CS 81-004, and previous editions; idem, *Directory of Soviet Officials: National Organizations*, May 1981, CR 81-11343, and previous editions; and the Western and Soviet press.

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younger members of the Politburo and had perhaps become threatening to the body's older members, for the two had been seen as suitable for even higher leadership positions. Podgornyy, however, represents the most clear-cut case. He had resisted Brezhnev's plan to convert the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which he then headed, into a "Council of State" with expanded authority—presumably a plan to allow Brezhnev to take over as head of state as well as to diminish Kosygin's authority as head of government. Because of Podgornyy's resistance, the publication of the draft constitution of the USSR was postponed time and again, and only in July 1977, after Podgornyy's ouster, was Brezhnev able to unveil the draft. After Podgornyy's fall, Brezhnev succeeded to the chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which the new all-Union constitution gave considerably more authority at the expense of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.[19]

As to policy issues, Polyanskiy had made constant demands for increased investment in agriculture—and thus in the civilian sector—and had thereby drawn the anger of all those whom Khrushchev had denounced as "iron eaters." [20] Mazurov, like Podgornyy and Kosygin, had promoted consumer policies.[21] Podgornyy and Mazurov were also known to have favored the retention and strengthening of the federal structure of the Soviet Union and, like Kosygin, to have opposed a complete break with traditional forms of government and economic administration. Podgornyy was interested, too, in expanding the authority of the local soviets.[22]

Of those added to the Politburo as full members, Ustinov and Romanov, the Leningrad party secretary, were promoted from candidate membership to full membership at the 25th Party Congress. Both, but especially Ustinov, may be considered representatives of the Soviet "military-industrial complex."

Two others, Chernenko and Tikhonov, were raised to full membership, at least in part, to replace incapacitated members. Chernenko's promotion in November 1978 followed the death of Kulakov. Tikhonov's promotion in October 1980 followed the retirement of Kosygin. Kosygin himself remained in the Politburo after his resignation as premier in October 1980 and until his death in December 1980. Both promotions probably strengthened Brezhnev's personal power base within the collective leadership.

The promotion of M. S. Gorbachëv to full membership in the Politburo should be seen as a move intended to provide a counterweight to Chernenko and Tikhonov, for Gorbachëv emerged from a local party organization that is more within Suslov's sphere of influence than Brezhnev's. The meteoric rise of Gorbachëv is noteworthy in several respects. He is an agricultural specialist, but, surprisingly, the series of poor harvests in the Soviet Union in recent years has not hindered his rise. He is also a lawyer by training, the first in the Politburo since Lenin. In this capacity, he also serves as Chairman of the Legislative Committee of the Union Council of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Along with Chernenko, who is an educator by training, he contributes to a diversification of the professional makeup of the leadership, which until recently consisted almost exclusively of engineers, plus a few agronomists. Third, at 50, Gorbachëv is the youngest Politburo member, several years younger than Shcherbitskiy (62) and Romanov (57), considerably younger than the full members of the Politburo (whose average age is 69), and much younger than the top leadership (whose average age is about 75).

There have been major changes as well among Politburo candidate members, whose number now stands at eight (up from six at the 25th Party Congress) and whose average age is 65. Chernenko, Tikhonov, and Gorbachëv were elevated to full membership in the Politburo before the 26th Party Congress. V. V. Kuznetsov, E. A. Shevardnadze, and T. Ya. Kiselev were likewise raised to candidate membership before the 26th Party Congress. Kuznetsov acquired his position in the Politburo in October 1977 (and shortly thereafter assumed the newly created office of First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR), where, because of the close ties he had had with Kosygin and Suslov as a member of Stalin's Orgburo,[23] he seems to have performed a mediating function within the leadership. Shevardnadze, the Georgian party secretary, became a candidate member in November 1978. Kiselev took the place of P. M. Masherov, who died in a traffic accident in October 1980.

In his report to the congress, Brezhnev stressed that the questions and issues submitted to the Politburo are "thoroughly analyzed in advance." In some instances, he noted, the Politburo had established "special com-

[19] See Boris Meissner, "The New Federal Constitution of the USSR," ibid., Vol. 27, 1978, p. 335.

[20] See Boris Meissner, "The Soviet Union Before and After the 50th Anniversary Celebration," *Osteuropa*, No. 10/11, 1968, pp. 731–32; and Sidney Ploss, "The Succession Problem in the Kremlin," ibid., No. 10, 1980, pp. 1103, 1105.

[21] See Meissner and Brunner, op. cit., p. 50; Boris Meissner, "The Soviet Union on the Way to the 24th Party Congress (I)," *Osteuropa*, No. 6, 1971, p. 377; and Ploss, loc. cit., p. 1105.

[22] See Meissner, "The Soviet Union Before and After the 50th Anniversary Celebration," p. 715.

[23] See Boris Meissner, *Russland im Umbruch* (Russia in Upheaval), Frankfurt/Main, 1951, pp. 24 and 77, n. 125.

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missions" for "the comprehensive study of, and generalization from, current phenomena and for the taking of appropriate practical measures in an operative procedure." One such commission deals with ideological matters.[24] It appears to be a restoration of a similar body once attached to the Central Committee under Khrushchev. Other Politburo commissions have been created for agriculture, transportation, and the energy industry.[25] It should be noted that in the economic realm, some Politburo commissions overlap with commissions set up under the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Such Politburo commissions undoubtedly have functions other than those officially attributed to them. Under Stalin, Politburo commissions were designed, in Khrushchev's opinion, to strip the Politburo of its power as an institution.[26] Under the current leadership, however, precisely the opposite is the case. The Politburo commissions link the Politburo's activities more directly to the Central Committee apparatus, thus making it possible to call upon expert advice to a much greater extent than if such advice were sought through the Central Committee Secretariat. Each commission, therefore, represents an attempt by the Politburo to exercise a certain control over the activity of the CC secretaries in these areas of responsibility and to strengthen its own position of power.

The Central Committee Secretariat continues to be second in importance as an institution only to the Politburo. Its composition has changed considerably in recent years.[27] To be sure, at the 26th Party Congress, the existing Secretariat was reelected in full. But many changes took place in the five years before the congress—changes that reduced the number of CC secretaries to 10, down 1 from the 11 elected at the 25th Party Congress.

Ustinov, after taking over the Defense Ministry subsequent to the death of Marshal Grechko in April 1976, was removed as Central Committee secretary later in 1976. K. F. Katushev was transferred from his post as secretary responsible for relations with ruling Communist parties to the position of Deputy Premier of the USSR. K. V. Rusakov, who from time to time had been a member of Brezhnev's personal secretariat, took Katushev's job in the Secretariat. Kulakov died suddenly, in late July 1978. Gorbachëv was promoted to the Secretariat in November 1978. Ya. P. Ryabov, who is personally close to Kirilenko, was a Central Committee Secretary from October 1976 to April 1979, when he was assigned to a post in Gosplan.

The Central Committee Secretariat derives much of its power from its preparation of the materials the Politburo uses in making decisions and from its implementation of those decisions. It also derives power from the fact that the head of the Central Committee Secretariat, the General Secretary, is the chairman of Politburo sessions. If the General Secretary is absent, the second CC secretary (Suslov) presides; if the second is absent, the third (Kirilenko) presides; and so on.

It is worthy of note that the significance of the CC secretaries in the collective leadership has increased since the October 1980 CC plenum. On the one hand, Gorbachëv was raised to full membership in the Politburo. On the other, I. V. Arkhipov, the new First Deputy Premier, is for the time being neither a CC secretary nor even a candidate member of the Politburo. This development would seem to be inconsistent with the relative balance that had prevailed between the party apparatus and the government machinery.

Since the 25th Party Congress, the number of Central Committee departments under the direction of the Secretariat has risen from 21 to 24 (see Table 2).[28] One new department is for "letters" from the working people, a subject that Brezhnev treated at some length in his remarks on the party and its tasks. This department, which is to handle mail from the populace at large, will function much as if it were the party's complaint commission. Subordinate to it is a "Group for Analyzing Public Opinion, for Social Research and Development." Another new department is for international information. Its head is L. M. Zamyatin, and its deputy head, V. M. Falin. The purpose of this new department is to facilitate the dissemination of information on issues of foreign policy, both within and outside the party machinery—a need that Brezhnev also stressed in his report. The third new department is for agricultural machine-building. Like the other two, it will address itself to a problem the party leadership has found particularly troublesome.

The significance of the Central Committee departments lies in the fact that they are responsible for areas administered by government institutions, such as the ministries and state committees. As such, they have direct ties with government bodies with similar responsibilities.

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[24] Meissner, "The Soviet Union Between the 25th and 26th Party Congresses (II)," *Osteuropa*, No. 11, 1980, p. 1192.

[25] Meissner "The Soviet Union Between the 25th and 26th Party Congresses (III)," ibid., No. 1, 1981; and "The Soviet Union Between the 25th and 26th Party Congresses (VI)," ibid., No. 6, 1981.

[26] See Khrushchev's historic speech at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, in *Ost-Probleme* (Bonn), 1956, p. 895.

[27] For the composition of the Secretariat at the time of the 25th Party Congress, see Boris Meissner, "Party Leadership, Party Organization, and the Social Structure of the CPSU," *Osteuropa*, No. 8/9, 1976, pp. 631–32.

[28] Ibid., pp. 609–11; and "The Apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU," *Sowjetunion intern* (Frankfurt/Main), Vol. 1, March 1981.

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Table 2. Central Committee Departments

Administration of Affairs
Administrative Organs
Agricultural Machine-Building[a]
Agriculture
Cadres Abroad
Chemical Industry
Construction
Culture
Defense Industry
General
Heavy Industry
International
International Information[a]
Letters[a]
Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries
Light and Food Industry
Machine Building
Military(?)[b]
Party-Organizational Work
Planning and Finance
Propaganda
Science and Educational Institutions
Trade and Domestic Services
Transport and Communications

[a] New since the 25th CPSU Congress in 1976.
[b] It has been suggested that the Main Political Directorate (MPD) of the Soviet Army and Navy functions much as if it were the military department of the Central Committee. Soviet sources indicate that although MPD officers are integrated into the military structure, the MPD itself enjoys the rights of a Central Committee department. See *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopedia), Vol. 2, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976, p. 562. For Western observers, however, the institutional boundaries between the MPD and the high party bodies remain ill-defined, and the status of MPD head General A. A. Yepishev within the senior Soviet military hierarchy remains unclear. See John J. Dziak, *Soviet Perceptions of Military Doctrine and Military Power,* New York, NY, Crane, Russak and Co., 1981.

SOURCES: *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart), No. 8/9, 1976, pp. 609–11; *Sowjetunion intern* (Frankfurt/Main), Vol. 1, March 1981.

Apart from the Politburo and the CC Secretariat organs, the third most important institution is the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers itself, with 115 members,[29] is too large to function efficiently as a decision-making body. The smaller Presidium, in assuming the role of an economic cabinet, is thus the government institution that immediately supplements the work of the high party organs.[30]

It is thought that on some fundamental questions of economic policy, the Presidium sometimes meets in joint session with the Politburo. And it is known that the Presidium, like the Politburo, has a series of standing commissions, including commissions for operations, capital construction, transportation, the defense industry, the consumer goods industry, foreign trade, and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).[31] But the precise extent of the Presidium's authority remains unclear to Western analysts. It is possible, even likely, that its responsibilities, or those of its standing commissions, overlap the responsibilities of the Politburo commissions.

The Presidium's membership, which for many years was not fully known to Western observers, is now defined by Article 132 of the 1977 constitution.[32] It consists of "the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and First Deputy Chairman and Deputy Chairmen" (see Table 1). It should be noted that the membership comprises several chairmen of state committees who in terms of economic importance outrank many ministers—for example, N. K. Baybakov as Chairman of Gosplan, I. T. Novikov as Chairman of the State Committee for Construction Affairs (Gosstroy), N. V. Martynov as Chairman of the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply (Gossnab), and G. I. Marchuk as Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology.

Since the 25th Party Congress, the Presidium has increased in size, from 12 to 15 members. In contrast to the high party bodies, however, it has had a high turnover in personnel, the result of shifts in the Politburo and especially of the death of Kosygin.

The leadership of the Presidium has changed several times in the last five years. Kosygin, as Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, headed the Presidium until his retirement in October 1980. During the early part of the period, he was assisted by Mazurov, who had been a first deputy chairman since March 1976 and by Tikhonov, who joined Mazurov in September 1976 as another first deputy chairman. After Mazurov's removal in November 1978, Tikhonov remained as the sole first deputy chairman. Upon Kosygin's retirement, Tikhonov was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers. His position as first deputy chairman, in turn, was assumed by Arkhipov, who had previously been a deputy chairman and who is still only a member of the Central Committee. Because Arkhipov is a specialist in foreign trade, it is likely that an additional first deputy chairman will have to be appointed, one who will concentrate more on the domestic economy.

The deputy chairmen of the Presidium membership have also changed considerably in the last five years. In 1977, K. F. Katushev, a Central Committee Secretary and a Brezhnev protégé, was made a deputy chairman.

[29] See Ger P. van den Berg, "The Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union," *Review of Socialist Law* (Alphen aan den Rijn), No. 3, September 1950, pp. 293–323. For the composition of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on Apr. 19, 1979, see Meissner, "The Soviet Union Between the 25th and 26th Party Congresses (III)," loc. cit., pp. 28–31.
[30] Van den Berg, op. cit., pp. 279–301.
[31] Ibid., pp. 301–02.
[32] See Meissner, "The New Federal Constitution of the USSR," pp. 418–19.

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In the course of 1980, three close associates of Kosygin—V. A. Kirillin, M. A. Lesechko, and V. N. Novikov—were dropped, and several new deputy chairmen were named. G. I. Marchuk replaced Kirillin in January. V. N. Makeyev, N. V. Talyzin, and L. A. Kostandov were appointed in October, and A. K. Antonov and I. I. Bodyul, in December.

The significance of the recent shifts on the Presidium is not yet clear. Tikhonov's replacement of Kosygin has changed little of the technocratic character of the Presidium or of the full Council of Ministers itself. The critical question is whether Tikhonov will be able to preserve the relative balance between the party apparatus and the government machinery. If, as has been proposed, the old state and economic administrations are reformed (without an overhaul of the entire Soviet system at the same time), this balance would be considerably disturbed.

Recent discussion of administrative reform in the Soviet Union has centered upon the economy, especially industry.[33] Kosygin wished to retain the vertical management system of the ministries, with production associations (*proizvodstvennyye ob"yedineniya*) as the middle administrative level and with a certain amount of autonomy for the individual enterprise. Brezhnev, in contrast, wished to foster horizontal coordination by placing the production associations under special industry associations (*promyshlennyye ob"yedineniya*), which were to take over the functions of the operational main administrations (*glavki*) of the individual ministries. So far, no decision has been made on the question. But the Brezhnev plan, if carried out, would result in a significant reduction in the number of ministries or even in the restoration of the Supreme National Economic Council of the USSR.

There has also been some discussion of what administrative forms should be used in applying target program methods to the economy. At the October 1980 CC Plenum, for example, Brezhnev advocated basing economic planning on target program methods to a much greater degree than had been the case previously, and at the same time he demanded that central management and local initiative be meshed as optimally as possible in economic administration. In this regard, he announced that a far-reaching reorganization of the current economic administration would be introduced.

Such statements leave no doubt that Brezhnev is attempting to achieve greater decentralization of everyday administration while retaining central planning and management. But they leave unsaid the precise manner in which the current administration is to be reshuffled and in which target programs involving several administrative-territorial units—programs such as the "food complex," which Brezhnev has been pushing, and petroleum and natural gas production in West Siberia—are to be run.

The 26th Party Congress left the question of administrative reform unresolved. At the October 1980 CC Plenum, Brezhnev had announced that the Council of Ministers was drafting proposals concerning the "improvement of the organizational structure of the administration," proposals that were to be completed before the 26th Party Congress so that no outworn forms of administration would carry over into the new five-year plan.[34] Nevertheless, it is clear that the Council of Ministers (in fact, the Presidium) did not complete its task by the time of the congress—perhaps because the reform, if carried out fully, would greatly restrict the power of the ministerial bureaucracy.

In his report to the congress, therefore, Brezhnev treated the question of administrative reform very cautiously. He repeated a proposal that had been made at the 25th Party Congress—that of creating a "system of management by groups of homogeneous and interrelated (administrative) branches"—and mentioned that interbranch complex departments had been formed within Gosplan. In addition, he stated that a commission of the Council of Ministers for "developing the West Siberian petroleum and natural gas complex" had been formed, and a "mixed territorial commission" had been established at Tyumen' under Gosplan. As for reform of industrial administration, Brezhnev declared that "the search should continue" for a correct solution. The "general direction" of the search, he said, is "to expand the independence of associations and enterprises, to expand the rights and responsibilities of economic leaders."

Another major institution, though less important as a decision-making body than the smaller leadership groups, is the CPSU Central Committee. The new Central Committee, which was elected on March 3, or the eighth day of the 26th Party Congress, changed in a way consistent with traditional patterns and interests. On the one hand, the stability of the "collective leadership" exercised by the full members of the Politburo has thus far rested on continuity in terms of personnel and on a relative balance between party officials and government officials within the CC (and Central Auditing Commission—CAC). On the other hand, this continuity makes the collective leadership more dependent on its imme-

[33] See Friedrich-Christian Schroeder and Boris Meissner, Eds., *Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsreformen in den sozialistischen Staaten* (Constitutional and Administrative Reforms in the Socialist States), Berlin, Duncker and Humblot, 1978, pp. 91–100.

[34] *Pravda*, Oct. 22, 1980.

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diate bureaucratic base, as a result of which it has less freedom of choice in making personnel decisions. Because of the natural tension between the General Secretary and the Politburo, the Kremlin leadership has usually tried to balance these interests by increasing the size of the Central Committee from one party congress to the next. Continuity of personnel is essentially preserved, but new leaders are able, if only to a limited extent, to move into the major leadership bodies, with an attendant gain in prestige.

This general approach was again evident at the 26th Party Congress. The new Central Committee is the largest yet—319 full members and 151 candidate members, making 470 members in all. It is thus considerably larger than the 1976 Central Committee, which had 426 full and candidate members. The new Central Auditing Commission, however, showed a slight drop in membership, from 85 to 75 members. Nevertheless, the new CC and CAC together have a total membership of 545, up 34 from 1976.[35]

With certain exceptions, the Central Committee has a special character, for it constitutes a much smaller "assembly of estates" than the party congress and thus is an arena in which the bureaucratic element is even more predominant. In this group of 470, we can perceive not only advancements of certain individuals but also shifts in the relative importance of various Soviet institutions.

The elections to the CC at the 26th Party Congress produced only a limited number of changes. Of the 319 full members elected to the new Central Committee, 239 (or 75 percent) had already been full members. This figure is only slightly higher than the 70 percent reelected at the 25th Party Congress. Of the remaining full CC members, half had previously been either candidate members (10.6 percent of all CC members) or CAC members (1.9 percent). But some of those dropped from membership were once important officials, including former Politburo members Podgornyy, Polyanskiy, and Mazurov.

There were likewise few changes in the bureaucratic elements "represented" on the Central Committee (see Table 3). For example, the proportion of party officials (not including party ideologues) among full CC members showed almost no change, rising to 44.8 percent from 44.6 percent in 1976. But it is particularly noteworthy that the Central Committee apparatus, which is linked to but distinct from the Central Committee Secretariat and which includes the Party Control Committee and Brezhnev's personal staff, is now represented on the Central Committee by 18 full members (5.6 percent), instead of 5 (1.7 percent) as before. This increase attests to a considerable strengthening of the party center and of its influence on Soviet domestic and foreign policy. It is also noteworthy that the proportion of republic and local party officials declined somewhat, to 31 percent from 33.4 percent in 1976—which testifies as well to the existence of a limited centralist trend within the leadership.

The proportion of government and economic officials (not including those officials with responsibilities in the realms of justice, culture, and the mass media) dropped slightly, to 29.8 percent from 32.4 percent in 1976. On the one hand, the proportion of representatives of the central state organs among full members of the Central Committee rose considerably, to 70 percent from 63 percent in 1976. All ministers or chairmen of state committees are now either full or candidate members of the Central Committee or members of the CAC. On the

Table 3: Occupations of Members of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission

	CC full members		CC candidate members		CAC members	
Occupation	1976	1981	1976	1981	1976	1981
Party[a]	128	143	51	50	19	8
State and economy	93	95	40	46	25	29
Trade unions and cooperatives	3	5	4	4	2	4
Komsomol	1	1	1	—	1	1
Military	19	22	10	13	5	4
Police	1	4	4	1	1	—
Justice and legal[b]	2	2	1	1	—	—
Ideology, culture, and science[c]	15	16	16	15	10	10
Foreign affairs	15	15	4	6	5	4
Workers, minor employees, peasants	10	16	8	13	14	13
Others	—	—	—	2	3	2
Total	287	319	139	151	85	75

[a] Includes all Politburo members, even those who hold state offices.
[b] Includes the USSR Minister of Justice.
[c] Includes party ideologues outside the CC apparatus and state functionaries in the mass media.

SOURCES: For a list of newly elected Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission members, see *Pravda* (Moscow), March 4, 1981. Analysis by occupation was done on the basis of current biographical files. For a fuller treatment, see the author's analysis in the forthcoming *Osteuropa* special issue on "The 26th Party Congress of the CPSU."

[35] For the author's ongoing analysis of the composition of the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission, see the *Osteuropa* special issue on "The 26th Party Congress of the CPSU," forthcoming. For the composition of both bodies in 1976, see *Osteuropa*, No. 8–9, 1976, pp. 606–30. See also the various reports by Herwig Kraus in *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL123/81, RL127/81, RL129/81, Mar. 25 and Apr. 1, 1981.

It is noteworthy that the proportion of women among CC full members is 2.8 percent, the same as in 1976. The proportion is higher among CC candidate members and CAC members; the women in this latter group are mostly workers and collective farm peasants.

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other hand, the proportion of republic officials among full CC members remained constant at 17 percent, and the number of local officials and economic managers was down to 2 percent from 5 percent in 1976. In terms of both numbers and importance, the centralist trend is clear here, too.

The military and the KGB made a few gains on the new Central Committee. As for the military, the representation of the Soviet High Command increased slightly, from 6.6 percent in 1976 to 6.9 percent in 1981. As for the KGB, representation also rose, to 1.3 percent from 0.3 percent in 1976. Several high-ranking KGB officials—including not only Tsvigun and Churbanov (as mentioned above) but also General G. K. Tsinev and Lieutenant-General V. M. Chebrikov, both deputy chairmen—attained full membership in the Central Committee.

The foreign affairs group, as a whole, was down slightly in representation, from 5.2 percent in 1976 to 5.0 percent in 1981. However, the changes were minor. The two new first deputy foreign ministers, G. M. Korniyenko and V. I. Mal'tsev, and the Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan, F. A. Tabeyev, were elected to full membership in the Central Committee. As noted above, Brezhnev's immediate foreign policy advisers made considerable advances.

The group concerned with ideology, culture, and science remained at about the same proportion. Their representation among full members of the CC fell to 5.0 percent from 5.2 percent in 1976.

Both the labor unions and workers achieved advances, presumably because of a reaction to the events in Poland. The representation of the labor unions was up to 1.6 percent, from 1.1 percent in 1976. That of the workers (including peasants) reached 5.0 percent, as compared with 3.5 percent in 1976.

Both the justice and procuratorial establishment and the Komsomol retained their small representation among full CC members. The former fell 0.1 percent, to 0.6 percent, and the latter remained about the same at 0.3 percent.

The composition of the Central Committee elected at the 26th Party Congress demonstrates not only the relative importance accorded to the bureaucratic elements represented therein, but also, and more generally, the unchallenged primacy of the Soviet bureaucracy. Nearly 83 percent of the full members of the current Central Committee are party and government officials, about half in the party bureaucracy and about half in the government bureaucracy. A further 7 percent are in the military, almost entirely in the senior officer corps. This 90 percent of the Central Committee—that is, the leading officials and the senior officer corps—constitutes what one might call the top bureaucracy, the Soviet power elite. The other 10 percent of the current CC members consists of either intelligentsia (those who do not hold political-administrative positions) or workers and collective farm peasants. Thus, the 26th Party Congress again confirmed, if confirmation were ever needed, that the CPSU is a body that represents primarily the interests of the bureaucracy.

In the next few years, shifts in Central Committee representation, as well as personnel changes and other changes in the leading party and government institutions, may well prove highly significant. After all, as the retirement and death of Kosygin showed, the departure of any prominent Soviet leader can alter the Soviet power structure markedly. In view of the advanced age of the Soviet oligarchs, the current balance of power in the Kremlin leadership cannot be expected to last long.

Over the longer run, however, the future of the Soviet system will depend not only on power struggles at the top, but also on developments among the broader political, social, and economic forces in the Soviet Union. It is for this reason that the observer must look beyond questions of the leadership, beyond the party and state apparatus, to understand the larger forces shaping the Soviet system today and to grasp the problems facing the Soviet leadership as it moves into the 1980's. It is characteristic that the 26th Party Congress had little to say about either.

Domestic Problems and Policies

General Secretary Brezhnev did devote major portions of his report to the Soviet domestic situation and the party's domestic policies. In essence, though, his remarks were little more than a listing of recent party activities, and were by no means a conscientious analysis of the "state of the Soviet Union." Sometimes, Brezhnev simply ignored a problem—for example, he made no reference to the dissident movement in the Soviet Union. In only a few cases did he mention any new measures designed to resolve a domestic political problem. In no instance did he offer a satisfactory solution to a problem critical to the future of the Soviet Union. A journal article does not permit a comprehensive analysis of the entire Soviet domestic scene; let us, therefore, examine selected problems, specifically, those related to the Soviet "intelligentsia," the Soviet work force, and the non-Russian nationalities, as well as their implications for the future of the Soviet system.

Brezhnev's point of departure in his remarks on the domestic situation in the Soviet Union was the proposition that "the drawing together (*sblizheniye*) of all

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classes and social groups of Soviet society" moved forward during the 1970's and will continue until it leads to the "creation of a society in which people are not divided into classes." Expanding on this theme, Brezhnev then devoted some attention to what he presented as the two classes (workers and collective farm peasants) and the social group (intelligentsia) in Soviet society.

In reality, Brezhnev's analytic categories do more to obscure the nature of social change in the Soviet Union than they do to elucidate it.[36] The major social groupings "drew together," if at all, only to a very limited extent. Rather, Soviet society and its various components have become even more differentiated—the result of such factors as continued urbanization, continued industrialization, and the quantitative improvement in the educational level of the Soviet population.[37]

One of the most significant consequences of such factors has been the expansion of the Soviet intelligentsia, a group that in a narrow sense includes what the Soviets refer to in various ways as "specialists," a term that includes persons with a higher or secondary-vocational education. In the past five years, the number of Soviet "specialists" has grown in both absolute and relative terms. They now number 26.4 million (1979), up from 22.8 million (1975),[38] and form an increasingly large percentage of the Soviet work force in both urban and rural areas. "Every fourth worker," Brezhnev asserted in his report, "is associated primarily with intellectual work."

Moreover, the intelligentsia is becoming increasingly differentiated. Within the Soviet intelligentsia, the technical intelligentsia is distinct from the scientific-cultural intelligentsia.[39] Both groups are about equally strong in numbers, and both evince a characteristic outlook of their own. At the same time, both exhibit a growing dif-

[36] For a more comprehensive discussion, see Boris Meissner, Ed., *Social Change in the Soviet Union: Russia's Path Toward an Industrial Society,* Notre Dame, IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 1972, pp. 23–172.

[37] Wolfgang Eichwede, Peter W. Knirsch, and Boris Meissner, *60 Jahre Sowjet-Russland* (Sixty Years of Soviet Russia), Hannover, Niedersächsische Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1977, pp. 36–49.

[38] *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1979 godu* (National Economy of the USSR in 1979), Moscow, Statistika, 1980, p. 397.

[39] For the difference between the technical intelligentsia (*tekhnicheskaya intelligentsiya*) and the scientific-cultural intelligentsia (*tvorcheskaya intelligentsiya*), see Meissner, *Social Change in the Soviet Union,* pp. 110–18.

Students from a Moscow secondary school familiarize themselves with the computer equipment at a major research institute.

—Keystone.

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ferentiation themselves, which serves to accentuate the social differences between university and technical school graduates (just as there are differences between highly skilled workers and the bulk of the labor force).

In contrast, both the workers and the collective farm peasants have registered relative declines in share of the population over the last five years.[40] Although the proportion of workers fell throughout the country generally, it did rise in rural areas. Furthermore, despite the drop in the percentage of persons employed in agriculture, that figure is still very high (21.8 percent in 1977) as compared to the figure for Western industrial countries (2–12 percent).[41]

The emergence of a numerically larger and more self-confident Soviet intelligentsia will have far-reaching implications for the Soviet system. It will affect, among other things, the nature of the top political leadership, for it is clear that the technical intelligentsia forms the manpower pool from which the political-administrative bureaucracy recruits most of its personnel. It will likewise have an impact on the political leadership insofar as a Soviet "middle class" coalesces from among such middle strata as middle party officials, bureaucrats, and members of the intelligentsia. Such a coalescence would mean not only that the bureaucracy itself would become increasingly differentiated, but also that various groups within the bureaucracy would increasingly put forward their special interests.

The changes in the Soviet intelligentsia will affect the party itself, too, for it is clear that the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia—groups that to a certain extent overlap—form the social base of the party. Brezhnev noted in his report, for example, that of the 17.5 million CPSU members, 43.4 percent are workers, 12.8 percent are collective farm peasants, and 43.8 percent are "representatives of the technical, scientific, and creative intelligentsia." But if other criteria of social class are used, such as occupation and educational level, the intelligentsia can be said to constitute an even larger proportion of the party than Brezhnev reported, inasmuch as "specialists" have accounted for 49.5 percent of all party members since 1977.[42] Indeed, the intelligentsia may account for far more than half of all party members. (The discrepancy arises principally because Soviet statistics count as workers those engineering and technical personnel who hold positions classified as workers, and as workers or collective farm peasants those rural intelligentsia who hold positions similarly classified.)

A Russian worker stops to watch the doing's in Moscow's Red Square after his day's labors and some shopping.

—Sven Simon/Katherine Young.

The result of these and other trends in Soviet society has been to consolidate not the "leading role of the working class," as Brezhnev maintained in his report, but the social preeminence, alongside the political-administrative bureaucracy, of both the intelligentsia, especially the educated segments of the intelligentsia, and an incipient "worker aristocracy." As a result, the Kremlin leadership, which above all represents the interests of the top bureaucracy, is finding it increasingly difficult to coordinate its policies so as to reach a consensus on the bureaucratic level, all the more because the bureaucracy as a whole is becoming increasingly differentiated.[43]

One area in which this difficulty can be seen is Soviet policy toward the dissidents and other forces working toward a quicker pace of social change.[44] Brezhnev evi-

[40] *60 Jahre Sowjet-Russland,* pp. 42–44.

[41] Figures according to Peter W. Knirsch, "The Development of the Soviet Economy Since the 25th Party Congress of the CPSU," in *Die Sowjetunion heute: Innenpolitik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (The Soviet Union Today: Domestic Policy, Economy, and Society), Berlin, Duncker and Humblot, 1981, p. 54.

[42] See Boris Meissner, "New Data on the Social Structure of the CPSU," *Osteuropa,* No. 9, 1979, p. 720.

[43] See Boris Meissner, Georg Brunner, Richard Löwenthal, Eds., *Einparteisystem und Bürokratische Herrschaft in der Sowjetunion* (The One-Party System and Bureaucratic Rule in the Soviet Union), Cologne, Markus Verlag, 1978, pp. 103–07.

[44] See Heinz Brahm, "Soviet Dissident Aspirations and Goals," in *Die Sowjetunion heute . . .*, pp. 82–102; Boris Meissner, *Das Sowjetsystem und Seine Wandlungsmöglichkeiten* (The Soviet System and Its Possibilities for Change), Bern, Schweizerisches Ost-Institut, 1976, pp. 38–46.

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

Andrey Sakharov, Soviet nuclear physicist and human rights activist, seen in February 1980 in the city of Gor'kiy, to which he had been exiled by Soviet authorities.

—Gamma/Liaison.

dently feels that the activities of the dissidents are particularly disturbing, although he studiously avoided mentioning the dissidents at the party congress. The reason for concern in this respect is that the dissidents, as a group, originate in a social base that consists essentially of the scientific-cultural intelligentsia. In a political sense, therefore, the dissidents must be considered the vanguard of this intelligentsia, and their political significance lies in the fact that they say aloud what other segments of the intelligentsia only think. At the same time, the leadership probably also fears that the dissidents may well express the unarticulated opinions of other strata in Soviet society, especially and increasingly those of the Soviet working class.

In analyzing Soviet dissent, then, it is essential to examine the Soviet intelligentsia. There are two considerations that incline the forces of reform among the Soviet intelligentsia to work toward change in the existing political and social system. One, perhaps the more important, is the aspiration toward freedom and social justice. Neither has been satisfied by the Soviet system in anything more than a limited way. Another factor is the need to remain up-to-date in a rapidly changing world, to be a part of the "scientific-technical revolution" and the new phase of modernization that revolution has triggered.

Different segments of the intelligentsia see these issues in differing lights. On the one hand, it is primarily the progressive segments of the intelligentsia that are the most concerned about freedom and social justice. Their principal aspiration is to expand the scope of human rights in the Soviet Union and, at the same time, to mobilize the creative forces in Soviet society through the release of individual initiative. On the other hand, it is essentially elements of the Soviet bureaucracy, especially the more technocratically oriented government bureaucracy, that are the most concerned about the need for modernization. While a constructive approach to the problem of modernization would seem to presuppose an expansion of freedom in the closed Soviet society, the proponents of modernization are trying to attain their goal without calling for any fundamental changes in the system. This approach, given the limitations of the Soviet system, may prove untenable.

In recent years, especially since the intervention in Afghanistan, the Soviet government has stepped up its campaign against the dissidents. It has adopted harsher criminal policies in an effort to put an end to both the Helsinki watch group and the Amnesty International group, not only in Moscow but also in the provinces. It has allowed or forced well-known dissidents to go abroad and has revoked their Soviet citizenship. And it has undertaken measures such as the exile of Nobel prize-winner Andrey Sakharov to Gor'kiy in 1980 and the suppression of dissident activity in connection with the Olympic Games in the summer of 1980 and the 1980–81 Madrid follow-up conference to the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

It cannot be denied that the Soviet leadership has made some progress in its drive to break the dissident movement. But given the social origins and basis of that movement, its eradication seems highly unlikely. In this regard, two new factors relevant to the dissident movement should be noted. First, ties between intellectuals and workers are now becoming more readily apparent.[45] Second, a start toward a women's emancipation movement has been made within the broader framework of the general civil rights movement.[46]

As for difficulties connected with the Soviet work force, a number of interlocking problems might be mentioned. Here, however, we shall focus on the nature of Soviet population growth and the distribution of the working population, on social welfare, and on the labor unions.

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[45] See Cronid Lubarsky, "The Social Basis and Extent of Soviet Dissent," *Osteuropa*, No. 11, 1979, pp. 931–32; Meissner, "The Soviet Union Between the 25th and 26th Party Congress (II)," loc. cit., pp. 1202–03; and "The Soviet Union Between the 25th and 26th Party Congresses (VI)," loc. cit.

[46] See "Woman and Russia," *Courage* (Berlin), March 1980, pp. 12–41; Meissner, "The Soviet Union Between the 25th and 26th Party Congresses (VI)," loc. cit.

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At the 26th Party Congress, Brezhnev went into some detail about the problems of uneven population growth among various groups in the Soviet Union and irregular distribution of the Soviet labor force. The general outlines of these problems are well known.[47] On the one hand, ethnic Russians have over recent decades constituted a smaller and smaller part of the population of the Soviet Union. From 58 percent in 1939, the proportion of Russians dropped to 52.4 percent in 1979, and there is every indication that even that figure will fall below 50 percent by the end of the century. Moreover, the proportion of other Slavic groups, such as the Ukrainians and Belorussians, has risen only slightly.

On the other hand, the non-Slavic groups have registered striking population increases. This is above all true of the Islamic peoples of the Soviet Union, especially those in Central Asia. The proportion of Muslims in the Soviet population grew from 11.6 percent in 1959 to 16.5 percent in 1979. For the five Central Asian nationalities, including the four Turkic groups, the figure rose from 6.2 percent in 1959 to 9.9 percent in 1979. For all Turkic groups in the Soviet Union (including Azerbaijanis, Tatars, and Bashkirs), it rose from 11.1 percent in 1959 to 15.2 percent in 1979. It is also noteworthy that among Baltic peoples, the Lithuanians were able to make at least marginal population gains. The proportion of Lithuanians in the Lithuanian SSR rose from 79.3 percent in 1959 to 80 percent in 1979.

Uneven population growth has led to irregular distribution of manpower, with labor shortages in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) itself and labor surpluses in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Moreover, as Brezhnev pointed out in his report to the congress, Soviet citizens, especially those in Siberia, the Soviet North, and the Soviet Far East, seem to prefer to move "from north to south and from east to west even though the rational distribution of productive forces demands movement in the opposite directions."

Brezhnev, in response to these problems, called for a "more effective population policy." Some features of that policy seem familiar—namely, measures will be taken to encourage larger families, increase maternity and child care allowances, and improve the living and working conditions of working women. Indeed, such measures were contemplated at the 25th Party Congress, but were not adopted because of the high costs involved. Now, however, it is obvious that the "uniform" population policy hitherto pursued will have to give way to a "more differentiated" policy, one that will concentrate on certain regions and groups and that will therefore have a better chance of producing positive results.

As for the question of social welfare, Soviet leaders had a good deal to say on the subject at the 26th Party Congress. Both Brezhnev and Tikhonov (the latter while providing the justification for the new five-year plan) stressed the need to satisfy the popular demand for increased supplies of food and consumer goods. Brezhnev also enumerated the measures that will be undertaken to improve working and living conditions and thus "to consolidate the material and intellectual foundations of the socialist way of life." High-flown rhetoric notwithstanding, the measures themselves read much as if they were simply a list of good intentions: minimum wages are to be raised, shops and restaurants are to be improved, housing construction is to proceed strictly according to plan, and schools and health services are to be upgraded. It is perhaps characteristic, too, that Brezhnev gave with one hand while taking away with the other. In saying that "those who want to live better must work more and better," he seemingly made his promises contingent on higher work output.

The problem of the labor unions was treated in much the same fashion at the 26th Party Congress—certain difficulties were hinted at, exhortations were made, but no real changes were introduced in an attempt to resolve the difficulties. Brezhnev devoted much more attention to the labor unions than he had at previous party congresses, not only repeating such stock phrases as the "reliable support" provided by the unions to the party, but also noting such recent developments as the inclusion of collective farm peasants in the labor unions.[48] The real concerns of the leadership, however, emerged in Brezhnev's demand that labor union officials should be "in the thick of the life of the workers." But Brezhnev evinced no readiness to contemplate more far-reaching measures designed to enhance worker satisfaction and increase labor productivity, measures that would give the labor unions more independence and the workers expanded rights of participation in the enterprise.

The emphasis given at the 26th Party Congress to such questions as the character of population growth, social welfare, and the labor unions surely betrays the leadership's concern over moods among the populace at large and especially among the rank-and-file workers. Such concern no doubt stems in part from the recent events in Poland. But it must also reflect recent internal

[47] See "Soviet Census 1979," *GeoJournal* (Wiesbaden), supplementary issue, No. 1, 1980; for population statistics by nationality, see "The All Union Census of 1979 in the USSR," *Radio Liberty Research*, September 1980.

[48] Between September 1976 and March 1977, 2 million collective farm peasants joined the trade unions. See *The Soviet Union: Domestic, Economic and Foreign Policy*, Vol. 4 (1976–77), New York, Holmes and Meier, 1979, p. 52.

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events, such as the incipient efforts to establish free labor unions in the Soviet Union and the recent increase in the number of strikes (for example, at the Tol'yatti Works on the Volga in May 1980). But in no case does the leadership seem ready to undertake serious measures to alleviate the situation. In this respect, too, the 26th Party Congress provides an accurate reflection of the current state of the Soviet leadership.

With regard to the problems posed by the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union, the 26th Party Congress dealt with the subject in the usual perfunctory manner. But the Kremlin's concern nonetheless showed through clearly. In past years, Brezhnev had asserted in every speech on the anniversary of the October Revolution that the "nationality issue" has been resolved once and for all in the Soviet Union; since the 24th Party Congress (1971), the basic Soviet line had been that a "single Soviet people" (*yedinyy Sovetskiy narod*) has taken shape as a "historically new international community of people" as a way station on the path to a single Soviet nation, with Russian as the standard language.[49] At the 26th Party Congress, however, Brezhnev admitted that although the "unity of the Soviet nations" (*natsii*) was unshakable "as never before," it did not mean that "all questions in the sphere of national relations have been resolved." Now, he depicted the "development of the culture of a single Soviet people—a new social and international community" as a goal still to be attained.

Even in his obligatory ritual comments on the question, Brezhnev was a model of restraint, conspicuously refraining from emphasizing the "leading role" of the Russian people and from delineating the Russian language as a "second mother tongue." National chauvinism and nationalism are alien to the CPSU, he declared, and then he went on to reject the "artificial blurring" of national characteristics and to demand "sensitivity and attention" from the party toward the problems connected with the existence of a "great multinational state."

Such protestations of solicitude, however, cannot mask the fact that Soviet nationality policy has in recent years aggravated the nationality question. That policy has adversely affected the non-Russian nationalities in a variety of ways.[50]

First, the Soviet leadership, although it continues to speak of "internationalism" and a "single Soviet people," has in fact intensified its policy of Russification. On October 13, 1978, it issued a secret language decree, according to which Russian instruction was to be promoted in non-Russian institutions of higher learning.[51] It also organized a scientific-theoretical conference on "The Russian Language—The Language of Friendship and Cooperation of Peoples of the USSR" in Tashkent in May 1979, ostensibly for the purpose of improving the teaching of the Russian language among non-Russians but essentially for the purpose of implementing the secret language decree.[52] And the constitutional legislation it has passed since 1977 has worked to the disadvantage of Soviet nationality groups, especially those groups whose homeland forms an administrative-territorial unit within the Soviet federation. In the Belorussian, Moldavian, and Kazakh soviet republics, for example, the new constitutions grant Russian the status of a second national language. In the union republics in the Caucasus, the Soviet leadership's intent was to delete from the local constitutions any mention of the local language as the language of state. But the storm of indignation was so great, particularly in Georgia and Armenia, that the leadership had to abandon the attempt to change the constitutions, even that of the Azerbaydzhani SSR.[53]

Second, Soviet policies have had a particularly adverse impact on those nationality groups not settled on a compact territorial unit, such as the Jews and Germans. The Soviets reject, on ideological grounds, the idea of cultural autonomy and hence the idea of autonomy for such groups.[54] Thus, the Jews and the Germans find themselves in a very difficult situation, and as a group, exhibit a marked desire to emigrate.

Third, the Soviet policy of centralization, especially economic centralization, aggravates the nationality question. In the 1977 Constitution of the USSR, the economy of the USSR is referred to as a "single national economic complex which encompasses all sectors of social production, distribution, and exchange" within the country. Soviet economic activity, therefore, must rest not only on central management of the economy, but also on central administration of the economy. Nationalities concerned to preserve their economic independence cannot but react strongly to such pressures for economic centralization.

Fourth, the CPSU, in contrast to the Soviet state, is unitary, not federal, in structure. Russians dominate the

[49] See Boris Meissner, "The Nationality Question and Soviet Ideology," *Europäische Rundschau* (Vienna), No. 4, 1979, pp. 78–83.

[50] See Gerhard Simon, "The Non-Russian Peoples as an Element of Change in the Soviet Economy," in *Die Sowjetunion heute . . .*, pp. 68–76.

[51] See Ann Sheehy, "New Measures to Improve the Teaching of Russian in the Union Republics," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL120/79, Apr. 17, 1979.

[52] Meissner, "The Soviet Union Between the 25th and 26th Party Congresses (II), loc. cit., pp. 37–38.

[53] See Simon, loc. cit., pp. 71–72.

[54] See Boris Meissner, *Sowjetunion und Selbstbestimmungsrecht* (The Soviet Union and the Right of Self-Determination), Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1962, pp. 14–23.

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party, accounting for 9.5 million, or almost 61 percent, of the 15.6 million party members (1976) while making up only 52.4 percent of the Soviet population (1979).[55] They dominate the party and government bureaucracy even more. For example, they account for 68.3 percent of the newly elected full members of the Central Committee.[56] Under Khrushchev, it is true, Ukrainians and Belorussians played a substantial role in the leadership; since Khrushchev, however, their numbers in top positions in the bureaucracy have declined.

Judging from Brezhnev's report to the congress, it seems likely that the Kremlin will continue the "process of an all-round approach" to the nationality question—that is, a policy of assimilation and minimization of essential national differences. It believes that it can best achieve that goal through economic and social policies designed to increase equality among the individual union republics. It justifies what amounts to continued Russification indirectly, by referring to the need to meet the nationalities' "specific needs in terms of language, culture, and living conditions."

Nevertheless, the approach proposed at the 26th Party Congress is not likely to prove a viable solution to the complex questions posed by discontent among the nationalities. Simply suppressing growing resistance among the non-Russian nationalities, especially in the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, and Armenia, will be hard in itself. It will be equally difficult to deal with the broader implications of nationality discontent. The nationality question is closely related to the dissident movement, for many Russian dissidents—such as Andrey Sakharov—exhibit an understanding of and sympathy for the aspirations of the non-Russian nationalities.[57] In addition, given the Soviet need for

[55] Meissner, "New Data . . . ," pp. 714–19.

[56] See Sergei Voronitsyn, "The Social Structure of the Newly Elected Central Committee's Voting Membership," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL159/81, Apr. 15, 1981, p. 6.

[57] Andrej Dmitrijewitsch Sacharow, *Mein Land und die Welt* (My County and the World), Vienna, Molden, 1975, pp. 29, 33, 67–69; and idem, *Stellungnahme* (Point of View), Vienna, Molden, 1974, pp. 75–76, 97–98.



Workers of several nationalities take a break near the largest hotel in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan.

—Keystone.

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redistribution of the labor force, the nationality question has serious implications for the Soviet manpower problem. It is of particular importance to the Soviet military, for in the coming years the Soviet armed forces will have increasing numbers of non-Russian recruits, who often have only a limited knowledge of Russian.

As this brief discussion indicates, the problems the Soviet leadership faces are not easily susceptible to solution. While the Soviet military buildup continues, the Soviet economy shows signs of stagnation. Moreover, the economy is experiencing troubles at the very time that the needs of Soviet society are growing (and it is a rather peculiar society at that, one that combines the features of an industrial society at the center with those of a developing society in parts of the periphery). Finally, profound social changes are taking place, and society's sense of self-awareness is growing, just as the problems of governing a multinational empire are beginning to mount.

Nevertheless, as this discussion also attests, the Soviet leadership's attempts to deal with such complex and closely interrelated domestic problems have in recent years been essentially reactive in character—providing not much more than a series of palliatives intended to stave off the worst while the leadership hopes for the best. It may simply be that the centralist-bureaucratic command structure of the single-party system can neither contribute to satisfactory solutions to the problems nor advance the modernization process in any meaningful way.

The 26th Party Congress, of course, was marked not by public soul-searching but by official optimism and exhortations to the party faithful. Even as Brezhnev and the assembled delegates looked toward the future, however, a certain element of pessimism could be noted.

Conclusion

In the concluding portion of his report to the 26th Congress, General Secretary Brezhnev emphasized that "our progress toward communism is accomplished through the stage of developed capitalism." This stage, he continued, "is a necessary, regular (*zakonomernyy*), and historically long period in the emergence of a Communist social formation." He then called for a new party program to replace the current program, which had been adopted in 1961 at the 22nd Party Congress and which had subsequently been amended only slightly at succeeding party congresses. Accordingly, the party congress directed the Central Committee to carry out the proposal.

The issue of a party program, like the occasion of a party congress itself, evokes images from the past. The party program adopted 20 years ago radiated with optimism.[58] It set forth a 20-year plan which envisaged the creation of the material-technical base for a Communist society in the Soviet Union and which foresaw the victory of communism on a worldwide scale, with the Soviet Union surpassing the United States as the world's leading economic power.

Precisely 20 years later, at the 26th Party Congress, Brezhnev's remarks on "developed socialism" reflected little of the optimism that inspired Khrushchev. Indeed, that optimism has gradually eroded over the intervening years. The process began soon after Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964, as the new Soviet leadership dropped the 20-year plan and its "utopian" objectives and embraced the notion of "developed socialism," a concept that Walter Ulbricht had advanced in East Germany.[59] It culminated with the adoption of the new constitution of the USSR in 1977. This erosion of optimism, along with the evolution of Soviet foreign and domestic policy over the years, has increased the need for a new party program, so Brezhnev's proposal in this regard was no surprise.

The present Kremlin leadership, as Brezhnev's remarks on "developed socialism" and his call for a new party program document, is fully aware of the great difficulties it faces in trying to bring about thorough modernization of the USSR. But Soviet developments of the last few years make clear that the current leadership is not in a position either to offer any clear, long-term domestic program or to mobilize the country's creative forces in an effort to surmount rising difficulties. Nor does it appear capable of ensuring a rational process of succession after the retirement or death of Brezhnev.

In this sense, then, the 26th Party Congress only confirmed what many observers had perceived in recent years—that the chasm between the current regime and Soviet society has grown even wider. While the changes in the formal organization of Soviet society have been limited in character, the changes in the informal order of society—which are extremely difficult to discern fully—seem to have been much more far-reaching. The Soviet leadership thus finds itself isolated from the society it purports to lead.

Such isolation will quite likely leave its imprint on the next several years. On the one hand, it will strengthen the influence of small cliques upon the decision-making

[58] See Boris Meissner, *Das Parteiprogramm der KPdSU 1903–1961* (The Party Program of the CPSU, 1903–1961), 3rd ed., Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1965.

[59] Richard Lange, Boris Meissner, and Klemens Pleyer, Eds., *Problem des DDR-Rechts* (The Problem of DDR Law), Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1973, pp. 21–23.

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process in the Soviet leadership; on the other hand, it will increase the pressure from younger generations moving up and seeking positions of authority and leadership. If a decisive change in the Kremlin leadership is delayed much longer, therefore, the possibility of a fairly tumultuous succession will increase. At the very least, tensions within Soviet society will rise. At most, there will be a double generation change within the leadership—one generation following another in a relatively short order—and, with it, the creation of conditions for additional conflict.

In the course of any succession crisis, the forces of reform in the Soviet Union could win influence and power. As the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan showed, however, there are also militant forces in the Soviet Union, which for now seem to possess even greater political weight than they did earlier. One cannot fully rule out the possibility that such forces, which are much more eager to confront risks than the present leadership is, might attain power in the coming succession. Both possibilities should be taken into consideration in any assessment of East-West relations in the coming years.

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Soviet Economic Slowdown and the 1981–85 Plan

By Abram Bergson

Publication of a new Soviet five-year plan is no longer the major media event in the West that it once was, but for serious Russia-watchers it still provides a useful opportunity to review, in light of official plan targets, prospects of the Soviet economy for the longer term. Such a review is particularly in order at a time when that economy is—by all accounts—beset by mounting difficulties.

As approved by the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on March 2, 1981,[1] the 11th Five-Year Plan is technically still in the form of a "draft" (*proyekt*), for it has yet to be revised to take account of discussions at the congress and also at meetings of local party, union, and other groups that were held throughout the country after the draft was first published last December. Other such meetings no doubt are still to be held. The plan will only assume its final official form when the Supreme Soviet has acted on it at a meeting scheduled for next October. Judging from previous experience, though, changes in the plan that are introduced henceforth are apt to be less than decisive.[2]

The new plan is the fourth such program to be launched under the aegis of Leonid I. Brezhnev. If all is not exactly well with the Soviet economy as the 1981–85 plan period begins, that is due in no small part to the deterioration in performance under the Brezhnev administration's three previous plans. The deterioration is particularly striking in the cardinal sphere of growth. The rate of increase of Soviet national income, which had already declined somewhat in the early post-Stalin years, has fallen sharply during Brezhnev's tenure. The fall-off is apparent whether we refer to Soviet official statistics on "net material product" or to data on GNP as understood and compiled in the West. Although affected by proverbial methodological quirks, the two official series that have been published by Moscow both show a decline in tempo fully as pronounced as that indicated by the Western data (see Table 1, page 26).

To be sure, Brezhnev and his associates have achieved notable success in what must have been a prime endeavor: to rapidly build up Soviet military power. Disposing of a GNP per capita that is still only one half that of the US, the Soviet leadership has been able, according to Western estimates, to furnish the USSR's defense establishment a volume of goods and services that during much of Brezhnev's administration has matched or exceeded the corresponding allocation in the United States.[3] And while increasing the supply of "guns" in a wholesale way, the government has also been able to provide Soviet consumers with appreciable additional amounts of "butter." Of course, the rise in per capita consumption achieved (Table 1) must be read in the light of the extremely low initial levels, for the fantastic inadequacies that prevailed when Stalin died (March 5, 1953) had only been partially eliminated by the time that Brezhnev became the principal party leader (October 1964). The quantitative growth is also

[1] For a text, see *Pravda* (Moscow), Mar. 5, 1981.

[2] The draft emerging from the party congress actually represents something of a revision of an earlier version, published in ibid., Dec. 2, 1980. An extensive check, however, reveals the changes to be quite inconsequential.

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[3] See US Central Intelligence Agency (hereafter CIA), *A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and US Defense Activities, 1967–77,* SR 78–10002, Washington, DC, January 1978; CIA, *Soviet and US Defense Activities, 1970–79: A Dollar Cost Comparison,* SR 80–10005, Washington, DC, January 1980; and Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress (hereafter JEC), *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China, 1979,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980.

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somewhat misleading because of perennial qualitative supply deficiencies, to which Soviet consumers have clearly become increasingly sensitive: the extraordinary volume of defective consumer products, recurring incongruities in assortment, periodic market imbalances, and resulting queues.[4] Still, standards have risen.

But, these achievements notwithstanding, the fact remains that national income must be the source of current allocations of goods and services to both defense and consumption. As national income growth slows, expansion in the volume of goods and services allocated to those two purposes conceivably could be continued for a while at the expense of allocations to still another use of the community's output, capital formation. But in time, a slowdown with respect to consumption or defense or both becomes unavoidable.

This has already occurred in the case of consumption, where, as Table 1 shows, the most recent advances have been modest indeed. Although there is no indication that defense allocations have yet been similarly affected, the overall decline in growth has understandably become a source of heightened concern to the Soviet leadership. This slowdown was clearly the central problem which the 11th FYP had to address.

[4] On qualitative deficiencies in the supply of Soviet consumer goods, see Gertrude Schroeder Greenslade, "Consumption" (processed), prepared for a conference on "The Soviet Economy: Toward the Year 2000," Airlie, VA, Oct. 23–25, 1980.



A new Soviet cruiser, the Kirov, photographed by the British Royal Navy in the North Sea in January 1980. The Kirov is armed with 20 SSN–X–19 surface-to-surface naval experimental missiles and 12 SAN–6 surface-to-air naval missiles.

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Table 1: Selected Indicators for the Soviet Economy
(Average annual rate of growth, in percent)

	1965–70	1970–75	1976–80	1980–85 (planned)
"Net material product," Soviet official: [a]				
"Produced"	7.7	5.7	4.5 [b]	n.a. [c]
"Utilized"	7.1	5.2	3.8	3.4–3.7
GNP, CIA	5.3	3.8	2.8	n.a. [d]
Gross fixed capital, Soviet official:				
Investment	7.6	7.0	3.5	1.9–2.8
Stock	7.5	7.9	7.0	5.4
Population	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9 [e]
Employment (adjusted for hours)	2.0	1.8	1.1	0.5 [e]
"Factor productivity"	1.3	−0.1	−0.3	n.a.
Industrial output, Soviet official:				
Overall	8.5	7.4	4.5	4.7–5.1
Group A (investment goods)	8.6	7.8	4.7	4.7–5.1
Group B (consumer goods)	8.4	6.5	3.8	4.9–5.2
Industrial output, CIA	6.4	6.0	3.6	n.a.
Agricultural output, Soviet official [f]	3.9	2.5	1.7	2.3–2.7
Agricultural output, CIA	3.6	2.2	1.4	n.a.
Consumption per capita	5.0	2.9	1.6	n.a.

[a] The two Soviet official series given here relate to national income but exclude diverse services; they differ somewhat in scope and manner of compilation, which need not concern us here.
[b] For 1975–79.
[c] Not available or not applicable.
[d] Some at the CIA feel that the 11th FYP indicates anticipated annual growth in GNP of 4.0 percent. See fn. 5 in the text.
[e] These figures are independent projections, not plan goals.
[f] Calculated as the yearly rate of growth of the average for the given five-year period over the average for the preceding five-year period.

SOURCES: For Soviet official data on national income, fixed capital, and industrial and agricultural output, and the corresponding official goals, see Central Statistical Administration, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1979 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1979—hereafter, *Narkhoz*), Moscow, Statistika, 1980; and *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 24 and Mar. 5, 1981.

For data of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on GNP and industrial and agricultural output, see Rush V. Greenslade, "The Real Gross Product of the USSR, 1950–1975," in Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress (hereafter JEC), *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1976; CIA, *The Soviet Economy in 1978–79 and Prospects for 1980*, ER 80–10328, Washington, DC, June 1980; and other releases of the CIA Office of Economic Research.

For population, *Narkhoz*, and US Department of Commerce, *Population Projections by Age and Sex: For the Republics and Major Economic Regions of the USSR, 1970 to 2000*, International Population Reports, Series P–91, No. 26, Washington, DC, 1979. Data for employment were derived from Murray Feshbach and Stephen Rapawy, "Soviet Population and Manpower Trends and Policies," in JEC, op. cit.; Murray Feshbach, "Employment Trends and Policies in the USSR" (processed), August 1978; and Murray Feshbach, "Population and Labor Force" (processed), prepared for a conference on "The Soviet Economy: Toward the Year 2000," Airlie, VA, Oct. 23–25, 1980. In estimating employment for 1980 and projecting it to 1985, I benefited from the advice of Mr. Feshbach.

For per capita consumption, see M. Elizabeth Denton, "Soviet Consumer Policy," in JEC, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, Vol. 1, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979; CIA, *Handbook of Economic Statistics 1980*, ER 80–10452, Washington, DC, 1980; and other releases of the CIA Office of Economic Research.

On factor productivity, see fn. 27 in the text.

Growth Targets and Constraints

The essentials of the new program are readily grasped. In the twilight of his tenure, Brezhnev not only proposes to arrest the Soviet economic slowdown, but is also seeking significantly to accelerate the economy beyond recently reduced tempos—a fact that the sometimes erratic official statistics tend to obscure.[5]

The target set for annual growth in national income, 3.4–3.7 percent, is nonetheless quite modest by Soviet standards. Under the plan for 1976–80, the government sought to achieve a growth rate of 4.7 percent a year. At the time, that was the lowest goal for national income growth that had ever been set in a Soviet five-year plan,[6] and even that target was not fulfilled (Table 1). The government evidently now has lowered its sights still further.

But, while modest, the new plan may not be modest enough. That becomes apparent when we consider

[5] A word of explanation is perhaps in order here. Soviet *output* targets for sectors and for the economy as a whole (in the fourth column of Table 1) tend to be subject to less upward bias than do the corresponding official data on *realized output* (columns 1–3). By inference, then, the new plan is projecting some limited acceleration of national income growth. Correspondingly, the acceleration projected for industrial and agricultural production is greater than the data in Table 1 might seem to indicate. On comparative biases in official targets and in data on realized output, see CIA, *Comparing Planned and Actual Growth of Industrial Output in Centrally Planned Economies*, ER 80–10461, Washington, DC, August 1980. Analysts at the CIA Office of Economic Research with whom the author has spoken estimate that the 11th FYP implies a GNP growth target of 4.0 percent per annum, or 1.2 percentage points above the corresponding realized figure for 1975–80. This figure may overstate somewhat the Soviet target.

[6] On the 10th FYP, see *Pravda*, Mar. 7, 1976. As implied, reference is to "net material product utilized."

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underlying constraints on future Soviet growth. Of these, energy is clearly one. True, the US Central Intelligence Agency's gloomy 1977 forecast that Soviet oil production would peak "perhaps as early as 1978 and certainly not later than the early 1980's," and that the initial falloff, when it came, would "almost certainly be sharp," [7] has yet to be validated by events. Some have even questioned whether it will ever be.[8] Nevertheless, the USSR is no doubt not nearly as well situated regarding oil as once was widely assumed.

There are, of course, major Soviet areas geologically favorable to oil extraction that remain to be exploited. Neither the CIA nor any other serious observers question that. But, here as so often has been the case in Soviet economic affairs, today's gain has seemingly been pursued at the expense of tomorrow's. With drilling capacity limited, the Soviet Union has focused on exploitation of existing fields to the comparative neglect of development of new fields for future exploitation. Techniques of exploitation have also been notably present-oriented.

While the early falloff in Soviet oil output that the CIA had predicted has yet to materialize, it is noteworthy that the production of oil in 1980 totaled but 603 million metric tons, or 17 to 37 million tons short of the goal set for that year in the 10th FYP; that, as a result, output grew by but 4.2 percent yearly in the period 1976–80, rather than at a planned 4.8–5.5 percent; that over the plan period, the annual rate of increase has tended to decline; and that in the new plan, the government is projecting a goal of but 620–645 million tons (see Table 2). In other words, the Soviet leaders are now essentially seeking to achieve by 1985 the goal they originally had some five years ago set for 1980.[9] The projected annual rate of growth of output is but 0.6–1.4 percent. Thus, even should the plan be fulfilled, oil production in the USSR would at best only be on something of a plateau.

In the USSR as elsewhere, oil is a focus of attention these days, and properly so, for owing to a sharp increase in output in the halcyon years preceding the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), oil has become by far the preeminent Soviet fuel.[10] Coal once occupied that place, however, and here the Soviet potential is, as no one questions, vast indeed. But even the comparatively limited growth target for coal in the 10th FYP proved quite beyond reach; in fact in 1976–80, production growth practically ceased (see Table 2). In the 11th FYP, the government seeks for coal, as in the case of oil, to attain much the same goal that it vainly targeted in the 10th FYP.

With natural gas, by contrast, the Soviet Union has

[7] See JEC, *Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 6; CIA, *Prospects for Soviet Oil Production,* ER 77–10270, Washington, DC, April 1977, p. 7; CIA, *A Discussion Paper on Soviet Petroleum Production,* Washington, DC, June 1977; and CIA, *The Soviet Economy in 1978–1979 and Prospects for 1980,* ER 80–10328, Washington, DC, June 1980, pp. 19–21.

[8] See, for example, Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, *The Soviet Oil Situation,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, May 1978; and Marshall Goldman, *The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum: Half Empty or Half Full?* London, Allen and Unwin, 1980, Chs. 6 and 8.

[9] See the 10th FYP, loc. cit.

[10] Constituting in 1979, in conventional units, 45.2 percent of all Soviet fuels. Central Statistical Administration, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1979 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1979), Moscow, Statistika, 1980, p. 170.

Table 2: Soviet Mineral Fuel and Electric Power Output, 1965–80 and 1985 Plan Targets

	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985 (planned)
Volume of output					
Oil, million metric tons	242.9	353.0	490.8	603.0	620–645
Gas, billion cubic meters	127.7	197.9	289.3	435.0	600–640
Coal, million metric tons	577.7	624.1	701.3	716.0	770–800
All mineral fuels, million metric tons[a]	908.7	1,168.7	1,516.6	1,859.7	2,167.5
Electric power, billion killowatt-hours	506.7	740.9	1,038.6	1,295.0	1,550–1,600
Average yearly percent increase over previous five years					
Oil		7.8	6.8	4.2	0.6–1.4
Gas		9.2	7.9	8.5	6.6–8.0
Coal		1.6	2.4	0.4	1.5–2.2
All mineral fuels		5.2	5.3	4.2	3.1
Electric power		7.9	7.0	4.5	3.7–4.3

[a] In conventional fuel units, with one ton equal to 7,000 kilocalories. Excludes minor fuels (peat, shale, wood), which accounted for 3.5 percent of the total in 1975. For 1980 and 1985 (planned), converted to conventional fuel at 1979 rates. The 1985 figure represents the midpoint of the indicated range.

SOURCES: Central Statistical Administration, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1979 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1979), Moscow, Statistika, 1980, pp. 168, 170–71; and *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 24 and Mar. 5, 1981.

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been achieving very real success, and the continued "forced growth" of output in this sector is now avowedly "a most important task." It is primarily on this basis that the Soviet government anticipates any substantial growth in the supply of fuels. And even then the planned growth tempo is still distinctly lower than that of earlier years.

In view of recent Soviet experience, fulfillment of even the limited goals for mineral fuels that have been set cannot be taken for granted. And what counts for overall economic growth is not only the extent to which fuel output can be expanded, but at what cost. As Soviet accounts of increasingly difficult extraction conditions suggest, costs have in fact been rising. Data sometimes cited on sharply rising money costs are unduly somber, for allowance must be made for continuing wage inflation. Yet, even in constant prices, expenditures per ruble of marketed output of oil rose by 14 percent from 1969 to 1975. The corresponding increases for natural gas and coal were 40 and 12 percent. For fuel generally, outlays per ruble of marketed output rose by another 7 percent from 1976 to 1979.[11] These figures relate to average cost. Increases in incremental costs must be greater.

Strip-mining for coal at Kharanor in Chita Province of East Siberia.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Rising costs—stemming from the need to exploit deeper, less favorably located, or otherwise inferior deposits—have been characteristic not only for fuel but for mineral resources generally.[12] Such "diminishing returns" should, if anything, tend to become more pronounced in the coming years. We must not, of course, overestimate the negative impact of these trends on future growth. In the Soviet Union, as in most economically fairly advanced countries, mineral extraction absorbs only a comparatively limited fraction of the community's total supply of labor and capital. Hence, even sizable increases in costs of extraction should not encroach very much relatively on the supplies of factor inputs available for other uses. But the diminishing returns do represent an impediment.

This impediment is the more awkward in that it comes when the supply of labor for the economy as a whole is itself not growing as it formerly did. Widely cited Western research into Soviet demographic trends as they bear on the Soviet labor force leaves no doubt as to this trend (see Table 1). The Soviet leaders are clearly cognizant of the adverse outlook for labor supply, and have already been taking some countermeasures, such as providing special inducements for superannuated workers to continue in gainful employment. But the leadership is apparently not at all optimistic about the results. This may be inferred from plan goals for growth of output and of productivity; the official targets for employment are not explicitly given in the plan.[13]

The manpower prospects are only made the less attractive by the fact that the limited increases in the labor force that do materialize will come almost exclusively

[11] See Central Statistical Administration, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1975 g.* (USSR National Economy in 1975), Moscow, Statistika, 1976, p. 229; and idem, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1979 g.*, p. 162. Because of Soviet accounting practice, data in these sources on the outlays (*zatraty*) in question can be considered only as approximations of costs in a Western sense.

[12] The increase in costs of mineral extraction is the greater when compared with cost increases in the economy as a whole. It is such a relative shift in costs that is ultimately relevant for economic growth. See Abram Bergson, *Soviet Technological Progress: Trends and Prospects*, Discussion Paper, No. 814, Cambridge, MA, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, February 1981, p. 13.

[13] In industry, according to the plan, productivity is to increase by 23–25 percent. If we assume that this range is paired in the most obvious way with the corresponding planned range for the growth of industrial output, we may infer that the growth of employment in industry is projected at 2.4 percent for the five-year period, or 0.5 percent yearly. That is the rate at which I have projected employment to grow in the whole Soviet economy.

Published goals of the new plan for the productivity of "social labor" and for the share of the growth of national income that is to be accounted for by increased productivity also seem consistent with the projection that I use for the growth of employment, although such goals are somewhat more difficult to interpret than those for industry.

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from peripheral Soviet republics, particularly Kazakhstan and the republics of Central Asia and of the Transcaucasus. In fact, the Russian and Ukrainian republics will experience a net decline in labor force. These trends, too, are well known, but a corollary may need underlining. Since the native populations in the peripheral republics seem reluctant to emigrate, the central government may have to incur inordinate costs in making industry available locally.

Although growth of the labor force will be determined essentially by demographic trends, expansion of another major factor input, the capital stock, is substantially discretionary, depending on the rate at which the Soviet government allocates the country's output to capital formation. As is clear from Table 1, the plan nevertheless projects a relative decrease, rather than increase, in the rate of growth of investment. The real volume of investment is to rise less rapidly than the national income, or only by some 1.9–2.8 percent yearly. This is also a lower tempo than that at which the capital stock has increased lately. It follows from a well-known, rudimentary relationship between a stock and a flow that expansion of the capital stock itself must slow, and the plan indeed anticipates a sharp decline in the rate of growth of capital stock, to 5.4 percent a year. We consider further below the government's policy on investment in the new plan.

How Feasible?

What, in sum, is the import of the trends just described? In seeking under the new plan to accelerate the growth of output, the Soviet leadership faces sharply declining tempos of growth in two major factor inputs—labor and capital—that such growth requires. If we combine these two inputs according to a form of "growth accounting" that lately has come to be widely practiced, we arrive at an estimated 2.2 percent growth of factor inputs yearly from 1980 to 1985.[14] That is 1.7 percentage points less than the tempo that prevailed from 1970 to 1975, and 0.9 percentage points below the tempo from 1975 to 1980. Along with the slowing expansion of labor and capital inputs, the USSR faces diminishing returns in extraction industries. At least in fuel branches, the resultant increase in costs could come to be rather marked, despite the comparatively limited goals set for the growth of output.

How, then, are Brezhnev and his associates proposing to speed overall growth of output? They are counting, to begin with, on relatively favorable weather in agriculture. Or so one surmises, for with due allowance for projected inputs into agriculture, it is otherwise difficult to account for the planned acceleration in agricultural output (see Table 1).[15] Although what constitutes "normal" weather in the Soviet Union is still somewhat problematic, the weather in 1976–80 probably tended to be less favorable for agriculture than it had been in earlier years of the Brezhnev era; hence, an improvement is very possible. Nevertheless, at least in the crucial case

Pensioner Mikhail Vorob'yëv back at work at Moscow's Automatic Transfer-Machines Plant, where he receives wages and additional leave on top of his pension.

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

[14] Here, I have employed the Cobb-Douglas formula with weights of .65 and .35 for labor and capital respectively.

[15] The targeted acceleration in agricultural production looms even more dramatic if one looks not at comparisons of five-year averages for 1976–80 and 1981–85, but at growth in production levels from those in the year preceding a given plan period to the final year of the period. From 1975 to 1980, agricultural production grew 1.4 percent a year; from 1980 to 1985, it must grow at 4.8 percent a year to meet plan targets.

The Soviet government is projecting a sharp increase in fertilizer inputs, but the target for 1985 is simply that for 1980, which was seriously underfulfilled. While the plan does not give a target for growth of capital stock in agriculture, it is fairly evident that a marked deceleration, paralleling that indicated for the whole economy (Table 1) is projected. I consider here official data on past growth of the agricultural capital stock as given in the sources on the all-economy capital stock cited in Table 1 and the stipulation in the plan that the share of capital investment going to agriculture is to be "not lower" than the "attained level." Agricultural employment has been trending down for years, and to judge from the goals for output and productivity in this sector, that trend is not now being reversed.

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

Hopes are high for the spring 1981 sowing on the Rodina Collective Farm in Voronezh Province.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

of grain, the output goal could well prove too optimistic. If we may judge from careful CIA assessments of the Soviet grain position, the projected increase in the average annual harvest to a level of 238–243 million metric tons could be difficult to achieve even with weather of a long-term average sort. The corresponding figure for 1976–80 was but 205 million tons.[16]

The leadership also hopes to achieve a more effective utilization of available factor supplies under rearrangements in the planning system lately made or now called for. There is much room for improvement in this respect. The aberrations regarding the supply of consumer goods referred to above are only the most egregious manifestations of malfunctioning by a mechanism that is notably wasteful generally. The mechanism, it seems clear, is wasteful even in comparison with the flawed performance of Western mixed systems.[17]

Attempts to improve the planning system, however, are nothing new in the USSR; shifts in working arrangements to that end have been almost incessant for fully a decade and a half.[18] Yet familiar complaints recur again and again, and close scrutiny only confirms what might have been inferred: the difficulties are deeply embedded in the bureaucratic system of centralized planning that no reform really displaces. This mechanism. which served a half century ago to propel an underdeveloped country forward in the most brutal way, apparently cannot readily be adapted to the exacting task of organizing a predominantly industrial economy. As such an economy has materialized in the USSR, expansion of output has had to come increasingly from more effective use of existing factor supplies rather than their sheer multiplication; the number of enterprises and variety of products have become ever greater and more taxing to deal with; consumers, though still far from affluent, have shown increasing discrimination in purchasing goods; and the leadership's own priorities have become relatively complex (see below).

The Soviet government is apparently not prepared to abandon the effort to improve planning. After initiating a wide-ranging reform in August 1979, it is now calling for yet more actions to "perfect" (*sovershenstvovat'*) the mechanism.[19] But, basically, centralized planning, with its characteristic stress on bureaucratic processes, remains in place.

While trying to improve the planning mechanism, the government is also seeking more effective or—to use a term that often recurs in the plan and in the discussion of it at the 26th Congress—more "intensive" application of factor supplies through introduction of new technologies. Efforts here seem unlikely to meet with much greater success. True, a number of relatively definite technological shifts are called for, and these might appear to be comparatively amenable to the kind of beaucratic control from Moscow that centralized planning favors. But the innovation process in the USSR is hardly less flawed than the planning system generally. Deficiencies in one are often simply replicated in the other. Consequently, technological progress, never very remarkable in the USSR, appears to have been dis-

[16] In appraising the feasibility of the target for agricultural output in the light of the indicated goals for inputs, and the possible role of the weather, I have sought to take into account: CIA, *The USSR: The Impact of Recent Climatic Change on Grain Production*, ER 76-10577 U, Washington, DC, October 1976; CIA, *The Impact of Fertilizer on Soviet Grain Output, 1968–80*, ER 77-10557, Washington, DC, November 1977; and David Carey and Joseph F. Havelka, "Soviet Agriculture: Progress and Problems," in JEC, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979, Vol. 2.

[17] See, for example, Abram Bergson, *Productivity and the Social System--The USSR and the West*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1978.

[18] See Gertrude E. Schroeder, "The Soviet Economy on a Treadmill of Reform," in JEC, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979, Vol. 1.

[19] On the 1979 reform, see *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* (Moscow), No. 32, August 1979, pp. 9–16.

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tinctly sluggish for some time.[20]

In striving for more effective planning and speedier technological progress, the government is predictably calling for economy in the use of energy. By 1985, it hopes to conserve as much as the equivalent of 160–170 million tons of standard fuel, or some 7.6 percent of the projected output of major fuels.[21] This particular target should not be much beyond reach, although the Russians have no great park of gas-guzzling passenger cars to draw down for the sake of fuel economy. As an alternative to the use of mineral fuels generally, the Soviet government also plans a marked expansion of atomic power. Under the 11th FYP, atomic energy plants, which supplied 4.4 percent of Soviet electric power in 1979,[22] are to increase their share of such power to 14.1 percent by 1985. Such use of atomic power does not seem to encounter popular resistance in the USSR such as it aroused in Western democracies, at least not overt resistance.

If technological progress in the USSR has been sluggish, that already says something about the effectiveness of the government's much-discussed efforts under détente to enlist Western participation in Soviet industrial development. Whether originating at home or abroad, new technologies ultimately can only be as effective as the Soviet innovation process allows, for such technologies must often be adapted to local circumstances, and their diffusion, not just initial introduction, matters. It is still another testimonial to the limitations of the innovation process in the USSR that that country has continued to lag technologically behind advanced countries, probably inordinately so for its stage of economic development.[23]

Soviet technological borrowing from the West is, of course, not exactly a recent development. Not only was it already under way on a great scale under the First Five-Year Plan, but, even though impeded, it was by no means halted by the cold war. Lately, however, such technological borrowing has increasingly taken the dramatic form of turnkey projects. But, while such ventures have been quite significant in some branches—e.g., oil extraction and chemicals—their impact on technological advances overall in an economy as large

[20] See Joseph S. Berliner, *The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1976; and Bergson, *Soviet Technological Progress . . . .*

[21] See the note to Table 2.

[22] See Goldman, op. cit., pp. 151–52.

[23] See Ronald Amann et al., Eds., *The Technological Level of Soviet Industry*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1977; and Bergson, *Soviet Technological Progress . . . .*

The main truck-assembly line at the Kamaz plant in Naberezhnyye Chelny.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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as that of the USSR has almost inevitably been very modest, much more so than is often supposed.[24] It is difficult to see how this situation could change much in the future.

Nevertheless, even very modest gains are to the good, and in the new plan the leadership still calls for the realization of "stable, mutually advantageous commercial-economic and scientific-technical relations with capitalist countries." After Afghanistan, this reference is understandably addressed to "countries that show an interest in cooperation with the USSR," but as Premier N. A. Tikhonov made quite clear in his 26th Congress speech on the 11th FYP, the USSR, for its part, is interested in trade with the USA.[25] The plan calls particularly for "continued implementation of existing understandings and conclusion of new agreements for the carrying-out of large-scale projects in the fuel, metal, and chemical industries and in other branches of the economy."

Soviet gains from technological borrowing have often been compounded by foreign capital financing. How the levels of such foreign funding under the new plan will compare with those of recent years is conjectural. Annual inflows of foreign capital, though, have been and no doubt will continue to be minute in relation to Soviet domestic investment.[26]

In growth accounting, juxtaposition of growth of output with that of inputs of labor and capital together yields a measure of growth of "factor productivity." This measure supposedly reflects the net of diverse forces affecting the overall yield to application of those factor inputs—forces such as we have been considering: diminishing returns, weather fluctuations, technological progress, and gains in planning effectiveness. Such a computation has its limitations, no less for the USSR than elsewhere, but it is still illuminating that in the late 1960's, Soviet factor productivity grew by some 1.3 percent yearly.[27] For a country at the Soviet Union's stage of development, that was not an especially distinguished performance. More recently, the growth of factor productivity has been negligible (see Table 1).

In the plan for 1981–85, the Soviet government implicitly seeks—if it is to accelerate the growth of output as projected in the 11th FYP—to restore, even to surpass, the tempo of the growth of factor productivity of the late 1960's. Even with favorable weather, such a speedup of productivity increase would be difficult to achieve. As for output, the relatively low tempos of growth in the last plan period perhaps could be sustained. But then again they very possibly will not be, so the slowdown could well continue.[28]

Investment, Butter, and Guns

A critical element in the 11th FYP, as we saw, is the goal for the real volume of investment. Since that is to grow at a tempo much below that at which the capital stock has been expanding lately, increase of that stock—a major source of output growth—must slow. Real investment is also to grow less rapidly than national income, so its share in national income is projected to decline somewhat. Concomitantly, the share of consumption might be expected to rise, or at least not decline. That is apparently to permit a sharp acceleration in the growth of per capita consumption over the very low recent tempos indicated in Table 1.

So much might be inferred from the investment and national income goals when they are juxtaposed with

[24] Bergson, *Soviet Technological Progress . . .*, pp. 36 ff.

[25] *Pravda*, Feb. 28, 1981.

[26] From 1974 to 1979, the gross Soviet debt to the West grew on the average by US$2.4 billion annually. Soviet fixed capital investment in 1978 totaled 328 billion in 1976 US dollars. See CIA, *Handbook of Economic Statistics 1980*, ER 80-10452, Washington, DC, 1980, pp. 27, 62.

[27] In calculating Soviet factor productivity, I have used the formula for factor inputs specified in fn. 14.

[28] Growth of factor productivity in the USSR has been affected hitherto not only by the causal forces on which I have focused, but by still others of diverse sorts—for example, increasing of labor skills, or shifts from farming to industry. However, there seems to be little prospect that favorable trends in such areas could be a source of acceleration in the future. For further discussion, see Bergson, *Soviet Technological Progress . . .*.

The drive for productivity: an exemplary worker at the Tol'yatti Automobile Plant poses in 1978 at the plant's "Honor Roll," where his photo will be posted.

—Sven Simon/Katherine Young.

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the anticipated low (0.9 percent) annual growth rate of the Soviet population. But a rapid increase in per capita consumption is also indicated by diverse related plan targets for increased output of agricultural and fishery products, for production of manufactured consumer goods, and for gains in real income (see Table 3), although these goals are statistically such as sometimes to be difficult to properly construe. As Brezhnev told the 26th Congress, output of industries in Group B (those producing consumer goods) is to increase at 4.9–5.2 percent annually. This is slightly higher than the target for Group A industries (those producing means of production) and thus reverses, if only marginally, traditional priorities in the USSR. Only once before, in the 1971–75 plan (also adopted under Brezhnev), was Group B similarly favored over Group A in a five-year plan, and in that case his priority did not survive the pressures encountered in implementing the plan.[29]

The new plan manifests essentially the same growth strategy that has been pursued in the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin. The dictator, in the interest of accelerating the expansion of investment and capital stock, and hence of output, sharply increased the share of national income invested; consumers consequently had to be subjected to the most extreme austerity. After Stalin, Soviet leaders apparently concluded that consumers must be allowed to reap appreciable material rewards for their exertions, and Brezhnev evidently felt it expedient to continue on that course.[30] The gains in consumption standards and the marked deceleration in the growth of investment volume under the last three ("Brezhnev") plans noted above were the result.

One must wonder, though, why the same economic course is still to be pursued for yet another five-year plan. The growth of output has already slowed markedly, and continued deceleration of the growth of investment can only exacerbate the mounting difficulties in reversing that output trend. The government's policy becomes understandable, however, when we consider that despite the rise in material standards in the USSR since Stalin, per capita consumption is still only at roughly 37 percent of the level in the United States.[31]

Table 3: Soviet Consumption-Related Items, Goals for 1980–85

(Average annual increase, in percent)

Agricultural output	4.8
Grain harvest	3.0–3.5[a]
Meat production, slaughter wt.	3.8
Milk production	0.9–1.3[a]
Fish, marketed output	1.9–2.3
Output of Group B industries (consumer goods)	4.9–5.2
Leather shoes output	2.2
Cloth output	3.5
Real income per capita	3.0–3.4

[a] Calculated as the yearly rate of growth of the average for the given five-year period over the average for the preceding five-year period.

SOURCES: Table 1; *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 24, Feb. 24 and 28, and Mar. 5, 1981; on grain, see also fn. 16 of the text.

Consumers, moreover, have become increasingly well educated and increasingly aware of Western living standards. As standards have risen, so too have aspirations. Lately, as the improvement in consumption has shown signs of faltering, Soviet commentators themselves have expressed concern at the adverse effects on labor incentives of limitations in the availability of goods of a quality and kind appealing to workers who have often by now met minimum needs.[32]

We need not ponder long to become aware of the pitfalls in any easy extrapolation of recent Polish experience to the USSR. But, should Brezhnev have been at all inclined finally to veer from the post-Stalin policy of speeding growth of consumption, reflection on events in Poland must have been sobering.

Reference so far has been to the 11th Five-Year Plan's goals for investment and consumption. Unfortunately, the Soviet government does not disclose its targets for the third major claimant to the USSR's national income: defense procurement. I have tacitly assumed that the volume of such outlays is projected to continue to grow at much the same tempo as realized heretofore in the Brezhnev buildup, i.e., about 4–5 percent annually, and to absorb much the same share of the GNP as it has lately—about 12–14 percent.[33]

In brief, the leadership, while continuing to devote large sums to defense, proposes to raise consumption standards at a rapid tempo. This, however, presupposes fulfillment of the plan target for national income,

[29] See *Pravda*, Feb. 24, 1981. The precise nature of the output categories in question is easily misunderstood. Reference in both cases is only to industrial output. Moreover, Group A probably includes munitions.

[30] See Abram Bergson, "Soviet Economic Perspectives: Toward a New Growth Model," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1973, reprinted as Ch. 3 in Abram Bergson, *Productivity and the Social System;* also, Abram Bergson, "Conclusion," in NATO, *The USSR in the 1980's*, Brussels, 1978.

[31] This represents the conventional geometric mean of alternative ratios for the year 1976, calculated in ruble and in dollar prices. See Imogene Edwards et al., "The US and USSR: Comparisons of GNP," in JEC, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, Vol. 1, p. 379. Even the resultant low ratio is an overstatement, for it cannot really allow for the qualitative supply deficiencies referred to earlier.

[32] T. Zaslavskaya, "Economic Behavior and Economic Development," *Ekonomika i organizatsiya promyshlennogo proizvodstva* (Novosibirsk), No. 3, 1980; and *Pravda*, Mar. 24, 1980.

[33] See the sources cited in fn. 3; and Subcommittee on Oversight, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, *CIA Estimates of Soviet Defense Spending*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980, p. 7.

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and that, as we have seen, will not exactly be easy. In place of the marked speedup that is projected, the tempo of growth of national income could well turn out to be lower than that of recent years. Under such circumstances, the leadership would face the need to review its priorities before the plan has run its course and to scale down allocations to one or more of the competing uses of the country's output. The resulting emphases could be of a novel sort.

Under Stalin, consumption was always a prime candidate for such trimming, but his successors have not felt free to treat consumers simply as a residual claimant. Brezhnev today still has good reason not to do so, although consumers could hardly be shielded fully from economic vicissitudes.

Investment could possibly be sacrificed, but under the plan, the growth of investment volume is already to fall to a notably low tempo. Any marked deceleration beyond that could easily prove shortsighted, for it would then be difficult to sustain the expansion of output at even minimal rates. With the new plan, the policy of deceleration of investment volume that has been in progress ever since Stalin died will have exhausted its possibilities.

What remains is defense. Until now, in the face of increasing economic difficulties, the leadership has persisted with its extraordinarily costly military buildup. There is reason to wonder, however, whether, as the new plan unfolds, Soviet leaders may not feel impelled to impose a degree of austerity here too.

In discussing trade-offs among different uses of national income, I have omitted reference to one other action the government might possibly consider taking in order to rescue the plan from difficulties that it can be expected to encounter—namely, to abandon the 41-hour workweek, which has been in effect in the USSR since 1960. This curtailment of leisure time would, no less than a cut in consumption, represent a blow to living standards. The leadership therefore has reason to avoid it. Indeed, in view of the likely adverse effect on labor morale, it is open to question how much might actually be gained in terms of output from any additional work time. To make matters worse, the 41-hour week is enshrined in the 1977 Constitution as a

Women shoppers jam into Moscow's Passazh department store upon getting wind of a new shipment of women's dresses.

—SIPA PRESS from BLACK STAR.

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The Gizhiga, one of several freighters, assisted by an icebreaker escort, that transported machinery, fuel, building materials, and food from Murmansk to gas industry workers on the Yamal Peninsula in the winter of 1979.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

condition ensuring the "right to rest." While there is no indication that the leadership now contemplates lengthening the workweek, such a step is perhaps not entirely to be excluded.

Conclusions

Our principal conclusion has already been indicated: the cardinal aim of the 11th Five-Year Plan—to reverse the long-term trend in the USSR toward slower economic growth—will be difficult for Brezhnev and his associates to achieve. Although recent reduced tempos of expansion of output are perhaps not beyond reach, the economy could easily slip below them, thus continuing the slowdown.

I have referred throughout to the Soviet government's new plan for 1981–85, but its program for that period as published in March also projects the overall growth of the Soviet economy for the period up to 1990. Over that time frame, national income is to increase by no less than 40 percent. Taken together with the corresponding target for 1981–85 alone, this indicates that the Soviet planners anticipate a yearly growth rate for national income in the later 1980's that may be as low as 3.1–3.5 percent, or lower than the rate projected for 1981–85.

There are good reasons for such a sober outlook. Even should the CIA's prediction of a sharp falloff in oil output be discounted, an impressive case has been made that petroleum will continue to be a significant constraint on Soviet growth through practically the entire decade. The presumption must also be that diminishing returns in resource extraction generally will become more, rather than less, pronounced as the years pass. Growth of the Soviet labor force can be expected to continue to slow in the last half of the decade. As for growth of the capital stock, stock-and-flow analysis clearly indicates a further decline in tempo, unless the growth of investment volume should accelerate.

In reflecting on the troubled state of the economy of the USSR, the Soviet leadership must sometimes wonder at its own priorities, particularly the stress on consumption that has obtained ever since Stalin died. Yet without a full reversion to Stalinism—with all that

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that implies—any serious shift back to the dictator's economic emphases would now hardly be possible. At the same time, failure to fulfill even the comparatively modest plan now in progress could make more impelling the case for finally taking an action that the leadership has evidently resisted so far: to initiate a radical reform of the planning mechanism. Uncertain as the results of such a reform might be, some improvement in performance over that of centralized planning should be possible. Difficulties in adjusting to a basically new scheme, however, could entail costs that the government can now ill afford.

Just how the Soviet rulers view the prospects for their economy in the years ahead must be conjectural. If they are at all realistic, they cannot be very optimistic about fulfilling even the moderate goals that have been established in the new plan. Yet, in contemplating Soviet economic prospects, the leadership is able to derive some comfort from the fact that Western competitors of the USSR are also experiencing economic difficulties, and not only regarding growth. In his address to the 26th Congress, Brezhnev not surprisingly dwells at some length on the "further sharpening of the general crisis of capitalism" of recent years.[34]

The leadership still seeks to base its legitimacy, however, on an ideology alleging the economic superiority—over its older Western rival—of a social system originating in a revolution launched more than six decades ago. For even the more cynically inclined of Soviet rulers, it must be disquieting to recognize that that system, whose creation imposed untold human and material costs on the Russian people, can at best generate only modest growth and provide consumers with goods and services not only notably meager quantitatively but also pervasively deficient qualitatively.

The disquiet could be the greater when the leaders recall that 1980 was to have been the terminal year of a party program promulgated dramatically two decades ago with the purpose of completing construction of the "material-technical basis" for communism.[35] That program's author, the late N. S. Khrushchev, however, has since been declared "harebrained." His more cautious successors now affirm that "the current decade is *a new major stage* in the creation of the material-technical basis for communism" and call for revision of the 20-year-old party program.[36] Clearly, the egalitarian utopia that is alluded to remains far away. Meantime, promises are made to increase the minimum wage, but marked income differentials persist, and elite groups in Soviet society enjoy an imposing array of privileges.[37]

Troublesome as such incongruities may be, the Soviet social system has indisputably functioned well in a way scarcely anticipated in the official ideology, that is, in the building of military power. This is doubtless reassuring to the Soviet leadership, but it remains to be seen to what extent the USSR can exploit its military power as a surrogate for the economic superiority which supposedly was to assure the ultimate victory of Soviet socialism over its Western rival. Meanwhile, the government's ability to sustain its military buildup becomes increasingly problematic in the face of mounting economic stringencies.

[34] *Pravda*, Feb. 24, 1981.

[35] Ibid., Nov. 2, 1961.

[36] Ibid., Mar. 5, 1981. Emphasis added. For the 26th Congress resolution proposing preparation of a new program, see *Pravda*, Feb. 27, 1981.

[37] On elite privileges, see Mervyn Matthews, *Privilege in the Soviet Union*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1978.

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Moscow and the Western Alliance

By Pierre Hassner

The assessment of the international situation that Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), conveyed to the delegates at the 26th Party Congress on February 23, 1981, differed markedly from that which he had rendered to the 25th Party Congress on February 24, 1976.[1] At the previous congress, he had stressed that the main characteristics of the time were a favorable change in the correlation of forces and a consequent détente with the developing capitalist states, and he had commented with almost a note of surprise, as Adam Ulam has remarked, at the extent to which "the progress of the socialist forces is the principal axis of the world development." [2] The tone of his observations at the recent gathering had none of this triumphant quality. He spoke of the period since the 25th Party Congress as "difficult and stormy," and he acknowledged that "at the beginning of the 1980's, clouds have started to darken the international horizon." Indeed, with almost pained surprise—even more clearly expressed in a recent authoritative article by Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and in the commentary of journalists like V. Kobysh and A. Bovin[3]—he contrasted the promising outlook of the late 1970's with the problems and challenges of the 1980's.

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In Brezhnev's eyes, the main achievement of the party in the period between the two congresses was the preservation of peace. Whereas his 1976 report had highlighted the decisive contribution of the CPSU to the progress of the "world revolutionary process," his 1981 one contained no references to the "world revolutionary process" and de-emphasized anti-imperialist struggle and the USSR's role in it. With respect to the Third World specifically, it stressed cooperation with liberated countries. The international section of the 1981 document, furthermore, called for "consolidating peace, deepening détente, ending the arms race." In fact, the primary emphasis of this section was on Brezhnev's peace proposals. These included a Soviet-American summit, a moratorium on the introduction of new theater nuclear weapons into Europe, and the creation of zones of peace, especially in the Indian Ocean.

This attention to the peace issue was by no means new in itself. In one sense, for example, Brezhnev's peace proposals in 1981 merely represented a continuation of the peace program he had launched at the 24th Party Congress in 1971 and expanded upon in 1976.

Yet the 1981 report had a thrust that diverged from the thrust of the two earlier ones. In 1971, Brezhnev talked about peace in relatively militant terms.[4] He referred to "the Soviet Union's struggle for peace and the security of the peoples" in the context of "rebuffing the imperialist policy of aggression," and he devoted a whole section to "the struggle of the peoples against

[1] See *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 25, 1976, and *New Times* (Moscow), No. 9, March 1981, for the two reports.

[2] Adam Ulam, "Smug Russians—Rationalizing the Past, Savoring the Future," *The New Republic* (Washington, DC), Mar. 27, 1976.

[3] A. Gromyko, "Leninist Foreign Policy in the Modern World," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 1, January 1981; V. Kobysh and A. Bovin, "Preview of World 'Troubles' in the Eighties," *Literaturnaya gazeta* (Moscow), Jan. 1, 1981, pp. 14–15.

[4] See *Pravda*, Mar. 31, 1971.

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imperialism." In 1981, in contrast, Brezhnev gave the peace issue undisputed priority. Moreover, the international portions of his report had a notably mild tone, even though he charged that the "imperialist enemy" had grown more aggressive.

This combination of characteristics of the peace proposals suggests that they were meant to check unfavorable trends rather than to promote a long-range design. Has the peace offensive, then, turned defensive? Is the USSR now reacting to an unfavorable change (or the threat of an unfavorable change) in the correlation of forces, rather than, as in the previous era of détente, attempting to build upon, and at the same time to encourage, a favorable one?

The answer to this question hinges on the answers to two sets of other questions. First, is the distinction between offensive and defensive adequate for analyzing Soviet foreign policy? Or should one link this distinction to a further one—namely, that between short-range and long-range policy? In such a context, the critical issue would be a somewhat more complex one. Should one interpret the present phase of Soviet policy as tactically defensive and strategically offensive, or vice versa? In particular, is there any evidence to sustain the earlier notion of many in the West that the USSR would be on the offensive in the short run (to capitalize on an alleged "window of opportunity" resulting from a strategic advantage in the first half of the 1980's) but on the defensive in the longer run?

Second, toward whom is the current "peace offensive" directed? Is it aimed primarily at the United States? Should it therefore be seen as a success for the Reagan administration's efforts to put the Soviet Union on the defensive by a show of firmness? Or is its target the West Europeans (and, more broadly, all of the United States' actual or potential allies, including the Japanese and Chinese)? Should it thus be viewed as an attempt to exploit the differences of the West Europeans with the Reagan administration over arms control and détente? In this case, should it be looked at as part of a more general effort to isolate or encircle the United States, or as a tactical move designed to influence the Reagan administration to resume the bilateral dialogue between the superpowers, which would remain the ultimate priority of the USSR? Or has Moscow simply given up on the United States and decided to follow a fundamentally regional strategy, based on a triangular relationship among Western Europe, the Persian Gulf, and the USSR, in which the Soviet Union's central position and its superior military power would enable it to play the dominant role and thereby to extract the economic advantages which have eluded it in its relationship with the United States?

In the past, it is fair to say, the essence of Soviet policy has been to avoid an either-or, and certainly a once-and-for-all, answer to the question of priorities, whether with respect to the defensive-offensive dilemma or with respect to the choice of interlocutors. It has consistently, and more and more successfully under Leonid Brezhnev, tried to have its cake and eat it too. For example, the USSR has sought to retain control of Eastern Europe while increasing its influence in Western Europe, and it has endeavored to conduct a bilateral dialogue with the United States and rival ones with West European states, particularly France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). More generally, Moscow has combined growing military power and territorial expansion at the expense of the West with an arms control dialogue and economic cooperation with the West from which it has tried to get, and to some extent obtained, important benefits.

Recently, however, the USSR has seemed to encounter increasing difficulty in pursuing apparently contradictory goals, especially in regard to the United States and Eastern Europe. Does this situation imply that the time of a more drastic or painful choice between the offensive and retrenchment, between economic cooperation and military superiority, or between the United States and Western Europe has come for Moscow? Or can Soviet leaders continue to combine intimidation and seduction in the case of Western Europe even as events impose more unpleasant choices on them in the cases of the United States or Eastern Europe? Or, finally, has the previous advantage of not having to choose, and the freedom of action which it entailed, tended to be transformed into an inability to choose, and hence paralysis across the board?

It is to these various issues that the present article is addressed. While some of them cannot be resolved definitively, their exploration will at least serve to clarify them and thereby enhance understanding.

Beyond Offensive and Defensive

As a starting point for examining the current phase of Soviet foreign policy, it is useful to try to establish a framework for assessing it. At any given moment, the question of whether Soviet foreign policy is offensive or defensive, status-quo-oriented or expansionist, is meaningless if posed in general terms. Soviet actions and reactions must always be seen as both offensive and defensive. Nikita Khrushchev's favorite term, "the dynamic status quo," best captures the dialectical ambiguity present in all Soviet concepts like "peaceful coexistence" or the "correlation of forces." These con-

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CPSU General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev and Helmut Schmidt seen at the West German Chancellor's June 30, 1980, arrival in Moscow.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

cepts are all more dynamic and conflictual than their Western counterparts, such as "détente" and "the balance of power." Like the Soviet tradition itself (whether through its Russian or Marxist side), they blur the distinction between offensive and defensive, by involving a search for security which is by its very nature expansionist, a feeling of weakness which by its very nature leads to a demonstration of strength, a stress on maintaining the control of the empire which by its very nature encourages an attempt to establish preventive control over the external environment.

By the same token, Soviet moves like the building of the Berlin wall and the invasion of Czechoslovakia have been defensive in the sense that they have essentially been reactions to counter a dangerous trend and have initally had a negative impact on relations with the West, but they have ultimately proved beneficial to the USSR by showing its resolve and the failure of the West to alter that resolve or to respond to it in any effective way. As Willy Brandt has written, it was the Western failure to do anything about the Berlin wall that started him on the path of "little steps" that resulted in the German-Soviet dialogue and Bonn's recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR).[5] Similarly, it was after the invasion of Czechoslovakia that the Soviet campaign for a European security conference met with a favorable Western response and that a détente based on the status quo began in earnest. In both cases, a defensive move brought about offensive consequences; at a later stage, these, in turn, had, and continue to have, a destabilizing impact on the very empire they had successfully protected in the short run.

Yet the distinction between offensive and defensive policy can assume operational significance if it is employed to distinguish Soviet priorities during various phases and concerning particular issues. Precisely because the USSR's policy is never either purely status-quo-oriented or purely voluntaristic (its aim being more to encourage and exploit favorable trends, such as contradictions in the capitalist world, and to discourage and contain unfavorable ones, such as contradictions within Moscow's own empire), Soviet leaders face real dilemmas. These dilemmas concern process and control—i.e., the encouragement of processes which are favorable to the Soviet Union because they enhance its influence or weaken the West, and the control and, if necessary, the containment of these processes lest they

[5] W. Brandt, *Begegnungen und Einsichten: Die Jahre 1960–1975* (Encounters and Insights: The Years 1960–1975), Hamburg, Hoffman und Campe, 1976, p. 17.

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get out of hand and become dangerous, either by provoking a Western counteraction or having a contagious effect on the Soviet empire itself. Like other powers, the USSR finds itself operating in a world with increasing opportunities for manipulating people, forces, and events but decreasing ways of controlling them.

Up to now, to be sure, Moscow has by and large chosen to gamble on a long-range process, accompanied by attempts to exert patient and sometimes indirect influence, with respect to the international environment and has preferred direct and short-range control in the case of its own empire. There is an element of inevitability about this contrast. In light of the nature of its power and the range of its instruments, the Soviet Union is almost bound to insist on controlling its own empire and on influencing its larger environment.

Nevertheless, these permanent elements should not obscure the existence of distinct periods in Soviet policy, with differing emphases in regard to retrenchment and consolidation, on the one hand, and a dynamic thrust toward the outside world, on the other. Indeed, various combinations of the two have emerged over time. Moreover, the precise relationships among the military, diplomatic, and economic components of Soviet policy have altered from period to period. Such factors render it more meaningful, even if more complex, to talk about strategy and tactics, long-term and short-term phases, in Soviet policy.

The Background

In approaching recent Soviet policy within this analytic framework, it is essential at the outset to see the Brezhnev era in the USSR in historical context. Broadly speaking, Iosif Stalin favored the absolute primacy of control at home and abroad. One sensed in Nikita Khrushchev a confidence in dynamic processes which led him to over-extension abroad and over-relaxation at home, to "premature globalism" (to use Zbigniew Brzezinski's term[6]) followed by "capitulationism" (as the Chinese described it). Brezhnev and his colleagues initially seemed to retrench on the Stalinist foundations of territorial control of the home base (what Richard Lowenthal called "socialism in one empire"[7]), but they were meanwhile preparing the power instruments, which Khrushchev had lacked, of a more realistic globalism. Brezhnev, in a sense, represents a synthesis of Khruschchev's aims and Stalin's means. He wishes to increase the power of the Soviet Union abroad and to enhance the viability of Communist societies at home; at the same time, he emphasizes control and cohesion and adequate military force.

The Brezhnev offensive, as it was prepared during the 1960's and unfolded after about 1969, had military, diplomatic, and economic dimensions. The most interesting and problematic question about it has concerned the linkages among these dimensions and the respective priorities that they have enjoyed.

Moscow seems to have taken two major decisions in the second half of the 1960's. First, it opted to "go global" militarily by building up the Soviet navy and Soviet conventional forces and, more generally, the Warsaw Pact's capability to project military power abroad. Second, it chose (after the failure of the half-hearted attempts at domestic economic reforms in 1965) to assign foreign trade and technological inputs from the West a more central role in efforts to overcome the economic difficulties of the empire.

These decisions, probably reached almost simultaneously and in any event implemented actively in the early 1970's, particularly in the peace programs of the 24th and 25th party congresses, came to symbolize two major options of Soviet foreign policy. One involved cooperation with the West and "making détente irreversible." The other entailed the projection of military force and helping "the world revolutionary process" along.

The third dimension, the political-diplomatic one, was in a sense designed to serve the other two. Nonetheless, it also predated them in certain ways, for it was a continuation of the classic Soviet program for European security, involving the recognition of the GDR and the results of World War II, the convening of a European security conference, the creation of nuclear-free zones, and the banning of weapons which could give the West an advantage.

While the USSR pursued the offensive in all three spheres, changes in the relative priorities that it attached to the three do seem to have occurred over the years. Particularly between 1974–75 and 1980, Moscow's hopes for control through military force increased, and its hopes for influence through economic cooperation and political détente tended to diminish (except to some extent with regard to Western Europe).

The explanation for the changes lay both in developments in the West and in the experiences—both positive and negative—of the USSR. As to the economic side, Soviet expectations of large-scale interaction with the United States were soon disappointed by the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 US trade act that limited the potential of the economic cooperation

[6] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "How the Cold War Was Played," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), October 1972, p. 190.

[7] See his "A Sparrow in the Cage," *Problems of Communism*, (Washington, DC), November-December 1968, pp. 2–28.

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agreement worked out between the Nixon administration and Moscow. This amendment would have made US credit policy subject to annual review of Soviet policy on emigration. Subsequent years simply confirmed the disappointment. The culmination of Soviet disillusionment came with the American grain embargo in the wake of the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan.

Furthermore, Soviet leaders appear to have revised their thinking somewhat about the general merits of foreign economic ties. To be sure, the USSR still showed itself eager for industrial cooperation and barter deals with whatever partner was available, particularly when Moscow could use its political and military weight in the bargain, as in the cases of such diverse partners as the FRG and Libya. But the experiences of the East European countries, particularly Poland, exposed the dangers of foreign indebtedness and the dubious utility of consumerism-plus-foreign-trade as a substitute for economic reform. In light of the political riskiness of economic reform, increased discipline and austerity had much to recommend them.

Finally, the energy crisis and the more general economic one in the West probably appeared to Moscow to be signs of weakness and decline of the West and convinced Soviet leaders that they confronted new opportunities for improving the USSR's bargaining position vis-à-vis the West. At the same time, Moscow in all likelihood saw these crises as dangerous to the USSR, in terms of their indirect consequences, and as good reason to try to insulate the Soviet economy as much as possible from the outside world.

In the military realm, the prevalent Soviet perception of the West in the 1970's was probably one of decline, especially in American unity and will. As early as 1969, a confidential projection for the 1970's of the Soviet Institute of World Economy and International Relations—quoted by an East European specialist who was privileged to see it—stressed the cultural and sociopsychological crisis of the West, and it predicted that this crisis would eventually become particularly strong in Germany and create important dissensions between the Federal Republic and the United States.[8] But it was, of course, the combination of Watergate, the US withdrawal from Vietnam, and the Angolan affair—both Kissinger's engagement and the US Congress's refusal to back him up—that contributed most to the Soviet belief, expressed in triumphant tones at the 25th Congress, in a decisive change in the world correlation of forces and, of more practical moment, to the lower estimate of the risks of American military intervention in the Third World or reaction to any Soviet moves there.

This perception converged with two factors of relevance on the Soviet side. The first was the series of setbacks the USSR suffered in the Third World at the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's. These included the fall of some friendly dictators and the change in orientation of others, culminating in Anwar Sadat's expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt. The second was the deployment—after concerted development efforts—of major new capabilities for power projection, especially for airlift, plus the innovation of extensive use of Cuban and East European military proxies.

These considerations, together, pushed Moscow toward heavier reliance on military control. As a result, the USSR between 1975 and 1978 sought much less to influence the leaders of developing countries with respect to their socioeconomic orientations and much more to control their regimes by establishing as heavy and structural a presence as possible in their countries—a presence which, Moscow hoped, would become irreversible. Among the specific means were revival or creation of local Communist parties; the conclusion of treaties of friendship and cooperation and, on the basis of these treaties, the penetration and control of the administrations, particularly the police—often through Cuban or East European proxies—and finally the use of the Soviet army directly to help consolidate the regimes or to change their rulers if these rulers were not sufficiently under control.[9]

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, of course, represented the culmination of this trend toward increased emphasis on military control. That invasion, it is true, can be seen as qualitatively different from earlier Soviet activities such as the interventions in Angola in 1975–76 and Ethiopia in 1977–78. In view of Afghanistan's contiguity to the USSR, its incorporation at least since 1978, if not before, in the Soviet sphere of influence, and the potential impact of regional developments on the USSR's Muslim republics, the invasion may well have been perceived as defensive in Moscow. Nevertheless, the direct and massive employment of Soviet troops, without even accompanying proxies, outside the borders of the "socialist community" proper was an unprecedented move. Moreover, not only was the West bound to regard it as offensive, but Soviet leaders also appear to have perceived a global significance in it. In their eyes, the poor prospects of détente—and particularly of SALT—and the unlikelihood of a dangerous American reaction justified a move which, while it had primarily local aims, would demonstrate the USSR's

[8] Oral communication from Professor A. Snejdarek.

[9] For two articles which document this evolution, see A. Haselkorn, "The Soviet Collective Security System," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Spring 1975, and F. Fukuyama, "A New Soviet Policy for the Third World," *Commentary* (New York, NY), October 1979.

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new military power and new unwillingness to sacrifice local advantages or run local risks for the sake of a global relationship with the United States which was deteriorating anyway.[10]

Moscow underscored this global aspect of the invasion by the way in which it defended its action. While it had justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 in terms of a doctrine of the "socialist community" defined in geographically restricted terms, it justified the Afghanistan affair in global terms. It indicated unmistakably that the Warsaw Pact had an expanding role in the defense of socialist conquests everywhere, and it employed the slogan "We shall never permit another Chile." [11] Thus, it gave credence to arguments in the West that the Brezhnev doctrine has an expansionist or dynamic character.[12]

The Current Period

The real issue today is whether the outward thrust evident since the 1960's and the mix of efforts to control and influence that emerged in the last half of the 1970's still prevail in Soviet foreign policy. If not, what is the nature of the shifts that have occurred?

That the months since the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan have witnessed the dawning of a new period in Soviet policy seems clear. Some of the changes that have taken place have their roots in developments during 1978 and 1979, prior to Afghanistan. Others have resulted from the policies of the Reagan administration. Still others reflect the Damocles sword of the Polish crisis.

[10] See Robert Legvold, "Containment Without Confrontation," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Fall 1980, p. 81.

[11] See *Pravda*, Jan. 13, 1980; *New Times*, Jan. 3, 1980; and Peer Lange, "Afghanistan—World Politics Without Sensitivity," *Aussenpolitik* (Hamburg), No. 1, 1981, pp. 81–84.

[12] This point was made forcefully by Fred Iklé, "Normalization in Afghanistan," *The Washington Post*. Jan. 2, 1980.

Affirmation of the right of intervention everywhere to protect the revolutionary process or socialist conquests does not, of course, mean that the USSR will exercise this right everywhere. The important issue concerns the emergence between the Soviet sphere proper, over which Moscow exerts direct and rigid control, and areas of the Third World marked by fluidity of Soviet gains and losses (as, for example, India and Egypt), of an intermediate sphere. This intermediate sphere—more or less contiguous to the Soviet bloc but not necessarily so, given Moscow's new capabilities for power projection—is one in which political and military commitment and control, while less direct and more reversible than they are in Eastern Europe, still involve a basic decision about using military force to preserve a regime considered to be on the way to socialism. South Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, and Libya (not to speak of Vietnam and Laos, which are full members of the "socialist community") appear to be part of this "Soviet international security system," whose limits Moscow has obviously been trying to expand and the Reagan administration, no less obviously is now trying to roll back.

Soviet military forces enter Kabul, Afghanistan, in December 1979.

—SYGMA.

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The beginnings of an American counteroffensive to the Soviet offensive date from much earlier than the advent of the Reagan administration—indeed, at least from the last half of the Carter presidency. US reactions both to the second invasion of Shaba by former Katangese gendarmes armed and trained by the USSR, the GDR, and Cuba, and to the Soviet role in Ethiopia; the intensification of American relations with China; and the US search for a renewed presence in the Persian Gulf, initiated before but accelerated after the fall of the Shah of Iran and manifested most concretely in the enunciation of the Carter doctrine for the area—all fit into such a mold.

At about the same time, the West launched an effort to redress the "Eurostrategic" balance. Discussions of this subject got under way with FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in November 1977 and went on throughout 1978; the decision to deploy in Western Europe a number of Pershing II and cruise missiles started to take shape in the spring of 1979.

The Reagan administration's rearmament program, aimed at depriving the USSR of a "parity plus" advantage and perhaps recovering this advantage for the United States but at any rate restoring the strategic intercontinental balance, added a new element to the equation. It suggested that the military buildup of the Brezhnev years might be producing the same outcome that Khrushchev's missile bluff had: an American political reawakening that would bring about an expanded military effort.

A further complication arose with the onset of the ferment in Poland in the summer of 1980. The flowering of an independent workers' movement and the pressure for renewal of the party there have confronted Moscow with the most ominous challenge within the Soviet empire that it has ever faced. Both intervening and not intervening seem to carry even greater dangers than those that existed in Hungary in 1956 or in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

As far as the Western reaction with regard to long-range theater nuclear forces is concerned, the USSR was slow to respond to the drift of events. In fact, Soviet leaders did not appear to take it seriously until the fall of 1979, when Brezhnev proposed negotiations aimed at heading off the introduction of new medium-range missiles into the European theater.[13] Subsequently, the peace offensive intensified and gained top priority in Soviet policy. Brezhnev's proposals at the 26th Party Congress represented one further step in the campaign.

The Soviet motivations behind this peace campaign have been fairly obvious. In 1980, Moscow finally lost hope for SALT II, and in 1981, it probably began to worry greatly about the Reagan rearmament program and about the strains which an intensified arms race might impose on an already troubled and over-militarized Soviet economy.[14] All three elements of the peace program that Brezhnev articulated at the 26th Party Congress—a Soviet-American summit, a moratorium on the deployment of new missiles in the European theater, and the creation of zones of peace, particularly in the Indian Ocean—had a common thread in such a context. They would each help protect a favorable shift in the correlation of forces against an ongoing American effort to redress the balance. In these general areas, then, the peace campaign can be seen as part of a long-run Soviet offensive but also, with greater certainty, as part of a defense against a Western counteroffensive, and hence as designed essentially to consolidate gains made.

The implications of the peace campaign are fuzzier with regard to Soviet-American competition in the Third World. Moscow certainly did maintain a more offensive posture toward at least Central and South America, involving, it seems, increased support for armed struggle, during the transition between the Carter and Reagan administrations. This culminated with the failed general offensive of the revolutionaries in El Salvador in January 1981. Perhaps by giving a green light (if it did so) the USSR wanted to record an important gain before the Reagan inauguration, thereby intimidating the new administration and preempting it from reacting. In this case, the initiative not only was unsuccessful but backfired. Alternatively, Soviet leaders may have welcomed the creation of a new focus of conflict to deflect American attention and involvement from Afghanistan and Poland and to give them an alibi—after or before the fact—for their actions there. In such a case, the reaction of the Reagan administration in words and deeds must have been highly pleasing to Moscow.

Whatever the calculation, however, Moscow subsequently remained strikingly discreet about El Salvador. Despite earlier affirmations after Afghanistan of a Soviet right to intervene anywhere to protect the revolutionary process or the conquests of socialism, speakers at the 26th CPSU Congress hardly mentioned the Salvadoran revolution, and, in contrast with the 25th Party Congress, no representative of the El Salvador Communist Party appeared on the rostrum. Indeed, the May Day

[13] See his speech of Oct. 6, 1979, in *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), Oct. 7, 1979.

[14] This interpretation is common to some American hawks and to some European doves. For the latter, see in particular G. Chiesa, "After the 26th Congress. The Current Delicate Uncertainty [with respect to] the USSR and the Socialist World," *Rinascita* (Rome), Apr. 24, 1981, pp. 19–20.

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

Signs of the antinuclear movement in Western Europe, clockwise from below: a French Communist Party rally in December 1979 says "No to American Missiles in Europe"; a London demonstration in October 1980; West German women evoke the irreparable damage of nuclear war at a demonstration in Bonn, on April 7, 1981, during a ministerial-level meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.

—Gamma/Liaison, Photoreporters, and Sven Simon/Katherine Young.

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slogans issued after the congress even omitted Nicaragua from the list of revolutionary countries saluted.[15]

Only with respect to the preservation of the Castro regime in Cuba did Soviet authorities evince any sort of commitment in Latin America. Here they were most explicit. They stressed on every possible occasion that Cuba is an integral and essential part of the "socialist community." At the Czechoslovakian Party Congress in April 1981, Brezhnev went so far as to almost directly link Soviet action toward Poland with US reaction toward Cuba.[16]

Such developments have caused some analysts to conclude that Soviet policy has entered a phase of digestion and consolidation, and that a period in world politics has begun in which each superpower is concerned above all with putting its own house in order.[17] But it can be argued, more convincingly to this author, that while there has indeed been an adjustment in that direction in Soviet policy, this has more to do with rhetoric and short-term tactics than with a strategic decision that would shape Soviet policy for the coming years.

Without accepting the maximalist view of the Soviet role everywhere, for example, one can point to various indications of Soviet activism in the Third World more recent than the failed offensive in El Salvador during the American political transition. These include the verified presence of Soviets and East Germans in Chad as advisers to Mu'ammar Qadhafi's Libyan forces that intervened in the internal strife there; the plausible Soviet involvement, or at least acquiescence, in the highjacking of a Pakistani airliner in March by political foes of the government of Gen. Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq; the Yugoslav government's mention of the role of "Cominformists," a code word for pro-Soviets, in the recent disturbances among Albanians in Kosovo (evidently the Greek government concurs with this assessment of the orientations of some of the participants);[18] the instant Soviet showing of the flag off the coast of Mozambique in February after South Africa attacked facilities of the African National Congress in Maputo; and Moscow's apparent support of Syria's emplacement of missiles in Lebanon and Damascus's refusal to remove them. Such evidence would tend to indicate that the USSR has by no means abandoned a militant role in the Third World, and it suggests that while the Reagan administration's policies may make Soviet leaders more cautious where direct confrontation might ensue or the position of vulnerable allies is at stake, these policies may afford the USSR new opportunities which it may be as eager as ever to exploit.

But the change in American reactions to Soviet activism in the Third World in recent months does seem to have induced an alteration in the style of Soviet enterprises there. During the last half of the 1970's, when interdependence and the decline in the utility of military forces were fashionable notions in the West, the Soviet Union, as the present writer emphasized at the time, could reap considerable benefits from "the importance of being old-fashioned"—i.e., from being unsophisticated enough not to have heard the news that expansion and control through military means were no longer "in."[19] Now that the Reagan administration appears bent on capturing the title for such old-fashioned unsophistication, the USSR seems to see an advantage to stressing diplomacy and the search for influence. Certainly, this is what it is doing both in the Persian Gulf, where its proposal for a zone of peace has encountered a more favorable reception than the American effort to establish a military presence on the ground, and in the Arab world, where the absence of US attention to the peace process in the Arab-Israeli conflict has afforded the USSR an opening upon which to capitalize. The succession of visits to Moscow by the foreign minister of Kuwait, Col. Qadhafi of Libya, and King Hussein of Jordan underscore this new emphasis.

At the same time, the Soviet Union possesses painfully inadequate resources, whether financial or cultural, to exert influence in the Third World in general. In its handling of nationalist or pacifist movements and of ambitious leaders, the USSR has often demonstrated more psychological and diplomatic skill than the United States, but American leverage and penetration have invariably proved superior. As a consequence, any progress that Moscow makes toward enhancing its influence will probably be indirect, the result either of the failure of US attempts to impose rigid alignments or of indigenous conflicts.

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[15] See Elizabeth Teague, "May Day Slogans Highlight Foreign and Domestic Concerns," *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), No. 161/81, Apr. 15, 1981.

[16] In the middle of the passage on the socialist community's support for Poland, there appears this sentence: "The glorious Republic of Cuba, an inseparable part of the community of socialist states, is fulfulling the tasks of its development under difficult external conditions. The Soviet Union formally and invariably supports and will continue to support the fraternal Cuban people." See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–SOV*), Apr. 7, 1981, p. F/3.

However, geopolitical realities, both regional and global, do appear to have an important impact on Soviet thinking concerning the "socialist community." It is highly revealing, for example, that Brezhnev's report to the 26th Party Congress emphasized a concept of the "socialist community" that was distinguished by its closed character. The report referred to Yugoslavia, North Korea, and China as "socialist states" but not as members of the "community."

[17] See, for instance, Annie Kriegel, "From Détente to Cold War," *Le Figaro* (Paris), Nov. 17, 1980.

[18] See C. L. Sulzberger, "New Balkan Questions," *International Herald Tribune*, Apr. 22, 1981.

[19] See my "Vulnerabilities and Strengths of the Soviet Union in a Changing International Environment," *Soviet Union* (Pittsburgh, PA), Vol. 4, No. 1, 1977.

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It is quite likely, then, that for a period the Soviet posture in the Third World will be rather low-key, with Moscow avoiding military confrontation where it could encounter American or nationalist resistance. But the USSR will not in all probability abandon hope of recovering the initiative at a later date.

To be sure, opportunities in places like Pakistan or Iran could become tempting enough to push the USSR toward an earlier return to an expansionist line than it seems to envisage. Two other considerations reinforce this possibility. First, Soviet leaders may now see a "window of opportunity," in conventional military and regional terms, upon which they could decide to capitalize before the building-up of US conventional military power or the forging of American-led regional or global coalitions makes it impossible or too dangerous to do so. Second, there have already been signs that a strategy with a stronger outward thrust has its proponents in Moscow, although they still seem to be in the minority, if the 26th Party Congress is a reliable guide.[20]

For the time being, however, the most enticing opportunities for Soviet influence lie in Europe rather than the Third World. The NATO decision to deploy medium-range theater nuclear forces constitutes one of the two main immediate dangers (the other is the situation in Poland) that preoccupy Soviet leaders at the moment. At the same time, the USSR, because its impact on Western Europe has been steadily on the rise, stands a good chance of blocking this plan. Such a calculation clearly underpins Soviet commentaries which stress the anarchical, unpredictable, and dangerous state of affairs in the Third World but also emphasize the progress of peace and détente in Europe.[21] The real question for Soviet policymakers, then, is whether the exploitation of the openings in Europe necessitates restraint and, possibly, sacrifices in other areas or whether the use of force in the Third World (or Eastern Europe) and tension with the United States may in fact improve Moscow's leverage on the West Europeans.

Western Europe: Pawn or Pivot?

Because of the existing opportunities, the prime target of the Soviet peace campaign and of Brezhnev's proposals at the 26th Party Congress would appear to be Western Europe. In the post-Afghanistan world, indeed, Western Europe seems to have gotten more central than ever to Soviet foreign policy. For this reason, it is desirable to devote some detailed attention to Moscow's recent approach to this region.

Even though Western Europe has acquired a highly central role in Soviet foreign policy today, the precise nature of the role itself has become more ambiguous. The actual choices that Moscow faces in its West European policy may be more dependent than before on the dangers and opportunities it encounters elsewhere.

Of course, the USSR has always confronted basic dilemmas, as well as tried to evade these, in dealing with Western Europe. Perhaps the oldest and most fundamental of these has been the Stalinist one of the trade-off between the tightness of control in Eastern Europe and the extent of influence in Western Europe. The Polish crisis has brought it back in recent months in a most acute form. A second dilemma has involved whether to seduce Germany or encircle it, to effect a bilateral rapprochement with it or to seek to isolate it. Détente and *Ostpolitik* have to a large degree softened or overcome this one, but it might well reemerge if events in Eastern and Western Europe produce a new polarization. The final dilemma has concerned whether to play the West European countries against the United States, in the hope of dominating the entire continent, or the United States against the West Europeans, in the hope of maintaining a bipolar and bilateral status quo.

In none of these cases, however, have Soviet leaders ever opted to pursue one course to the total exclusion of the other. For instance, they have always tried to "have" their East European control and to "eat" their West European influence too, even though in Stalin's years there was no question of running any risk with regard to the former for the sake of the latter. Prior to 1969, when Moscow was attempting to isolate West Germany, it still left the door open to a bilateral understanding down the road once the dangers of isolation had sunk into the consciousness of the West Germans. In more recent years, even as Soviet leaders have seemed to accept Germany's division and the Federal Republic's membership in NATO and the Common Market, they have sought, through a mixture of implicit sticks and carrots, to make use of the FRG's special position to influence the policies of these organizations in ways the USSR has deemed desirable. Even when, as under Khrushchev or at the time of the Moscow summit of 1972 between Brezhnev and US President Richard M. Nixon, the Soviet Union has seemed to attach clear priority to the superpower relationship with the United States, Europe has never ceased to be viewed as at the very least an essential component (whether as a hostage or as a stake) of this relationship. This has been especially evident in the military realm. Soviet armament programs, strategic doctrines (both nuclear and conventional), and

[20] V. Kobysh seemed to be sympathetic to this position in the debate with A. Bovin cited in fn. 3.

[21] This appeared to be the position of A. Bovin in the debate cited in fn. 3.

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arms-control policy have always given Europe a higher priority than their American counterparts, which have always had a bilateral bias. The Soviet emphasis on medium-range bombers and missiles provides ample testimony to this fact.[22]

Over the years, Western observers have propounded or attributed to the USSR four formulas for general relations between the two superpowers and the two halves of Europe. These are (1) acceptance of the status quo based on partition, (2) mutual disengagement of the two superpowers, (3) incorporation of Western Europe (or at least West Germany) into the Soviet sphere, and (4) abandonment of Eastern Europe and the acceptance of its incorporation (or at least that of East Germany) into the Western sphere.

But all of these have been too simple to account for Soviet policy. Moscow has always followed a "status quo plus" approach. On the one hand, it has kept maintenance of its position in Eastern Europe as its top priority; on the other hand, it has supplemented this concern with a combination of (2) and (3). That is, it has endeavored to detach Western Europe from the United States and align it with the Soviet bloc, at least to the degree of rendering its ties with the United States more precarious and marginal and its ties with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe more central and irreversible.

Such, as John Van Oudenaren has shown, has been the essence of the USSR's policy on European security since the 1960's.[23] Moscow does not ask, as in earlier periods, for the severing of links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, the neutralization of West Germany, or the dissolution of NATO and the departure of American troops from the European continent. But it does seek, through a mixture of pressure and diplomacy, a West Berlin as separated from the Federal Republic and as tied to the GDR, a Federal Republic with as limited a relationship to the West and with as close links to the East, and a Western Europe as autonomous from the United States and as tied to the Soviet bloc as is possible without provoking instability in Eastern Europe (whether through too strong intra-German links, too heavy a financial dependence of East European states on Western credits, or, above, all, uncontrolled domestic social and ideological evolution).

The preferred Soviet method of achieving such goals has been détente in conditions of clear Soviet superiority. Without détente, Soviet superiority or military pressure can encourage Atlantic unity or, if West Europeans perceive the Atlantic connection as unreliable or dangerous, drive the West European countries toward unity and an autonomous defense. Without Soviet superiority, détente can promote instability in Eastern Europe by raising East European expectations excessively and by increasing West European influence in the area. It is only the two together which maximize Soviet interests. That Moscow understands this point is demonstrated plainly by its campaign for "military détente" and in the notions that it has broached from time to time for economic cooperation between the USSR and Western Europe based on a Soviet guarantee of the security of Western Europe's energy supplies.

Within this basic framework, however, shifts of emphasis and interpretation have taken place over time. Moreover, the three major developments repeatedly mentioned in the preceding discussion—namely, the invasion of Afghanistan, the evolution of US policy and West European reactions, and the Polish crisis—seem to be forcing the USSR toward yet another of these periodic reassessments, only perhaps of a more radical nature than has been usual.

During the initial period after Khrushchev's fall, 1964-68, Moscow was unmistakably in search of influence in Western Europe—with the Karlovy Vary conference of European Communist parties in April 1967, its abortive attempt to revive the peace movement, and its campaign for an end to NATO by 1969—but pursued a relatively passive course in Eastern Europe. In the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet leaders assigned top priority to integration and consolidation in Eastern Europe plus the peace offensive and the campaign for European security, i.e., to détente based on the status quo. After 1975, the feeling of global confidence that Brezhnev expressed at the 25th Party Congress gave rise to a kind of "neo-Khrushchevism," characterized by greater activism abroad, particularly in the Third World, and greater passivity in Eastern Europe. This orientation explains the overengagement in Afghanistan and what must appear in retrospect to Soviet leaders as excessive laxity and tolerance with respect to Poland. These developments, in turn, have produced a rude awakening and an apparent sense of relative helplessness in Moscow—at a point at which the new opportunities that lie before the USSR may in fact sharpen its dilemmas even further.

These new opportunities arise above all from the possible implications of West European reactions to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While the reactions of the United States (in particular, the grain embargo), possibly the Muslim and nonaligned world, and most

[22] See Fritz Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 47; P.M.E. Volten, *Brezhnev's Peace Program: Success or Failure?* PhD dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 1981, pp. 263-68.

[23] See his *The "Leninist Peace Policy" and Western Europe*, Cambridge, MA, Center for International Studies, MIT, January 1980.

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certainly the Afghan people were stronger than the Soviet rulers had expected them to be, those of the West Europeans were probably weaker.

Up to this juncture, the conventional wisdom had been that détente encouraged diversity within alliances and in policies toward the other camp, but international crises forced each side to rally around its leader and against its opponent. After other comparable Soviet actions, all Western powers had shelved détente at least for a few months (although already in 1969 France was a partial exception) until the next Soviet peace offensive. This time, however, the first concern of most West European governments, particularly the French and German ones, was to save détente. Initially, they sought to do so by interpreting the invasion of Afghanistan as a regional problem to which above all the Muslim and nonaligned world should respond, while a separate European détente should continue. Then they went to the other extreme and suggested that the world was on the brink of war, as in 1914, and that the role of Europeans was to preserve the East-West dialogue and hence world peace, which was being endangered by the lack of communication between the two superpowers. Contrary to what many had anticipated, the invasion of Afghanistan even seemed, if anything, to encourage opposition to the implementation of NATO's decision on theater nuclear weapons, instead of rendering it easier by demonstrating the seriousness of the Soviet threat (as the action did to the American public). The increased plausibleness of military danger appeared to lead to the conclusion that détente had to be saved at all costs.

During the early weeks after the invasion, three developments contributed to the West European attitude. First, the Soviets did not seem interested in exploiting the West European reluctance to abandon détente. The way Soviet leaders justified the invasion and their arrest of Andrey Sakharov at the very time when governments and Olympic committees in Western Europe were agonizing about following the US decision to boycott the Moscow games or not, tended to leave the impression that the USSR was determined to intimidate or defy, rather than to placate or seduce. Soviet behavior within the world Communist movement seemed to indicate an interest in counting the faithful rather than in rallying the undecided or dividing the adversaries. After the spectacular approval of the Afghanistan invasion, based on the theories of "two camps" and a "shift in the correlation of forces," by Georges Marchais, Secretary-General of the French Communist Party (PCF), Moscow pushed for a meeting of European Communist parties in Paris without consulting the Italian and Spanish parties, which wound up staying away from the meeting. Moreover, although the Paris meeting was part of the Communist campaign against NATO's proposed introduction of new medium-range missiles into Europe, the communique issued at the end of the gathering made only perfunctory reference to the role of the Socialists, the pacifists, and the various progressive Western forces in this undertaking.[24] At the interstate level, the Kremlin cancelled Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow and called upon its East European allies to do the same with all similar contacts.

Second, despite the obvious Soviet pressure for a freeze of contacts, the East European governments and elites gave many signs of not being happy about such a freeze and of being as interested as the West Europeans in saving détente and preserving contacts—particularly economic ones—with the other side. This was certainly true of the Poles and Hungarians, and to a lesser extent of the East Germans. The tone of their presses was very different from that of the Soviet press. Furthermore, the GDR on April 30 even concluded a five-year, US$1,281 million agreement with the FRG for road, rail, and water links between West Berlin and Bonn. This step Bonn took as a significant signal.

Third, many in Western Europe, and particularly in the FRG, read the discrepancy between the Soviet and East European responses in a highly optimistic way. Nobody doubted that a psychological difference existed between the USSR and the East European regimes, and that all Europeans, East and West, had a more immediate and intense attachment to détente than did the two superpowers. But beyond this point, interpretations could and did vary. According to one view, discordant tones heard from the East reflected a conscious division of labor. Another appraisal held that they resulted from differing emphases and imperfect coordination rather than any fundamental disagreement, with the Soviet Union wanting to avoid a proliferation of peace initiatives and to get its camp well in line before launching a coordinated peace offensive. Still another assessment contended that they signaled something much deeper and newer—namely, that, to quote a competent and representative West German observer, early in 1980 there had "evolved a situation in which, for the first time since World War II, the maintenance of a minimum of East-West contacts was left to the medium-rank powers in Europe."[25] In other words, there was a symmetry between East and West in the sense that in the East too the

[24] *L'Humanité* (Paris), Apr. 29, 1980.

[25] Eberhard Schulz, "New Developments in Intra-bloc Relations in Historical Perspective," in K. Dawisha and P. Hanson, Eds., *Soviet–East European Dilemmas*, London, Holmes and Meier, 1981, Chap. 4. The original formulation at a meeting on June 23, 1980, was much stronger. For an alternative perspective, see Peter Summerscale, 'Eastern Europe in the wake of Afghanistan," *The World Today* (London), May 1980, pp. 172–79.

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A press conference at the April 1980 Paris meeting of 22 European Communist parties, which called for peace and disarmament. At the right is Georges Marchais, Secretary-General of the French Communist Party; at the left, Andrzej Werblan, then member of the Politburo of the Polish United Workers' Party; and third from the left, Boris Ponomarëv, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and a candidate member of the CPSU's Politburo.

—Diego Goldberg/SYGMA.

crisis was a historic opportunity for the small and medium states of Eastern Europe to assert their autonomy and their common interests with their West European counterparts in saving peace against the growing irrationality of their superpower ally. The last interpretation proved the most widespread.

Subsequent events have shown the first and second interpretations to have been the most defensible ones. With the visits of French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to Warsaw in May 1980 and Chancellor Schmidt to Moscow in June-July 1980, the Kremlin resumed cultivation of the West Europeans, and its ostensible thirst for governmental East-West contacts since then has been second to none of those of its satellites. Conversely, since the West German elections in October 1980, the GDR has hardened its attitude toward the FRG considerably. For instance, it has raised both the amount of Deutschmarks that it requires be exchanged at the border (thereby cutting the number of visitors in half), and the rhythm of its diplomatic demands for full recognition.[26] Thus, the gap between Bonn's outlook and that of the USSR has narrowed tremendously. Last but not least, the fall of Edward Gierek in Poland has pointed up the fragility of the East European governments with which Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing sought to pursue a separate détente (the Polish First Secretary was their favorite interlocutor), and the Polish crisis in general has demonstrated that the regimes of Eastern Europe contribute more to the problem of peace in Europe than to its solution, that they are caught between the social dynamics of popular dissatisfaction and the military constraints of Soviet dominance, and that the diplomatic freedom of action of their rulers is as narrow as their authority is fragile.

In retrospect, however, the third interpretation is less interesting in terms of East European realities than for what it conveyed to Moscow about West European, particularly West German, perceptions, aspirations, and perhaps illusions. The enthusiasm and emotional intensity with which German commentators, including Chancellor Schmidt, spoke for a time about the discovery by the middle powers of both Western and Eastern Europe of a community of interests in preserving peace in Europe and about their seizure of the initiative by staying out of the conflicts of the two superpowers or by reconciling the superpowers themselves, or at least get-

[22] See ... *Security* ... *Program: St* ... pp. 263–68.

[23] See his *T*... International St... *nal Herald Tribune*, Oct. 10, 1980.

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ting them to talk to one another, cannot have been lost on Soviet leaders. But precisely what conclusions Soviet leaders have drawn from it is ambiguous. Do they see in it more of a threat to their control of Eastern Europe or of an opportunity for influencing Western Europe? Both elements are certainly there in an objective sense, and the management of this duality is one of the main forms that the permanent dilemma described earlier takes for Moscow in the present period.

In any event, after an interval no longer than the similar one between the invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968 and the Soviet peace offensive of the spring of 1969, the USSR moved toward encouragement of "peaceful" or "realistic" tendencies in Western Europe, both at the state level and among social and political forces outside existing governments. And it did so with one eye on Eastern Europe and the other on the United States.

On the delicate triangular relationship with the two Germanies, there was ample evidence even in the pre-Afghanistan period of Moscow's promoting the idea of a separate intra-German détente, and of its using East Germany to influence West Germany and using the latter to influence Western Europe and NATO as a whole.[27] The current East German theme that progress in intra-German relations must be linked to progress on military détente is only the most obvious example that such efforts continue.

At the same time, there has also been evidence that too close a relationship between the two Germanies, especially when such intimacy goes against the general trend of the moment in intra-European relations, worries the Kremlin, just as it is frustrating in an economic sense to the other East Europeans.[28] Exactly how much autonomy and how much Soviet influence have been involved in the GDR's alternations between hardening and opening up toward the Federal Republic during 1981 is impossible to ascertain. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suggest that while the general direction and limits of the permissible have been set by the Kremlin, the East German leadership has a special interest, within this direction and these limits, in the maintenance of a conflictual-cooperative special relationship with the FRG as well as in the prevention of the spread of the Polish virus. The GDR struggles in its own way with the same dilemma as the Soviets; it seeks to exercise whatever influence it enjoys in both directions, contradictory as such an approach may be. This situation, in turn, makes it easier for the USSR to use the GDR as a proxy (whether as bait or threat).

As for Western Europe more broadly, Moscow has traditionally endeavored to foster divisiveness. For example, it has tried to fight any Franco-German rapprochement by playing one country against the other,

[27] See F. Oldenburg and G. Wettig, *Der Sonderstatus der DDR in Europäischen Ost-West Beziehungen* (The Special Status of the GDR in European East-West Relations), Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, No. 21, Köln, May 1979.

[28] Ibid. and, more recently, G. Wettig, "Seclusion in the GDR's Policy toward the West," *Aussenpolitik*, No. 2, 1980, p. 127.

Soviet General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev (left) meets with then Polish First Secretary Edward Gierek (center) and then French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (right) in Warsaw on May 19, 1980.

—Jacques Pavlovsky/SYGMA.

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encouraging them to compete for the honor of having the best special relationship with the USSR (an honor particularly dear to France since the days of Charles de Gaulle), attempting to play on French memories and fears of the German threat. Such efforts have certainly persisted in recent months. Even though the emergence of a distinctive European point of view, one bent both on greater autonomy from the United States and on maintenance of a dialogue with the Soviet Union, has had reality essentially in the understanding between FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and former French President Giscard d'Estaing, Brezhnev attempted subtly to set the two at odds with each other in his successive meetings with them in the spring of 1980.[29] Similarly, the USSR has always opposed a strengthening of European unity, and this preoccupation too has not disappeared. According to reliable reports, Brezhnev insisted in his meetings with both Schmidt and Giscard that Spain should not enter either NATO or the Common Market.[30]

On the other hand, Moscow has over the years not only accepted the reality of European economic integration but has given some ambiguous signs of welcoming it as long as it is compatible with institutionalized cooperation on a broader pan-European scale.[31] Moreover, Soviet leaders have even seemed to be willing to tolerate a degree of political integration as long as it is not directed against détente.

This last attitude has manifested itself in a new and interesting way in the wake of Afghanistan. For the first time, Franco-German rapprochement, in the guise of the Giscard-Schmidt alliance, was treated as a factor of peace. True, the most explicitly positive appraisal of it came from the pen of a slightly idiosyncratic, though important, commentator, A. Bovin. He went so far as to write that Europe should, "while remaining a loyal partner within the Atlantic alliance, have an equality of rights and play a pacifying role in international affairs" and that "without a common position between France and Germany on the great world problems it is difficult to think of Europe as a continent of peace and cooperation" and "without stable, regular, equal relations between the United States and Western Europe one cannot speak of stability in international relations in general."[32] But other authoritative commentators adopted a similar line.[33] Moreover, those who stressed that there was no substitute for a bilateral understanding with the United States were distinctly less vocal and central in the summer of 1980.[34] All this suggested an official judgment that détente was divisible.

Parallel to this form of political wooing of the Europeans went suggestions that there were common Soviet–West European interests opposed to those of the United States, which was depicted as creating artificial dangers in the Persian Gulf, and that cooperation was possible on the basis of a Soviet guarantee of Western Europe's energy supplies. Such suggestions were put forth first by N. Portugalov, one of the top collaborators of the Department of Information of the CPSU Central Committee.[35] They provided a link between the longstanding Soviet proposals, in the framework of the Belgrade and Madrid followups to the Helsinki conference on European security and cooperation, for a conference on all-European cooperation in energy, and the Brezhnev proposals in India in December 1980 and at the 26th Party Congress for making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace.

It soon fell to the same Portugalov, however, to lay out clearly the conditions and limits of the positive Soviet attitude toward Franco-German collaboration and West European independence from the United States. In an article in *Literaturnaya gazeta* in August 1980, he denounced the timid allusions to Franco-German military cooperation made during Giscard d'Estaing's visit to Bonn, and, broadening the subject, he argued that Franco-German collaboration and independence from the United States could play a positive role for peace only as long as they did not bring about an independent center of military power, did not exclude Eastern Europe and the USSR, and took the road of "military détente leading to the building of a pan-European system of security and cooperation, a system which, without suppressing the differences between East and West, by definition deprives of any utility and point the American military guarantees to Western Europe, which condition its permanent dependence upon the United States."[36]

The same perspective obviously underlies the formulation in Brezhnev's report to the 26th Party Congress that "the basis of the process of European security is to make the whole of Europe a zone of peace." In short,

[29] See, for instance, *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), No. 22, 1980, pp. 19–21.

[30] See the account of Jorge Semprun's interview with former Spanish Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, in his lecture on "The Spanish Communist Party and the Soviet Union" at a seminar held at the Centre d'Études et de Recherches Internationales (Paris) on Mar. 30, 1981. This lecture will appear as a chapter in L. Marcon, Ed., *L'URSS vue de gauche* (The USSR Seen from the Left), Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, forthcoming.

[31] See in particular N. V. Inozemtsev, "International Relations in Europe in the Year 1979," *Europe 1970*, Alphen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff, 1972, pp. 14–138.

[32] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), June 9, 1980. Also see the commentary by Daniel Vernet in *Le Monde* (Paris), July 11, 1980.

[33] See, for instance, S. Beglov's interview with *La Repubblica* (Rome), Aug. 2, 1980.

[34] For an example of this latter position, see the interview that F. Burlatskiy gave to A. Cavallari, in *La Stampa* (Turin), July 30, 1980.

[35] TASS commentary, Feb. 29, 1980.

[36] N. Portugalov, "Behind the Looking Glass," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, Aug. 6, 1980. See also the comment by D. Vernet in *Le Monde*, Aug. 9, 1980.

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Europe should become more independent of the United States, but only as long as it grows more dependent on the Soviet Union; NATO should be weakened, but only as long as it is not replaced by an independent European defense system.

If, then, Moscow does not contemplate a "Europe of the middle powers" or a continental balance, the traditional question reemerges in a new form. Namely, is the Soviet Union's goal a European security system of which it would be the manager, or is it only a bipolar Europe, based on the existing structures, in which the weakness of the West European partners and their dependence upon the East would in turn weaken Atlantic cohesion and make the United States a less formidable (or less threatening) and less resistant (or more reasonable) interlocutor for the Soviet Union?

Moscow, however, does not have to choose between these two versions. Indeed, Brezhnev's report, while offering no substantive concessions either to the United States or to the West Europeans (particularly on such central issues as Afghanistan), made formal gestures to both. (Of those overtures which had at least something to do with substantive issues, it is true, the majority related to West European, rather than American proposals. The moratorium on the deployment of new missiles in Europe was directed specifically to West Germany; the extension of the zone for confidence-building measures, to France.)

Viewing the situation in an extended time frame, one might capsulize things in the following manner: In the long run, Moscow has the ambition to play a central role in European security and to marginalize the United States—a goal toward which present Soviet actions and proposals certainly point more directly than ever before. Nevertheless, the dialogue with the United States does maintain a parallel importance over the long haul as well. In the short run, playing the peace issue and trying to elicit positive West European reactions which contrast with the generally negative attitude of the United States fulfill a double function. Either they help to change the American position through the influence of the West Europeans, or they drive a wedge between the West Europeans and the United States if the latter does not change its attitude.

In connection with the short-run considerations, it is noteworthy that Soviet commentaries since the 26th Party Congress have had a dual character. Some have focused particularly on the FRG and its alleged failure to appreciate the magnitude of the step that Brezhnev took in its direction; others have emphasized that the USSR does not want to split Western Europe from the United States, since Moscow wants the West Europeans to influence American policy in the direction of détente.[37]

The same ambiguity is manifest in Soviet attitudes toward West European social forces and political movements, on the one hand, and governments, on the other. Moscow has always sought to exploit opportunities at both levels, and its current peace offensive combines appeals on the two levels. It has been bombarding governments with letters and initiatives. At the same time, it has been not only making whatever use it can of Communist parties but also giving strong emphasis to peace movement activities—i.e., to enlisting all potentially pacifist or neutralist forces, particularly the Christians, the social democrats, and the environmentalists, in opposition to NATO, or at least to nuclear weapons and in particular to the deployment of medium-range missiles in Western Europe. In this last regard, it has scored some notable successes in recent months.

Yet the question of the goal of these campaigns remains. Is the purpose of Soviet leaders limited to influencing Western policies on the specific points at issue? Or, beyond that, do they aim to encourage the advent to power of the Left, which they perceive as more prone to pacifism or neutralism? Or do their objectives extend even further? That is, do they pursue the destabilization of West European societies themselves, either to create a revolutionary situation or, simply, to jeopardize the capacity of West European states to act in foreign affairs, progress toward integration, and influence Eastern Europe through their attractiveness as models?

As far as relative preference for conservative or social democratic governments is concerned, the only clear and constant keys to Soviet attitudes have been the kind of foreign policy that a government pursues, and a repugnance for the unknown. These criteria have led Moscow to support the Social Democrats, including Helmut Schmidt (even though it would have chosen Willy Brandt), in the FRG and the conservatives, including Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (though it would have picked the Gaullists), in France.

Nevertheless, real dilemmas do confront the USSR across the long run on this score. A social democratic Europe may offer less military resistance to Soviet policy, but it may also pose more of an ideological challenge to Eastern Europe.[38] In a period of détente, the latter may be quite dangerous, while in a period of renewed cold war and arms race, and especially with

[37] For an example of the first type, see "FRG Rebuff on Disarmament Plan Incomprehensible," TASS, Mar. 17, 1981, in *FBIS–SOV*, Mar. 18, 1981. For one of the second sort, see the discussion among A. Bovin, N. Shishlin, and V. Levin, Radio Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, Apr. 12, 1981, in *FBIS–SOV*, Apr. 13, 1981.

[38] See the author's "Western European Perceptions of the Soviet Union," *Daedalus* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1979, pp. 147–49.

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Ronald Reagan in office in Washington and the missile decision on the top of the political agenda, the former becomes more attractive.

On the ideological front, the Soviets have continued to insist on a clear separation between communism and social democracy and to criticize notions like the "Euroleft," the "third way," or the "new internationalism"—broached in particular by the Italian Communists—for blurring this distinction,[39] but their relations with the Socialist International and with the left wing of social democracy everywhere have been more and more cordial, particularly with respect to matters of peace and security. For instance, they have tried more and more openly to drive a wedge within the SPD between Helmut Schmidt and Willy Brandt, as shown by the Soviet invitation of Brandt to Moscow on June 30, 1981. Moscow has more and more frequently promoted, and sometimes financed, common initiatives on disarmament with these groups and nonparliamentary forces such as the German environmentalists or "alternativists." The Socialist International and certain social democratic parties were even the subject of a favorable paragraph in Brezhnev's report to the 26th Party Congress.

It should be noted, however, that there has seemed to exist a conflict—i.e., more than a division of labor—regarding initiatives of the "Euroleft" type and initiatives of the "world peace movement" type. The former undertakings have been based on dialogue between Eurocommunists and social democrats, and while they have generally endorsed such steps as Brezhnev's proposal for a moratorium on the deployment of new missiles in Europe, they have done so within a framework acceptable to the moderate Left. The latter undertakings have denounced the Western rearmament effort and have denied that the corresponding Soviet one has created any problem of imbalance.[40] Clearly, Moscow would prefer to encourage those of the second sort as much as possible.

Still, the immediate Soviet concern in both cases has seemed to be not to replace Western governments but to influence them. The opening to social democracy is not an opening to popular fronts or united left movements; it is an opening to all forces which can influence existing governments, whether of the Left or of the Right, so that they will in turn seek to influence the United States in the direction of "military détente." In short, the primary aim appears to be to exercise leverage through a chain of proxies.

This does not mean, of course, that Soviet attitudes toward specific West European governments or toward Western Europe as a whole will not shift. For example, even though Brezhnev initially went out of his way to support Giscard d'Estaing in France, he may now feel, particularly in light of the recent hardening of attitudes of the French Right, including the Gaullists, toward the USSR, that strong backing of François Mitterrand, whom Brezhnev and his colleagues have never trusted, may be the better course of wisdom, for Mitterrand and his Socialists could bring France closer to the pacifist-neutralist wave which is sweeping other West European countries. Mitterrand's election as President of France has already called into question the trend toward a more autonomous Western Europe under Franco-German leadership, and should Schmidt fall too, the Franco-German rapprochement itself, with its dangers and advantages for the Soviet Union, would be seriously jeopardized if Germany went to the right after France had gone to the left. Then the USSR might seek to exploit the diversity of political paths taken by various Western states: conservatism in the United States and Great Britain, Christian Democracy in Germany, democratic socialism in France, possibly right-wing military rule in Spain, a drift to the neutralist left in Greece, etc. That is, it might abandon any inclination to accept some degree of European unity for the sake of a separate European détente and opt to try to capitalize on European fragmentation and weakness, instead of banking on supposedly stable and predictable bourgeois governments. It might also rely on increasingly anti-American,

Soviet party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev (right) welcomes Polish United Workers' Party First Secretary Stanislaw Kania to Moscow on October 30, 1980, for a one-day consultation on worker unrest in Poland.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

[39] See *l'Unità* (Rome), May 9, 1981.

[40] On this general issue, see the polemics between the editors of *l'Unità* and the pro-Soviet General N. Pasti, in ibid., Apr. 19 and 23, 1981.

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Third Worldist, and pacifist left-wing parties and movements, even though it knows they are even harder to control. In this context, there would be increased plausibility to the suspicions more and more frequently voiced that the USSR is assisting terrorism and encouraging the destabilization of Mediterranean Europe (to begin with, Yugoslavia) or of NATO's southern flank (particularly Spain, Italy, and Turkey), and if the USSR is actually doing such things already, they would become less marginal and less half-hearted.[41]

For the time being, however, it is a safe bet that the Soviet Union is more preoccupied with trying to eliminate instability in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland, than with promoting instability in Western Europe. Perhaps even more than the challenge of American rearmament, it is the challenge of the Polish renewal which must be the first priority of the Kremlin's European policy.

What consequences this priority will have for Soviet attitudes toward the West, and especially Western Europe, is, once again, ambiguous. As the East German case has illustrated, fear of contagion of the Polish example can lead to a questioning of détente and to a hardening of position with respect to Western Europe. But the desire to influence Western Europe, and in particular to preserve the special political and economic relationship with the Federal Republic and France to block NATO's rearmament program, could be strong enough to persuade the USSR to exercise restraint toward Poland.

To be sure, the Soviets cannot know, any more than anyone else can, whether an intervention in Poland would reunify the West, kill détente, and help NATO or would generate responses of the sort observed after the invasion of Afghanistan—that is, would produce within Germany, within Western Europe, and within the Western alliance an even greater polarization than before between hawks wanting to punish the Soviet Union and doves wanting to preserve the intra-German relationship or to avoid alienating a powerful and brutal neighbor. Nevertheless, on balance it is likely, as Leopold Labedz has pointed out, that the Soviets see more chance of splitting Western Europe from the United States if they practice restraint.[42] Moreover, the hopes that Moscow attaches to Brezhnev's prospective visit to Germany may act in conjunction with the fears it has about President Reagan's threats against Cuba to counsel restraint. The trends evident in recent West European elections and in the domestic strife in Yugoslavia could have a reinforcing effect on these anticipations.

But on this issue of intervention vs. nonintervention in Poland, as well as on the more global one of provisional retrenchment or preemptive adventure, the USSR may find it increasingly difficult to keep all its options open. Wherever it turns, Moscow faces a more dramatic choice, in a more unpredictable environment, than has been the case for a very long time.

[41] For elaboration, see F. Barbieri in *La Stampa*, May 10, 1981.

[42] "The Politics of Survival," *Encounter* (London), December 1980. See also my comment on this article in *Commentaire* (Paris), Spring 1980, pp. 22–27.

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Communism and Ethiopia

By Paul B. Henze

The Ethiopian press now regularly refers to Mengistu Haile-Mariam, Chairman of the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia (PMGSE), as "The Communist Leader." Ministers and other high government officials call each other "comrade." At the entrance to Addis Ababa's Bole International Airport huge signs bear the legends: "Proletarians of the World, Unite!" and "The Victory of Socialism Is Inevitable!" Large canvases showing determined soldiers, workers, and peasants spell out similar messages at every square and intersection in the sprawling capital. Giant portraits of Marx, Engels, and Lenin dominate Revolution Square, and a stylized profile device featuring these three Communist saints decorates the entrances of many public buildings. The halls of ministries are festooned with posters in Amharic, and occasionally English, proclaiming revolutionary slogans. Soviet flags flutter beside the red-yellow-green national banner in the city and in the countryside. From all this, a visitor arriving in Ethiopia for the first time is likely to conclude that this country has been rapidly and willingly transformed into a bastion of communism.[1]

This would be too hasty a conclusion. While it is true that there is more outward evidence of loyalty to communism in Ethiopia than in East European countries which have formed part of the Soviet empire for nearly four decades, all of this iconography and sloganry obscures the fact that Chairman Mengistu's government is still very much an improvised system which has been slow to evolve into permanent new forms. The imperial governmental structure was not disbanded when Haile Selassie was deposed on September 12, 1974. The ministries and boards and semi-autonomous functional organizations that took form in the last 30 years of the old emperor's reign all continue to exist with names changed only slightly, if at all, and are to a large part still staffed by the Western-educated civil servants who as young men moved into them in the 1960's and early 1970's. These people have assured continuity of government throughout the revolutionary period, providing basic services, maintaining highways and communications, and skillfully managing the country's finances. The Derg—the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC)—which seized control of the revolution in the latter part of 1974, had no alternative but to depend on them. From the beginning, in fact, the Derg seems to have taken the established governmental structure for granted.[2] The only really new revolutionary institutions created by the Derg, the *kebeles* (neighborhood associations), which threatened to replace the existing local governmental structure during the period of the "red terror" in 1977–78, have since been severely curtailed. Although they did help the Derg overcome

[1] David Ottaway, "Ethiopian Revolution Brings Trappings of Communism," *The Washington Post*, Mar. 16, 1979. This and other sources cited are generally intended to direct the reader to additional information, background data, or alternative interpretations of events. In the main, however, the information on which this article is based derives from observations and conversations during a private visit by the author to Ethiopia in January-February 1981; from his service as US National Security Council staff officer for Horn of Africa affairs in 1977–80, during which time he was a member of three official missions to Horn countries; from extensive private contacts with Ethiopians and Ethiopianists in the period 1973–76; and from service at the US Embassy in Addis Ababa and travel to all Horn countries in the period 1968–72.

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[2] Accounts of the early phase of the Ethiopian revolution are of varying quality (none definitive). They include: Blair Thompson, *Ethiopia: the Country that Cut off its Head—A Diary of the Revolution*, London, Robson Books, 1975; Colin Legum, *Ethiopia: the Fall of Haile Selassie's Empire*, New York, NY, Africana, and London, Holmes and Meier, 1975; David Hamilton, *Ethiopia's Embattled Revolutionaries*, Conflict Studies No. 82, London, Institute for the Study of Conflict, April 1977; and John Markakis and Nega Ayele, *Class and Revolution in Ethiopia*, Nottingham, Spokesman, 1978. To date, there have been no significant Ethiopian memoirs about the revolution.

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One of the many revolutionary posters visible throughout Addis Ababa.

—William Campbell/SYGMA.

political rivals and mobilize the population to cope with the crisis caused by the Somali invasion, the *kebeles* proved to have little capacity to evolve into dependable administrative instruments.

Colonel Mengistu had emerged as the most dynamic member of the Derg long before he took the title of Chairman after General Teferi Banti was killed in February 1977. Since the execution of his deputy, Lt. Col. Atnafu Abate, in November 1977, Mengistu has been increasingly visible as head of state and government. He rules as Haile Selassie did, from the Grand Palace built by Emperor Menelik II shortly after the founding of Addis Ababa in 1886, and he has adopted many features of the old, highly personalized imperial style, traveling periodically to outlying regions (thus keeping provincial officials on their toes), visiting development projects and factories, and receiving delegations of local citizens. When Mengistu is not traveling, newspapers almost daily carry photographs of him—as they once did of Haile Selassie—receiving foreign visitors, officiating at ceremonies, or lecturing groups of officials or students.[3] Ethiopians expect their leader to be diligent and energetically engaged in the daily tasks of governing, meeting with ministers, approving plans and budgets, and personally managing the governmental machinery. Mengistu's present style of leadership accords much more with this national tradition than the faceless, shadowy character of the Derg during its first years.

One feature of the imperial system is absent: parliament. The old Ethiopia was one of the few African coun-

[3] For samples of coverage of Mengistu's activities, see *Ethiopian Herald* (Addis Ababa), Feb. 1, 4, and 5, 1981.

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tries that kept an elected parliament functioning, with debates and a legislative process that was not entirely illusory. A Communist system also requires a parliament, as an essential feature of official mythology, even though Soviet-style legislatures are invariably only political ornamentation. However, the Derg, which gives the PMGSE its only basis for legitimacy, has not evolved into a representative institution with real or symbolic legislative functions. In actuality, it seems to have dwindled to a mere fraction of its original membership and seldom meets as a body. The elegant British-colonial-style parliament building in Addis Ababa has been repainted an earthy red shade and refitted with imposing iron gates with the hammer-and-sickle symbol as centerpiece. It is now the headquarters of the Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE), which serves as a substitute for both parliament and party. Many Ethiopians doubt whether Mengistu would have organized COPWE at all if it had not been for Soviet pressure. The lack of a party in Ethiopia, as we shall see below, has been a source of continual frustration to the Russians and Ethiopia's other Communist friends.

What are the factors that have led to radicalization of Ethiopia under Mengistu, and why has this process stopped so obviously short of Soviet-style communism despite a considerable Soviet-bloc presence in the country? To answer these questions and to venture a guess about where the country will go from here, one must trace both indigenous political developments and their interaction with foreign involvement, particularly Soviet and Cuban, in Ethiopia and in the Horn generally.

Revolutionary Whirlpool

The causes of the Ethiopian revolution will be debated for years. It came when modernization processes in the country were accelerating. The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 caused a sharp rise in petroleum prices which had immediate, serious consequences in Ethiopia. These intensified anxieties caused by the illness of the crown prince and uncertainty about the succession to the aging emperor. Haile Selassie proved unable to control the ferment which developed in the cities and in the army in early 1974. The established governing elite also was not able to assert control, and power slipped into the hands of an improvised military committee.[4] When the military deposed Haile Selassie on September 12, 1974, an Eritrean general, Aman Cendom, was declared head of state.

What orginally appeared to be an orderly transfer of power soon turned bloody. General Aman was killed in a bloody encounter at his home on the night of November 23–24, 1974, and a few hours later, some 60 of the most prominent officials of the previous government (including men known for their liberal views as well as conservative traditionalists) were executed. General Teferi Banti succeeded General Aman as head of state, but it soon became clear that these dramatic events marked the emergence of Mengistu Haile-Mariam as the most assertive member of the Derg. Less than a month later, on December 20, Mengistu declared "socialism" in Ethiopia,[5] and beginning in early 1975, the military rulers launched a series of measures almost Maoist in nature. These included sweeping land reform; the dispatch of 60,000 students to revolutionize the countryside;[6] nationalization of much industry and foreign investment and all urban rental property; and suppression of labor unions. On April 20, 1976, Mengistu proclaimed a "national democratic revolution," which—it was claimed—would quickly create the prerequisites for "scientific socialism" and establishment of a "people's democratic republic" with guarantees of "national self-determination" reminiscent of the Soviet model.[7]

These moves generated uprisings in rural areas and widespread opposition in the cities. Yet, in declaring "socialism," Mengistu had apparently given no serious consideration to the need to establish a political party to manage the enormous stresses of revolutionary change. Absence of such a party has proved to be revolutionary Ethiopia's most awkward political problem. A plethora of leftist factions and groups sprang up to fill the void—some, but not all, of them having friends, advocates, and protectors in the Derg or the government.

One of the earliest groups to surface (in August 1975) was the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP). Lacking any "official" sponsorship, the avowedly Marxist EPRP rapidly attracted a large following of ill-disciplined intellectuals, students, and junior government officials, but seemed to have very little appeal to either the officers or rank and file of the military. The eagerness of EPRP adherents to move into the forefront of the revolu-

[4] Much about events during this confused time remains unclear. To date, the best attempt to chronicle them is David and Marina Ottaway, *Ethiopia—Empire in Revolution*, New York, NY, Africana, and London, Holmes and Meier, 1978. See also Pliny the Middle-Aged, "The PMAC: Origins and Structure," Part I in *Ethiopianist Notes* (East Lansing, MI), Vol. 2, No. 3, 1978, and Part II in *Northeast African Studies* (East Lansing, MI), Vol. 1, No. 1, 1979.

[5] The word that Mengistu used was *Hibrettesabawinet*. On the concept, see David and Marina Ottaway, op. cit., p. 8.

[6] Paulos Milkias, "Zemecha—An Assessment of the Political and Social Foundations of Mass Education in Ethiopia," *Northeast African Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1979.

[7] For a text, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SSA*), Apr. 22, 1976, pp. B/1–7.

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tion, their disdain of the military's lack of ideological sophistication, and their criticism of the military for not surrendering power to civilians created strains. The military—and especially Mengistu, who proved to be far more skillful in the art of elementary infighting and survival than the Marxist intellectuals—became increasingly wary of the EPRP.

In September 1975, General Teferi Banti, PMAC Chairman, announced that a political party would be formed. By the end of that year, it had become widely known (although never officially announced) that the Derg had set up a "Political Bureau" to establish this party. The Politbureau was headed by a French-educated Marxist of Galla origin, Haile Fida, who had recently returned from exile. There were serious differences within the Derg, however, on what form the party should take—and perhaps on whether it needed to be established at all. What the Politbureau proceeded to set up came to be called MEISON, an abbreviation standing for the "All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement." MEISON soon had cells in most parts of the country, although the degree of official sponsorship varied from region to region. The ideologues of the EPRP and MEISON, both espousing Marxism, quickly joined in intense rivalry. At times, both seemed also to be at odds with the Derg and with the government apparatus itself. The latter included the Provisional Office of Mass Organization Affairs (POMOA), set up in early 1976. POMOA, too, established branches in most parts of the country, sometimes seemingly overlapping with MEISON.

Divisions within the amorphous Derg became apparent in July 1976 when the head of its Political Affairs Committee, Captain Sisay Habte, was arrested and executed. His deputy and successor, Senay Likie (who was among those killed later in a February 1977 shoot-out on the Grand Palace grounds which resulted in the deaths of Chairman Teferi and seven other members of the Derg and in Mengistu's assumption of the chairmanship of the PMAC), had already set up another political grouping, Wez Ader (Labor League). At about the same time still other elements in the Derg created Abyot Seded (Revolutionary Torch), a party which seems to have had as its objective the exercise of control over the *kebeles* as a counterweight to MEISON.[8] Political commotion continued to intensify. Arms were distributed on a large scale to urban and rural *kebeles,* and political murders and executions became routine.

In the wake of the Somali invasion in the summer of 1977, the political struggle polarized rapidly. In August, Haile Fida and his main Politbureau aides fled the capital into the western province of Welega, but they were soon captured and imprisoned. This meant the end of both MEISON and the Politbureau. In November, Mengistu moved to eliminate his deputy, Lt. Col. Atnafu Abate.[9]

During the winter 1977–78, "red terror" raged—directed primarily against the EPRP, which had become a focal point of opposition elements considerably broader than the Marxist ideologues who had originally formed it.[10] Although political ferment had receded by the summer of 1978 and EPRP remnants had retreated into remote areas of the countryside,[11] the problem of organizing a political party continued to bedevil Mengistu. Indeed, in May 1978, a colleague of Haile Fida, Negede Gobeze, who happened to be in Europe when Haile broke with the Derg in August 1977, was smuggled into Ethiopia on a passport of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) with the connivance of the Cubans. However, the PMGSE quickly discovered Negede and expelled him from the country.[12] Mengistu, in fact, used reaction to this interference to help consolidate his own power.

Moscow and the Horn

The Negede episode highlighted the heavy involvement of the Soviet Union and its allies in revolutionary Ethiopia. Moscow's interest in the country, of course, dates from much earlier than 1974, and while the USSR may at times have pursued other options in the region, the principal Soviet objective seems to have been to gain leverage in Ethiopia, which it viewed as the key country of the Horn.[13]

Shortly after World War II, Moscow set up a diplomatic mission in Addis Ababa and embarked on a medical aid program to Ethiopia. During the Khrushchev era, Ethiopia became the target of more energetic Soviet ef-

[8] Marina Ottaway, "Democracy and New Democracy: the Ideological Debate in the Ethiopian Revolution," *African Studies Review* (Boston, MA), April 1978; and John Markakis, "Garrison Socialism: the Case of Ethiopia," *MERIP Reports* (Washington, DC), No. 79, n.d.

[9] *FBIS–SSA,* Nov. 16, 1977, pp. B/1–2.

[10] Donald R. Katz, "Children's Revolution: a Bloodbath in Ethiopia," *Horn of Africa* (Summit, NJ), Vol. 1, No. 3, 1978.

[11] J.-C. Guillebaud, "Ethiopia on the Path to 'Normalization,' " *Le Monde* (Paris), Feb. 20, 1978.

[12] *The New York Times,* May 26, 1978.

[13] Nimrod Novik calls this a policy of "flexible persistence" in his *On the Shores of Bab-al-Mandab—Soviet Diplomacy and Regional Dynamics,* Foreign Policy Research Institute Monograph No. 26, Philadelphia, PA, 1979. See also Carlo Zaghi, *I Russi in Etiopia* (The Russians in Ethiopia), 2 vols., Naples, Guida Editori, 1972; Czeslaw Jesman, *The Russians in Ethiopia, an Essay in Futility,* London, Chatto and Windus, 1958; Paul B. Henze, "The Russians and the Horn," in Kenneth Hunt and Uwe Nerlich, Eds., *The Flanking Strategy: Regional Instability and Soviet Power Projection,* London, Macmillan for the European-American Institute for Security Research, forthcoming, 1981.

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The late Soviet Premier A.N. Kosygin (left) with Mengistu Haile-Mariam, Ethiopian chief of state, at September 14, 1979, ceremonies in Addis Ababa commemorating the fifth anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution.

—Gamma/Liaison.

forts. Haile Selassie was invited to Moscow in 1959 and given an oil refinery and an aid credit of US$100 million. Yet in the 1960's, the USSR had to go slow, for Ethiopia remained militarily dependent on the US and drew on economic aid and advice from a wide spectrum of Western and nonaligned donors in effecting a slow but steady modernization.[14] Haile Selassie made a quick recovery from the revolt of his bodyguard in December 1960 and displayed great skill in pan-African politics, maintained close relations with Israel, and at the same time had good relations with many Muslim states.[15]

As a consequence, the Soviet embassy in the Ethiopian capital kept carefully within the bounds of propriety. Only Ethiopians who could not qualify for study in Europe or America showed much interest in Soviet and East European scholarships. However, the Russians were not slow to learn that Ethiopian students in Rome, Paris, and Washington were easier targets for political indoctrination than those in Moscow or Prague. Indeed, it was among Ethiopian students in Europe and the US that propaganda and leaflets began to appear in the 1960's promoting an Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Movement (EPRM). Under the guise of contributions to literacy campaigns, student welfare, and other worthy causes, Ethiopian student organizations abroad sent money into Ethiopia to support student agitation at the university in Addis Ababa and in secondary schools.[16] The Soviet Union appears to have envisioned the EPRM as an embryonic Communist party in Ethiopia, but even after the coup in Ethiopia the movement was generally not that evident, restricting its activities to claimed sponsorship of a revolutionary newspaper, *Democracia.* Although the movement subsequently said that it had

[14] For a remarkably insightful analysis of Ethiopia at the beginning of the 1960's, see the chapter "Weird monarchy . . .," in James Morris, *The Road to Huddersfield,* New York, NY, Panther Books, 1963.

[15] The most comprehensive analysis of Haile Selassie's style of leadership is Christopher Clapham, *Haile Selassie's Government,* New York, NY, Praeger, and London, Longmans, 1970. Another analysis, recently reprinted in an Ethiopian paperback edition and available in all Addis Ababa bookshops, is John Markakis, *Ethiopia, Anatomy of a Traditional Polity,* Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1974.

[16] Marilyn Hall Baissa, "Civil-Military Elite Interaction in the Ethiopian Revolution: the Role of Students," in *Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Ethiopian Studies, Session B, Apr. 13–16, 1978,* Chicago, IL; and Legesse Lemma, "The Ethiopian Student Movement in 1960–74: A Challenge to the Monarchy and Imperialism in Ethiopia," in *Northeast African Studies,* Vol. 1, No. 2, 1979.

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

SOURCE: Adapted for *Problems of Communism* by the Cartographic Services Lab of the University of Maryland, College Park, Md., from the map on pages 24–25 of Paul B. Henze, *Ethopian Journey*, London, Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1977.

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formed a party as early as 1972, the EPRP did not surface until 1975.

Thus, whatever priority Moscow may have attached to its Ethiopian connection, pickings were indeed slim in Ethiopia until the mid-1970's. The USSR was not loath, however, to respond to other tempting opportunities that arose in the Horn during the 1960's. These included irredentism in Somalia, dissatisfaction in Eritrea following dissolution of the Ethiopian federation arrangement in 1962, and the ambitions of an indigenous Communist party in newly independent Sudan. Although Soviet opportunism in various of these situations may have been aimed at undermining the position of imperial Ethiopia, it ultimately has hampered the establishment of firm ties with revolutionary Ethiopia.

When the Western powers refused to supply Somalia with arms beyond what they judged adequate for internal security needs, the Soviet Union made a more generous offer which the still anti-Communist Somali leadership of the mid-1960's found too choice to turn down. After Somalia's army chief, General Mohamed Siad Barre, seized power in 1969, Moscow was quick to send more arms and numerous teams of advisers to help him build socialism and lay the basis for realizing his territorial ambitions vis-à-vis Ethiopia.[17] By 1976, the Soviets had nearly 4,000 military and civilian advisers in Somalia.[18] Soviet involvement with Somalia at first seemed to afford Moscow a chance to increase its influence on the Horn—including construction of and access to the port facilities at Berbera—without too much risk to its Ethiopian connection. Although there were periods of serious Ethiopian-Somali tension during the 1960's and early 1970's, it was only after revolutionary commotion had seriously threatened the Ethiopian state structure that Somalia, flush with Russian arms, was emboldened to attack directly a country ten times more populous than itself.

Eritrea provides a more subtle and complex example of Soviet perseverance in encouraging divisive forces to weaken the imperial system in Ethiopia while carefully avoiding the appearance of doing so.[19] (Moscow doubtless also hoped that insurgency in Eritrea might dislodge the US from the large Kagnew military communications station outside Asmera, mistakenly denounced by Third World radicals as a military base.) By and large, Russian



N. V. Podgornyy (left), then President of the Soviet Union, with Mohamed Siad Barre, President of the Democratic Republic of Somalia, in Mogadiscio just before signing of a USSR-Somali treaty of friendship and cooperation on July 11, 1974.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

support for the Eritrean dissidents was not direct. Czechoslovakian and Hungarian arms arrived in Eritrea through Syria and, after 1967, through South Yemen. Iraq and later Libya also became major supporters of Eritrean insurgents. Eritrean rebel leaders were able to set up political representation in and to broadcast from Damascus, Baghdad, Aden, and Mogadiscio. Eritrean guerrillas were trained in Cuba in the latter half of the 1960's, and Castro's Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Organization selected the Eritrean "liberation struggle" for one of its major propaganda campaigns.[20]

It is, however, impossible to believe that much of this pro-Eritrean activity—sustained over many years by countries closely linked to or directly dependent on Moscow—could have persisted and gained momentum if the Kremlin had found it distasteful. China's involvement in the late 1960's in support of the Eritrean struggle—the PRC delivered weapons and medical supplies mainly through Aden and also trained Eritreans in guerrilla warfare—doubtless spurred the Soviet Union's desire to increase its leverage in the Eritrean situation. After Col. Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri seized power in Khartoum in May 1969 and turned sharply toward

[17] J. Bowyer Bell, "Strategic Implications of the Soviet Presence in Somalia," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Summer 1975.

[18] Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Trouble in the Horn," *Newsweek* (New York, NY), June 27, 1977. While other totals have been suggested, this seems to be the most accurate. On a per capita basis, such a figure amounted to somewhat more than 1,000 Soviet advisers per million of local population. If Soviet personnel were to be supplied to Ethiopia on a comparable scale, there would be 35,000 to 40,000 Russians in Ethiopia today.

[19] For background on the complexities of Eritrea, see G.K.N. Trevaskis, *Eritrea: A Colony in Transition, 1941-1952*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1960.

[20] See Aryeh Yodfat, "The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa," *Northeast African Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1979-80.

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Moscow, the way was open for massive supply operations over the Sudanese border. As a result, the Eritrean dissident movement was transformed from a war of underground political agitation, aircraft hijackings, and terrorist strikes into a genuine military struggle. Ethiopian military forces in Eritrea from late 1969 onward found themselves up against guerrillas organized in regular formations, utilizing heavy weapons and armored vehicles.[21]

Soviet encouragement of the Eritrean insurgency paid off handsomely, for the situation there became a major contributing factor to the destabilization of the pro-Western imperial system in Ethiopia. Without the strain Eritrea represented, it is conceivable that the pressures which produced the 1974 revolution could have been accommodated by accelerated reform.

Eritrea did not cease to be a problem for Ethiopia with the 1974 revolution, however. In the ensuing months of revolutionary chaos, the Derg lost control of almost all of Eritrea. (Moreover, the Sudan-based Ethiopian Democratic Union mounted a major offensive into Gonder Province in the northwestern part of Ethiopia.) It was only with the Somali invasion and the massive influx of Soviet-bloc aid that Addis Ababa began to regain some, but not all, of the ground that it had lost in Eritrea. As we shall see, Moscow's relationship with the Eritrean insurgency became an embarrassment when the Soviet Union decided to support the Mengistu regime against the Somalis.

In the Sudan, the Soviet Union absorbed a sober lesson. Despite providing Nimeiri generous military aid (which helped in combatting rebels in the Sudan's south) and encouraging the Sudanese Communists to generally cooperate with the Khartoum government, Moscow did not convert him into a fully pliant ally. Nimeiri moved in May 1971 to assert control over the trade union movement, which was the principal base of the Communists. The local Communists responded in July with a coup which came within a hair's breadth of succeeding. While Moscow's role has not been documented, it is hard to believe that the USSR, at the very minimum, was unaware of the Sudanese Communists' plans. In any case, the abortive coup changed Nimeiri's perception of the Soviets. He quickly moved to settle the southern rebellion and undertook a complete reorientation—becoming one of Africa's most pro-Western leaders. A case could be made that Moscow learned lessons from its handling of Nimeiri that have been applied to dealings with Mengistu, but it is too early to be sure.

[21] Henze, "The Russians and the Horn," loc. cit.



Soldiers of the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF) bearing Soviet-style weaponry.

—Katherine Young.

New Opportunities and Dilemmas

In the mid-1970's, the pace of events in the Horn quickened, with revolution in Addis Ababa and the Somali invasion of Ethiopia. Ethiopian domestic developments and Soviet activity in the Horn soon merged in a most complex and contradictory manner. New opportunities for Soviet influence in Ethiopia required not only a cutback in pursuits elsewhere in the Horn but also a reorientation of Moscow's efforts within Ethiopia itself. The new possibilities themselves proved less productive of influence than they may have appeared at first glance.

In Ethiopia, the political ferment and intensification of class struggle (visible in the Derg's radical social measures) that followed the 1974 coup seemed to offer the chance that forces sympathetic to communism might consolidate control over the revolution. It was not at all clear, however, who would come out on top—the military or civilian forces. While definite information is naturally scarce, there is considerable circumstantial evidence that during the first two or three years after the revolution, the Soviets and perhaps other Communists

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abroad were providing support for several different civilian radical groups simultaneously.[22]

Moscow still had to proceed with some caution in Ethiopia. Although the political rhetoric in Addis Ababa turned decidedly pro-Soviet after the executions of November 1974, Ethiopia continued to remain completely dependent upon the United States for military support to combat the Eritrean insurgency and discourage Somali attack. American and European economic aid also continued to flow.[23] (This continued aid flow tends to belie the allegation current today in Ethiopia that US hostility to the revolution drove Addis Ababa into dependence upon Moscow.) Moreover, the Soviet Union could not feel sure of American intentions or likely reactions to any moves in Ethiopia.[24] Moscow was preoccupied with Angola and unsure of the outcome of its intervention there until the US Congress passed the Clark Amendment in December 1975, which placed certain limits on the ability of the US government to counter Soviet activities in Africa.[25]

With the election of Jimmy Carter in November 1976, Washington became increasingly critical of the human rights violations of the Derg, and in April 1977, Ethiopia broke off its military relationship with the US. Meantime, in December 1976, Mengistu had traveled to Moscow, where he received promises of Soviet military aid. In the spring of 1977, Russian and Cuban advisers began to arrive. Some were transferred directly from Somalia, although the latter had by no means reached a decisive break with the Soviet Union.

The July 1977 Somali invasion of Ethiopia's Ogaden (a region of largely nomadic peoples in the southern part of Bale and Harerge provinces), however, indicated that matters had clearly gotten out of control from the Soviet perspective. Moscow must have been aware, through its large presence in Somalia, of that country's preparations for major operations in Ethiopia,[26] but appears to have been either unable or unwilling to stop it. In the event, the USSR—forced to choose—opted to pursue predominance in Ethiopia rather than preserve its Somali investment.[27] The Soviet Union mounted a massive air- and sealift of advisers, arms, and Cubans, which by the end of February 1978 had enabled Ethiopia to deal the Somalis a decisive defeat.[28]

Obstacles to Improved Relations

Soviet military assistance, however, once having succeeded in helping Ethiopia build up its military establishment and repel Somalia, had by and large outlived its usefulness (I shall return to this point later). What was really needed, from Moscow's viewpoint, was establishment of the basis for a more permanent relationship with the Ethiopian revolutionary regime. In this regard, the Soviets faced the formidable task of reorienting themselves from their former disruptive, destabilizing policies vis-à-vis Ethiopia, policies that had left considerable sources of tension between the USSR and Ethiopia. Moreover, as we shall see, there were also a number of built-in factors that made Addis Ababa likely to resist Soviet inroads.

The vanguard party issue. One area of particular tension between the two countries was the issue of political organization in Ethiopia. From the Soviet perspective, what was needed was the creation of a strong, organized revolutionary party that would be capable of controlling and channeling the ferment in Ethiopia, and which would be sympathetic to the Soviet bloc. Moscow constantly urged Mengistu to establish such a party, but did not cease its efforts to cultivate alternatives. It is not clear to what degree if any Moscow sought to dampen the flames of political turbulence that swirled through-

[22] Soviet, East European, Cuban, and Western Communist party media reporting on Ethiopian developments during this time contained contradictory highlighting and defense of radical elements in Ethiopia as well as criticisms of the Derg. Within Ethiopia, leftist political groupings competed with each other for Soviet favor. There is some evidence of Italian Communist involvement through Eritreans. None of the radical political groupings developed a cohesive leadership structure. While the EPRP appears to have had the longest record of Soviet support, Haile Fida, Negede Gobeze, and others opposed to the EPRP also enjoyed Soviet and Cuban favor. As a party, the EPRP never functioned in a completely overt way, and there was always considerable mystery about its leadership structure as well as the source of its funds—which were ample to cover printing, travel, and organizational expenses.

[23] See David Ottaway, "Ethiopia Gets New US Arms," *The Washington Post*, Aug. 26, 1974; "US Lends Another $15 million to Ethiopia," *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), Apr. 26–27, 1975; and Constance Holden, "Ethiopia: Did Aid Speed an Inevitable Upheaval?" *Science* (Washington, DC), Dec. 27, 1974.

Indeed, US military aid to Ethiopia actually increased after the 1974 coup. Addis Ababa received eight F-5E's (its first) on April 15, 1976, and these aircraft helped blunt the Somali invasion in the summer of 1977. Moreover, Ethiopia bought for cash nearly US$120 million worth of American military equipment in fiscal year 1976 alone. The total Western "investment"—military and economic aid—in Ethiopia in 1974–76 was probably ten times greater than Communist expenditures on the country, even including unknowable sums spent by Moscow on clandestine political action, propaganda, and other intelligence operations.

[24] There can be no doubt that American policymakers confronted considerable dilemmas and confusion in this period. See, for example, *Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, Hearings of the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, August 4–6, 1976*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1976.

[25] Implications of this development in the larger context of Soviet policy in Africa are discussed in W. Scott Thompson, "The American-African Nexus in Soviet Strategy," *Horn of Africa*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1978.

[26] On this point, see "Somali-Ethiopian Turnabout," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), Aug. 4, 1977, and "Moscow's Calculations on the Horn of Africa," ibid., Aug. 12, 1977.

[27] Richard Remnek, *Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa: the Decision to Intervene*, Center for Naval Analyses Paper No. 270, Alexandria, VA, January 1980.

[28] Even before the Cubans arrived, troops and armor provided by the ultra-Marxist regime in Aden helped inflict serious damage on Somali forces in September and October 1977. Moreover, Ethiopia's F-5E's demolished the Soviet-equipped and -trained Somali air force.

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out Ethiopia in 1977–78. In this setting, the Cubans (whether acting on their own or at Soviet initiative) arranged for Negede Gobeze's return in an attempt to revive MEISON. Mengistu's sharp response to this interference indicated that arms shipments that had already totaled more than US$1 billion and the presence of some 18,000 Soviet-bloc troops (the vast majority of them Cubans) had not made him a puppet.[29]

Mengistu and Moscow continued to demonstrate considerable differences about the importance and role of a vanguard party in Ethiopia's revolution. For example, at a Kremlin banquet in November 1978 (during a visit in the course of which Ethiopia and the Soviet Union signed a cooperation treaty), Mengistu stated:

In circumstances where, in distinction from other revolutions, we have no vanguard party, the Ethiopian revolution is overcoming the difficulties I have mentioned and is achieving victory thanks to the fact that the Provisional Military Administrative Council in order to carry out the responsible task assigned to it by history is succeeding in uniting the whole nation on the basis of the revolutionary course worked out by it. In this lies the historical uniqueness of the Ethiopian revolution.[30]

By contrast, a Radio Moscow English-language commentary of December 15, 1978, stated:

The leadership of the council and the Ethiopian government will be giving every possible help and support to the Marxist-Leninist groups in the country in the building of a party of the working class, which is to become the vanguard party of the working people of Ethiopia.[31]

Indeed, it was not until December 18, 1979, that Mengistu declared the formation of the Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia.[32]

In the subsequent year and a half, COPWE has developed slowly and has acquired no separate status. It has no leadership that differentiates it from the PMGSE itself. It is essentially a propaganda organization supporting PMGSE campaigns and goals. There is no evidence of intention to give COPWE status as the genuine source of revolutionary ideology or governmental policy, and no timetable—as far as is known—for it to emerge as a full-blown Communist party.

Ethiopian nationalism. As the Derg tackles the problems of national consolidation and economic development, it finds itself the beneficiary of a strengthened popular sense of Ethiopian nationalism. In this respect, the revolutionary dialectic can be seen to have been at work in Ethiopia, but in a manner not likely ultimately to be favorable to the interests of the Soviet Union or of Marxism. Initially, the centralized system which Haile Selassie had consolidated appeared to be coming apart. The Somali attack in 1977 not only reversed this process but demonstrated how widespread and deep the underlying sense of attachment to Ethiopia is.[33]

Since the Middle Ages, Ethiopian nationalism had been closely linked to Christianity. Ethiopians saw their country as a Christian island in a Muslim/pagan sea. In 1974, the military revolutionaries reduced Christianity to a less privileged status and made a number of conciliatory gestures to Ethiopia's Muslims, who constitute perhaps 30 percent of the population and are found among all nationalities in the country (even the Amharas in Welo Province). This "affirmative action" toward Islam apparently produced dividends at the time of the attack by Muslim Somalis. Muslim Ethiopians identified with the revolution and did not, except in the Ogaden itself, to any significant extent gravitate toward the Somalis. As the fight against the Somalis continued, Mengistu appealed increasingly to Ethiopian national traditions and fear of Muslim/Arab encroachment. (In addition, Cairo's support of Somalia gave the Derg the opportunity to exploit a deep-seated sense of rivalry with Egypt that goes back to medieval times.[34])

The revolutionary motto *"Ethiopia Tikdem,"* which combines the ideas of "Ethiopia United" and "Ethiopia First" and which gained content during the anti-Somali struggle, now serves as the basis for a nationalism freed

[29] The Cuban ambassador and most of his staff were expelled immediately, and the chargé d'affaires of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen was sent back to Aden. *The New York Times,* May 26, 1978. Some Soviets may also have had a hand in the Negede undertaking. In the summer of 1978, the Soviet ambassador and several of his officers also departed.

On Mengistu's independence, see Louis Rappaport, "There's Hope for Ethiopia," *Horn of Africa,* Vol. 2, No. 1, 1979.

The estimates of Soviet military aid to Ethiopia and of Soviet-bloc military personnel in the country as of 1978 are from US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969–1978,* Washington, DC, 1980, p. 161; and US Central Intelligence Agency (hereafter, CIA), *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries 1978,* ER 79–10412U, Washington, DC, September 1979, p. 4.

[30] *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 18, 1978.

[31] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Dec. 18, 1978, p. H/2.

[32] For the text of the declaration on formation of COPWE, see *FBIS–SSA,* Dec. 21, 1979, pp. B/3–10.

[33] See John Harbeson, "Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa," *Northeast African Studies,* Vol. 1, No. 1, 1979; Michael Warr, "There's a Revolution in Ethiopia," *Horn of Africa,* Vol. 2, No. 3, 1979; and Gerry Salole, "Who are the Shoans," ibid.

[34] See, e.g., Wondimneh Tilahun, *Egypt's Imperial Aspirations over Lake Tana and the Blue Nile,* Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa University, 1979; also, Christopher Wren, "Sadat Warns Ethiopia of Force if It Obstructs Nile," *The New York Times,* June 6, 1980. Soviet resentment of Egypt's shift to the West is coincidental to and not determinant of Ethiopia's resentment of Cairo.

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A soldier at an Addis Ababa rally during the Somali-Ethiopian war: the poster, showing Ethiopian forces driving invaders out of the Ogaden, bears the slogan: "We will defend our territory with our blood."

—Camerapix-Keystone.

of the trappings of Solomonic myth and imperial pomp and tradition. Haile Selassie's imperial mystique had wide appeal to the masses but became increasingly embarrassing to Ethiopia's modernizers and intellectuals. Marxists and radicals fanned this sense of embarrassment, which made many young Ethiopians, in spite of their awareness of their country's long tradition of statehood and deep political experience—unique in Africa—feel inferior to other Africans who, everyone pretended, had emerged from the anticolonial struggle morally purified, unburdened by outdated political concepts, and therefore better prepared to develop just social, economic, and political systems. Ethiopian intellectuals no longer suffer this sense of inferiority. The revolution has disposed of it. No one in Ethiopia advocates restoration of the monarchy. While Mengistu's style has come to resemble the imperial style of leadership, it is not perceived as monarchical. Instead, it is seen as more in accord with what has been the prevailing pattern in post-colonial Africa: one-man domination of a government.[35]

How, the skeptic asks, does this analysis square with the fact that revolutionary Ethiopia has been plagued by regional dissidence and local tribal revolts? In addition to the Ogaden and Eritrean wars, as many as a dozen other regional insurgencies have flared up since 1974.

Tigres, Afars, several Oromo (Galla) groups, Falashas, and various tribal and religious groups in the northwest have openly resisted the PMGSE. Most of these movements were originally manifestations of resentment against revolutionary reforms applied indiscriminately to peoples with varied customs, land-tenure systems, and historic rights. Some have had a religious basis, although the revolt of the Falashas has been largely illusory.

Much local ferment has been a manifestation of age-old regionalism, which even Haile Selassie was unable to eliminate. Some of these movements have been nourished by external support, e.g., the Afars and some Oromos, as well as certain peoples in the northwest who were sympathetic to the now practically defunct Ethio-

[35] Jean Claude Pomonti, "Ethiopia Again in Firm Hands," Parts I and II, *Le Monde*, Nov. 6 and 7, 1979; and Bereket Habte Selassie, "Political Leadership in Crisis—The Ethiopian Case," *Horn of Africa*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1980.

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pian Democratic Union (EDU) and welcomed armed fighters from across the border. It has become increasingly evident, however, that none of these movements has the character of a genuine national liberation struggle.[36] As the PMGSE has gained confidence in its own strength and moderated revolutionary excesses, most of the regional revolts have waned. None, except the struggle being waged by the Tigre Popular Liberation Front (TPLF), which is linked tenuously to the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF), presents a major problem for the PMGSE at the present time.[37]

The two strongest dissident movements in the country—the EPLF and the TPLF—are both Marxist. Their Marxism gives them a certain degree of coherence which confounds PMGSE efforts to defeat them. Both maintain links with Communist movements abroad,[38] and Mengistu must occasionally ask himself whether the Soviets may not be encouraging some of these links. Ironically, the Marxism of both these movements makes them suspect with anti-Marxist Arab states who might otherwise be a source of substantial aid. The web of contradictions in which these movements are caught—including the inability of the EPLF to compromise with other Eritrean rebel movements—does not justify much optimism that they could lay the basis for separate existence of the territories over which they aspire to gain control. War-weariness of the local population makes it likely that more moderate policies by the PMGSE would stand a fair chance of winning the majority of the people of Tigray and Eritrea to the side of the central government.[39]

As for the western and southwestern parts of the country—the last regions over which imperial power was consolidated in the late 19th century—these have been the least disturbed by resistance and dissidence during the revolution. This fact soundly refutes the shallow notion, fostered at times by both Marxist Ethiopians and Western liberals, that Ethiopian nationalism rested on a conflation of outdated 3000-year-old imperial tradition and Amhara predominance.[40]

Can Marxism in general and the Soviets in particular benefit from the sense of Ethiopian nationalism and the centralized state which Soviet and Cuban military intervention have helped reconsolidate? As far as Marxism is concerned, we have the curious situation wherein all the main contenders for predominance in Ethiopia purport to be Marxists. The EPLF, TPLF, and EPRP all claim to be more genuinely Marxist than their opponents of the PMGSE, although the genuineness of the Marxism of all of them is open to serious question. The PMGSE's Marxism has a simplistic, declarative, ritualistic quality which East European diplomats within the Ethiopian capital find embarrassing. Some Soviets and Cubans must find it embarrassing too, for it has little relevance to the realities of power and control in the country.

Marxism, as such, seems to offer no solution to the problems of creating a political party or of regularizing the constitutional structure of the military regime. (Nor do Marxist/Soviet prescriptions for dealing with the nationality question seem any longer to have much appeal.) After the nearly fatal misadventures of 1975–77, Mengistu is not about to again risk losing power to leaders of a political party. As for constitutional structure—is it really necessary to revise much of what the revolutionary government inherited and has made do with quite successfully? One can detect a civilianization of the PMGSE (Mengistu and other Derg members are now seldom mentioned in the press with their military ranks and frequently appear in civilian dress), and the term "provisional" could be removed from the title of the government. But neither development would be allowed to alter basic power relationships.

These are fundamental issues on which the Soviets—given their own doctrinaire bent, as well as their desire to consolidate their influence in Ethiopia—find it difficult to be flexible or patient. Herein lies the most basic reason why the future course of Ethiopian-Soviet relations is not likely to be smooth. The revolution in Ethiopia is already well on its way to stabilization in patterns that are for the most part a natural extension of Ethiopian nationalist development.[41] The people are ready to settle down and devote their primary energies to economic development. It is not these aspirations, but intellectual impatience, revolutionary turbulence, divisive regionalism, and tribalism which the Soviets have been skillful at exploiting in seeking to expand their

[36] For a contrary view regarding the Oromos (Galla), see Richard Greenfield and Mohammed Hassan, "Interpretation of Oromo Nationality," *Horn of Africa*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1980.

[37] See Gayle Smith, "Ethiopian Dissidents Step up Guerrilla War in Northern Tigre Province," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), Feb. 5, 1981. (Note that the province in question is denoted as "Tigray" on the map, in accordance with the usage of the US Board of Geographic Names—*Eds.*)

[38] On the TPLF's ties, see ibid.; on the EPLF's, see Yodfat, op. cit.

[39] For background on the Eritrean movements, see Pliny the Middle-Aged, "Eclectic Notes on the Eritrean Liberation Movement: E Pluribus Unum," *Ethiopianist Notes*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1978.

[40] On this point, see Gene Ellis, "The Feudal Paradigm as a Hindrance to Understanding Ethiopia," *Journal of Modern African Studies* (Cambridge, Eng.), No. 2, 1976; Legesse Lemma's review of that article in *Ethiopianist Notes*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1978; and Gene Ellis, "Feudalism in Ethiopia: a Further Comment on Paradigms and Their Use," *Northeast African Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1979–80.

[41] This development was foreseen by John Harbeson. See "Toward a Political Theory of the Ethiopian Revolution," in *Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Ethiopian Studies*.

The theme of continuity has also been noted by Marina Ottaway, who wrote in 1976 that "the political system of Ethiopia in 1975 remained just as detached from society as it had been under the Emperor." See "Social Classes and Corporate Interests in the Ethiopian Revolution," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, No. 3, 1976, p. 481.

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influence. Soviet arms and Cuban soldiers enabled the PMGSE to fend off its foreign enemies and maintain its grip on power, and for this Mengistu is grateful. However, this gratitude is likely to erode rapidly as the poverty of Soviet prescriptions—and aid—for dealing with the real problems of national development becomes more obvious.

The extreme political turbulence of the period from 1974 through 1978—as severe as any society has endured in modern times in the wake of revolution—has made ideological Marxism and debate about the aims of the revolution and about the structure of the government and society unattractive not only to the military leadership in Ethiopia but to most of Ethiopian society. University and secondary school campuses are models of good order. The ritualistic repetition of Marxist-Leninist slogans and grim pictures of hero-Communists mask the absence of serious study of Marxism as a live political/social faith. *The Ethiopian Marxist Review*, published by the EPRP in exile in Rome, provokes little interest within Ethiopia. Shelves in bookstores are crammed with unsold Marxist classics in English and Amharic, while *Time* and *Newsweek* are still sold on the streets and people depend on them and Western radio broadcasts for news of the world.

The EPRP remains a code word for generalized opposition to the Derg and is said to still control remote areas in the northwest. However, these do not appear to be outposts of Yenan-style communism. Rather they are regions where local circumstances and resentments make opposition to the PMGSE popular. Can the EPRP return as a politically competitive force? It seems prob-

Backed by posters depicting Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin and flanked by Ethiopia's Christian and Islamic leaders, Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam (left center), Chairman of the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia, and PMGSE Vice Chairman, Lt. Col. Atnafu Abate, lead the September 1977 observance of the third anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution. Atnafu Abate was purged two months later. —Guy Terran-Gamma/Liaison.

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lematic. The party has enunciated no clear-cut program which has relevance to the urgent problems facing Ethiopia today.[42]

The religion factor. Another feature of revolutionary Ethiopia which is likely to be a major obstacle to the spread of Marxist influence is an identifiable surge in religion, particularly Christianity. This development is paradoxical, for the Derg has shown little warmth toward Ethiopian Orthodoxy, which it stripped of most landholdings under the land reforms. However, the revolutionary leadership from the beginning recognized the strength of religious feeling in the country and the manner in which religious tradition formed part of the very fabric of Ethiopian life.

As a consequence, the PMGSE has not engaged in any significant antireligious propaganda. Indeed, during the entire revolutionary period, Ethiopia's two principal religious dignitaries—the Orthodox patriarch and the chief Muslim mullah of Addis Ababa—have been present, placed near the PMGSE leadership, at all state occasions. Although Mengistu has not yet been seen at public religious ceremonies, his wife—with a considerable entourage—participated in the 1979 and 1980 annual pilgrimages to Kulubi for the feast of St. Gabriel.

There has been a tremendous increase in the number of Ethiopians—Christian and Muslim—making the annual Kulubi pilgrimage in the years since the revolution.[43] The Ethiopian Orthodox Church seems to be making better use of its reduced resources. The peasantry, enjoying moderate prosperity as a result of land reform and increased cash earnings, still contributes generously to the support of parish churches. City and country churches are well maintained, and some new ones are even being built. The churches are filled to bursting on Sunday mornings with believers of all ages, including young men in business suits and young women in the embroidered white national costume. Tombs surrounding Old Trinity, one of the capital's oldest churches, include several constructed for Marxist victims of the "red terror"—some of the tombs being in a dramatic modern style capped by a red star or a hammer and sickle.

Mengistu has perpetuated imperial Ethiopia's toleration of Islam and, indeed, improved conditions for Muslims, several of whom hold prominent positions in the government. The Minister of Communications is Muslim, as are Ethiopia's ambassador to the United Nations, the President of Addis Ababa University, and the Director of Ethiopian Airlines. Islamic feast days are now observed as public holidays, and mosques are as well attended as churches.

Religious and national traditions also flourish in another related field: arts and handicrafts. Painting, already highly developed before the revolution, has expanded further, with emphasis almost entirely on religious and historical themes. No original revolutionary iconography has developed. Addis Ababa shops offer thousands of parchment and canvas paintings of saints and kings, but no portraits of revolutionary heroes or events.

The military drain. If religion and nationalism stand as basic obstacles to the penetration of Marxist ideology (whether Soviet or other) in Ethiopia, there are also serious problems of a more practical nature which are

A gravesite at Addis Ababa's Old Trinity.

—Paul B. Henze.

[42] Michael Chege, an admirer of the EPRP, has written despairingly that the Derg "will be remembered in history for having committed the infamous act of carrying out a capitalist revolution in the name of Marxism and, even worse, for having destroyed Ethiopian socialists in the name of socialism." See his "The Revolution Betrayed: Ethiopia, 1974–79," in *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* No. 3, 1979, pp. 370. On the nature of Ethiopia's "Marxism," see also Richard F. Sherman, "Marxism in the Horn of Africa," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1980.

For a contrary interpretation, which sees everything that has happened in the Horn in recent years as undifferentiated gain for the Soviets (and which takes little account of the internal dynamics of the countries involved), see Stephen David, "Realignment in the Horn: the Soviet Advantage," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Fall 1979.

[43] Attendance at Kulubi was estimated at 120,000 in 1971 and 250,000 in 1975. *Ethiopian Herald,* Jan. 18, 1976. In 1980, it was variously estimated at between 350,000 and 500,000.

On the strength of Christianity in today's Ethiopia, see David Ottaway, "Coptic Church, Home Restaurants Thrive in Marxist Ethiopia," *The Washington Post,* Dec. 12, 1980.

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likely to generate increasing resistance to Soviet political influence in the country. One problem area is the enormous costs that the Addis Ababa government currently must bear for its military defense. This issue has two aspects: first, the major threats that Ethiopia faces today were in large part exacerbated by Soviet policies in the Horn in the decade before the Ethiopian revolution; second, Ethiopia's budget is strained to the breaking point by the costs of maintaining an expanded military for which the Soviet Union has provided the arms but none of the daily maintenance costs.

On the first point, Addis Ababa is aware that it was not the West that enabled (and, who knows, perhaps even encouraged) the Somalis to attack. Addis Ababa realizes, too, that it was not "Western imperialist" support that turned Eritrean political dissidence into a major insurgency that might have achieved de facto independence in 1978 but for its internal wrangling. (In the case of Eritrea, it should be noted, Mengistu's own lack of moderation pushed a large part of the population into open support of a rebellion in which it had previously avoided participation.[44])

Today the PMGSE has 100,000 troops in Eritrea and yet has less effective control than Haile Selassie was able to maintain with a maximum of 25,000. In all, Ethiopia now has between 250,000 and 300,000 men under arms. The Soviet Union has generously delivered US$2 billion worth of arms, but has contributed almost nothing to cover local costs of training, housing, clothing, and feeding the massively expanded Ethiopian military establishment. Moreover, the local expenses of some 12,000 to 15,000 Cubans must also be met from the Ethiopian budget.[45] There is considerable irony in this situation, for in the early 1970's, Marxist students used to berate the United States for its military aid to the imperial regime, charging that this distorted Ethiopia's priorities and diverted to military purposes resources that should have gone to education, health, and economic development. Yet, the Ethiopian armed forces never totaled more than 45,000 during imperial times.

No Ethiopian expects that the costs of Soviet arms assistance will ever have to be repaid; the Russians presumably will cancel these debts at some future date, as a token of their "generosity." But this offers no solution



A Cuban artillery company photographed in October 1978 in a front-line defense position at Jijiga in Ethiopia's Ogaden.

—Bernard Couret-Gamma/Liaison.

to the pressing problem of the military drain on the national budget. Ethiopia cannot afford to go on keeping 300,000 men under arms unless the Soviet Union undertakes major budgetary support, or unless the Derg abandons most economic development goals.

Economic pincers. Indeed, Ethiopia is fast approaching a major economic crisis, and the sterility of Marxism and Soviet/Cuban models in the face of the country's problems is growing more evident with each passing day. The reserves in the economy and financial system which the revolutionary government inherited are approaching exhaustion. Nothing underscores this fact so dramatically as the petroleum situation. Ethiopia

[44] See Tamene Asmare, "Ethiopia Halts Peasant March, Talks with Arab Neighbors," *The Washington Post,* June 4, 1976; David Ottaway, "Full-Scale Warfare is Raging in Eritrea," ibid., Feb. 7, 1975; idem, "US Seen Pressuring Ethiopia to Call Off Peasant March," ibid., June 12, 1976; and John Darnton, "Eritrean Guerrillas Wearing Down Ethiopian Troops," *The New York Times,* Mar. 2, 1977.

[45] A precise figure on the Cuban military force in Ethiopia is elusive. Clearly, the numbers are down from the levels at the height of the Somali-Ethiopian war. The CIA estimate is 13,000. See *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954–79,* ER 80-10318U, Washington, DC, October 1980, p. 15.

The Cubans have claimed a smaller involvement. In December 1979, Fidel Castro stated that at the peak of Cuban involvement, there had been 12,000 Cubans in Ethiopia. See *Discurso pronunciado por el Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz, Primer Secretario del CC del Partido Comunista de Cuba y Presidente de los Consejos de Estado y de Ministros, en la clausura del II periodo de sesiones de 1979 de la Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, Palacio de las Convenciones, 27 de diciembre de 1979* (Speech by Commander in Chief Fidel Castro Ruz, First Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Cuba and President of the Councils of State and Ministers at the End of the Second Session in 1979 of the National Assembly of Popular Power, Palace of Conventions, December 27, 1979). This is an unpublished but printed document of the Departamento de Versiones Taquigráficas.

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produces no oil of its own, and some 70 percent of foreign-exchange earnings now go to pay for petroleum imports procured on its behalf by the USSR through short-term agreements giving Ethiopia little price advantage. Export receipts, which come primarily from coffee, have been declining as a result both of nationalizations in the coffee trade and of the decline in world coffee prices.[46]

Unless the Soviets in an unexpected burst of generosity come to the rescue, Ethiopia will find itself confronted in 1982 or 1983 by a situation where its entire export earnings must be spent on petroleum. Worse still, Ethiopia's alliance with the Soviet Union has kept it from capitalizing on the current worldwide search for new oil that has recently brought its neighbor, Sudan, discoveries which in two or three years should satisfy its domestic needs. A country as large as Ethiopia must have oil. American firms searching 10 years ago found some indications of oil, but exploration ceased with the revolution. Although the Russians have indicated a willingness to help Ethiopia resume the search, nothing concrete has happened. The Russians have other priorities.

[46] Pranay Gupte, "Ethiopian Civil War Hurts the Economy," *The New York Times*, July 10, 1980.

Not surprisingly, Mengistu's ministers are giving urgent thought to means of raising export receipts. A prime candidate would seem to be agriculture (the country lacks exploitable minerals, and its textile and food-processing industries barely meet growing domestic requirements). Already in the 1950's, development specialists saw enormous potential in Ethiopia for supplying food and meat to the Middle East and Europe. However, schemes for producing in Eritrea fruit, vegetables, and dairy products for export, already basically frustrated by the 1967 closure of the Suez Canal, were dealt a further setback by the insurgency in the region. (At the time, Eritrea accounted for one third of Ethiopia's industrial and modern agricultural production.) Moreover, the 1974 revolution cut short projects in other parts of the country—based on both foreign and domestic capital—for growing and processing spices, tea, food, and industrial crops.

Land reform, while releasing new productive forces, has not solved the export problem. To be sure, in most of the revolutionary years, harvests have been good. The 1980 grain harvest was excellent, and farmers are maintaining large herds. The problem is that the government is having difficulty persuading the peasants to sell their produce at established prices because supplies of consumer goods have been falling as all but essential

Cultivation by tractor and by more traditional means at the Abyot (Revolution) Cooperative in October 1980.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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imports have been cut off. Now relatively prosperous by local standards and able to feed themselves, the farmers are not eager to part with their produce or to grow industrial and export crops unless they perceive clear advantages. Lacking means of coercion in rural areas, the PMGSE can only resort to vain exhortation. Collectivization has been encouraged, but the wary, individualistic Ethiopian peasants need no one's advice to realize the disadvantages of giving up control over land and livestock. So collectivization has made no headway. The rural population has learned to use peasant associations to defend its own interests. In its approach to the peasantry, the revolutionary leadership is hostage to its own success.[47]

Ethiopian agriculture therefore offers little prospect of becoming a quick source of increased exports. Nor is there much future in traditional Marxist/Soviet prescriptions for dealing with this kind of situation: dispatch of political activists to the countryside to increase the political awareness of the peasantry, levying of quotas for export production on state farms, or development of more state farms. (Mengistu has already exposed the inefficiency of some state farms.[48]) By the same token, there is little point to importing more East German tractors, which would only consume more petroleum and replace labor already available in surplus.

The PMGSE has not yet brought itself to admit what most Ethiopians know—that private enterprise with incentives could produce an increasing flow of varied exports. A small but growing class of indigenous businessmen and commercial farmers emerged in Ethiopia before the revolution and was beginning to have an impact on the economy. Some of these men work in the management of nationalized enterprises, while others sit idle; surprisingly few have gone into exile. They are a resource to be put back to work in the future when the present leadership—or more pragmatic successors—liberate themselves from Soviet economic dogma.

Abandonment of "socialist principles" in the economy is likely to come piecemeal. The first field where this might occur is tourism. Ethiopians look south and see that Kenya's earnings from tourism are approaching US$200 million a year, with prospects for steady increases without need for high additional domestic investment (development for tourism can be a good source of investment from abroad).[49] No country in Africa has a wider variety of attractions for tourists than Ethiopia, and a good basis for the tourist industry was laid before the revolution. There is talk of a lively debate within the PMGSE last year regarding tourism. Marxist ideologues apparently argued that tourism would corrupt Ethiopian society and divert resources. They also had a deeper fear that tourism would revitalize links with the West. However, the ideologues evidently lost, for a pragmatic policy encouraging tourism is now in effect, with visas already being issued on demand to prospective tourists. Indeed, tourists have begun to arrive again, and the Addis Ababa Hilton now enjoys a 75 percent occupancy rate. Large-scale tourism in Ethiopia cannot rely on the Hilton, however. Other facilities must be refurbished, and new ones, built. Construction of new hotels will be difficult without foreign private investment, and the capacity to handle a large flow of tourists can be created only by permitting private enterprise to operate with relative freedom. For now, performance lags, and many questions remain to be worked out before Ethiopia can realize even US$25 million a year from tourism.

Prospects for quick returns from other forms of economic liberalization are less encouraging, especially if the liberalization is half-hearted. The tactic of preempting the civilian Left by adopting radical measures—practiced so effectively by Mengistu and his colleagues in the first three years of the revolution—is irrelevant now to the problems of the economy. However, the Derg is still embarrassed about admitting the economic bankruptcy of communism. Tanzania is still praised as a model—but not much imitated, for Tanzania offers examples mostly of what to avoid. Kenya's bustling capitalist economy and its comfortable political pragmatism could eventually have more effect on Ethiopia's economic development than is now apparent. The two countries are officially close friends, and travel between them does not require visas.

Prospects

As one assesses the prospects for the future of the Ethiopian revolution, it is clear that the Soviet Union and its allies are of decreasing relevance to the solution of Mengistu's domestic and foreign problems. For exam-

[47] See Marina Ottaway, "Land Reform in Ethiopia, 1974–77," *African Studies Review*, April 1979; Alula Abate and Tesfaye Teklu, "Land Reform and Peasant Associations in Ethiopia," *Northeast African Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1980; Paul Brietzke, "Land Reform in Revolutionary Ethiopia," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, No. 4, 1976; John M. Cohen, "Effects of Green Revolution Strategies on Tenants and Small-scale Landowners in the Chilalo Region of Ethiopia," *Journal of Developing Areas* (Macomb, IL), Vol. 9, No. 3, 1975; John Cohen et al., "Rural Development Issues following Ethiopian Land Reform," *Africa Today* (Denver, CO), Vol. 23, No. 2, 1976; and John Cohen and Peter Koehn, "Rural and Urban Land Reform in Ethiopia," *African Law Studies* (South Hackensack, NJ), No. 14, 1977.

[48] For example, on a tour of Sidamo Region in March 1979, Mengistu criticized workers at an agricultural unit for "consuming more than what is produced . . . ." *FBIS–SSA*, Mar. 15, 1979, p. B/1.

[49] By contrast, Ethiopia's tourism receipts were US$3.1 million, US$3.8 million, and US$6.0 million in 1977, 1978, and 1979. PMGSE, Ethiopian Tourism Commission, *An Overview of Tourism in Ethiopia*, Addis Ababa, May 1980.

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ple, Soviet arms assistance continues to provide Ethiopia an upper hand in the struggle with Somalia, yet the Somali threat is fated to diminish unless Mogadiscio can find major new sources of aid—an unlikely prospect.

Chances for an Ethiopian-Somali reconciliation appear exceedingly dim. Yet a de facto cessation of hostilities is not entirely out of the realm of possibility. Much depends on Somalia's Siad Barre, who took a major gamble that his break with the Soviets and Western concern about the Middle East after the Iranian revolution would secure him new large-scale backing to supplement assistance from Egypt and money from Saudi Arabia, which would enable him to go down in history as the unifier of all Somali-populated territories.[50] But he lost his gamble. The Somali attack enabled Mengistu to overcome his most threatening internal political opposition and emerge as the clear defender of Ethiopian national integrity. It also permitted him to acquire large quantities of Soviet military equipment without surrendering control of his own governmental apparatus to the Russians or Cubans. With this equipment (including new aircraft) and Cuban training, the Ethiopians in late 1980 pushed Somali forces, and a large part of the local nomadic population as well, over the border and established firm control of roads and towns in the Ogaden.[51] Unless Siad obtains significant aid from the West, Ethiopia's forces are now fully capable of confining him without further help from the Russians and Cubans. Somalia, in turn, is flooded with refugees and close to economic collapse.[52] The only question is whether Siad can politically survive the inevitable decision to give up his grandiose ambitions.[53]

Reintegration of the Ogaden into Ethiopia—with or without substantial return of ethnic Somalis who have fled—does not appear to be a priority matter for the PMGSE, for Menistu seems less and less inclined to take any steps to restructure the country along Soviet-style nationality lines. This attitude toward the Ogaden is not likely to change unless exploitable oil is found there.

Much more serious than the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict for the future of the Derg and for the Horn in general is the conflict in Eritrea. Here the attitude and actions of the Russians and Cubans are not conducive to the sort of settlement that Mengistu is likely to accept, but some settlement is essential if the Ethiopian economy is not to suffer severe hemorrhage.

From the outset, Mengistu has shown himself an ardent Ethiopian nationalist on the question of Eritrea.[54] However, as he has adopted more and more of the characteristics of a traditional leader of Ethiopia, his understanding of Ethiopian history and identification with its main currents seem to have deepened. If Mengistu is capable of gaining a stable hold on leadership in Ethiopia, after the manner of the two great unifiers and modernizers of the country—the emperors Menelik II and Haile Selassie I—he may be able to grasp the necessity of compromise in Eritrea.[55]

Time is not on Mengistu's side in Eritrea. The longer the insurgency goes on, the greater will be the diversion of PMGSE resources from productive purposes, the decline in Ethiopia's economic situation, and the loss of Eritrean skills and talent. Eritrea could become Mengistu's undoing, as it was Haile Selassie's. The region has a high potential for rapid new development in both industry and agriculture, and its talented and well-trained people could make a major contribution to Ethiopian development in many fields. Conciliatory policies should still be able to win most Eritreans back to supporting—or at least tolerating—the central government.[56]

When it comes to solving the Eritrean situation, Mengistu must find the Russians and Cubans of very little help—indeed, they constitute part of the problem. Militarily, the Cubans have shown more "conscience" regarding Eritrea than about any other international issue in which they have become involved, i.e., they have avoided engaging in combat against the Eritrean insurgency, which they supported in the 1960's and

[50] Siad was not alone in overestimating his chances. A considerable body of academic opinion emerged in 1977–78 to support the Somali cause. For example, I. M. Lewis wrote, ". . . the tide seems to have begun to turn decisively in favour of the Somali cause." See "Has the Dergue Had its Day?" *Horn of Africa*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1978.

[51] "Every Fourth Person in Somalia a Refugee," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, May 21, 1980; and Jay Ross, "Ethiopian Push Weakens Somali Guerrillas," *The Washington Post*, Nov. 23, 1980.

[52] Gregory Jaynes, "In Somalia, Every Day's an Emergency," *The New York Times*, Nov. 3, 1980; Edward Girardet, "Somalia: Not Just a Crisis, a Disaster," *The Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 21, 1980; and idem, "Somalia—4000 Refugees Daily," ibid., Mar. 25, 1981.

[53] See David D. Laitin, "The War in the Ogaden: Implications for Siyaad's Role in Somali History," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, No. 1, 1979.

[54] The official Ethiopian position has remained that Eritrea is an integral part of Ethiopia. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Eritrea Then and Now*, Addis Ababa, 1976.

[55] There is precedent for compromise on Eritrea in the experience of both emperors. Menelik II, even after defeating the Italians at Adowa in 1896, had to reconcile himself to the continuation of Eritrea as an Italian colony. Although Haile Selassie desired to incorporate Eritrea into Ethiopia after World War II, he accepted a United Nations–sponsored federation in 1952 and tolerated it for 10 years—longer, it should be remembered, than any other federation has lasted in Africa. See Harold G. Marcus, "Menelik II," in Norman Robert Bennett, Ed., *Leadership in Eastern Africa: Six Political Biographies*, Boston, MA, Boston University Press, 1968; and Leonard Mosley, *Haile Selassie, the Conquering Lion*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964.

It would not be contrary to these historical experiences for Mengistu to accept some arrangement for autonomy as a basis for an Eritrean settlement.

[56] Not all observers share this view. Bereket Habte Selassie anticipates a success of the "Eritrean freedom fighters" which, he predicts, "will mean the same end for the Dergue that it did for Haile Selassie." *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa*, New York, NY, and London, Monthly Review Press, 1980. See also Dan Connell, "The Birth of the Eritrean Nation," *Horn of Africa*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1980; and idem, "Repression as a Way of Life," ibid., Vol. 3, No. 2, 1980.

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Ahmed Mohamed Nasser, Chairman of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), photographed in Khartoum, Sudan, in 1977.

—Contact.

early 1970's.[57] Yet, such scrupulous behavior does not appear to have given Havana any special credibility or leverage with any of the Eritrean factions.

The Soviets are discredited for having played all sides in Eritrea. It is quite conceivable that Moscow is now operating behind other countries—just as it did when it covertly supported Eritrean separatism—to work out a reconciliation between the EPLF and the PMGSE on the basis of a common devotion to Marxism. The East Germans may be the Soviet proxy in this respect. However, there is no evidence that this effort to bring about a Marxist Eritrea, or rumored similar attempts by the South Yemenis, Libyans, Syrians, or Italian Communists (which have probably also had Soviet encouragement), have produced any grounds for optimism. Indeed, Communist mediators in this situation run the risk of worsening their own relations with both sides.[58] Moscow may still cherish the kind of scheme Fidel Castro tried to implement for it in March 1977 in a last-ditch effort to avert the complications created by the Somali July invasion: a plan for federation of the entire Horn, with Ethiopia and Somalia joined in a common socialist state which would include an autonomous Ogaden and an autonomous Eritrea.[59] But such a grand Marxist "synthesis" is hardly practical in the real world.

A more practical solution has been pushed by Sudan's Nimeiri, based on his own settlement in 1971—with Ethiopia's help—of Khartoum's bloody 17-year struggle with southern rebels. In that struggle, each side was strong enough to deny the other victory, and the foreign powers that had intervened were tired of the involvement. Nimeiri conceded genuine autonomy to the south, honored his promises, and consequently turned the region into a primary area of political support for himself.

Could Mengistu do the same with Eritrea? There is probably no question of greater importance for the future of the Horn. Yet it has no simple answer. The Eritreans are less unified than were the Sudanese southerners when settlement was achieved, and more affected by outside ideologies: Marxism and Arabism.[60]

Repeated Sudanese-sponsored unity conferences have produced no results to date.[61] Nevertheless, it is only Nimeiri and the West who have something to offer Mengistu—or any subsequent Ethiopian leadership—on Eritrea. Since the UN settlement of 1952, the West has recognized Eritrea as an integral part of Ethiopia but has underscored the territory's special status deriving from 50 years of Italian colonial rule. The trump card which Nimeiri holds is his capacity to cut off all support to all Eritrean insurgents, who cannot maintain their strength without some degree of safe haven in Sudan. However, Nimeiri has steadily reoriented his country toward the West since the mid-1970's. He is militarily dependent upon the US and has attracted important Arab and

[57] See "Castro's Hesitation on Eritrea—Mengistu's Visit to Havana," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, May 3, 1978. The Cubans showed fewer "scruples" in the case of Somalia, where after training the Somali guerrillas that infiltrated the Ogaden in 1975–76 and creating the Eritrean insurgency that gave the Somalis the opportunity to invade the Ogaden with regular troops in 1977, the Cubans then played a major role in defeating them.

[58] See, for example, "Honecker's Visit to Ethiopia and South Yemen," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Nov. 20, 1979; also, Raman C. Bhardwaj, "The Growing Externalization of the Eritrean Movement," *Horn of Africa*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1979. The Derg finds the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)—a more conservative, Muslim-oriented movement—less offensive than the EPLF.

[59] See David Ottaway, "Castro: Playing Kissinger in the Horn," *The Washington Post*, Mar. 18, 1977.

[60] See, for example, Darnton, loc. cit.

[61] Gregory Jaynes, "Sudan Offering to Mediate in Ethiopia's Eritrea War," *The New York Times*, Dec. 4, 1980; and Edward Girardet, "Cubans, Curfews, Kalashnikovs Calm Eritrea," *The Christian Science Monitor*, Feb. 27, 1981.

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Western economic investment. Moreover, he requires Western backing if he is to successfully close the Sudanese-Eritrean frontier and deny Sudanese territory to the Eritrean rebels. Therefore, he would find it exceedingly difficult to take decisive steps to undermine the Eritrean insurgency as long as Ethiopia remains dependent upon the Soviet Union and Cuba and declares itself to be a Communist state.

Consequently, the position of the Russians and Cubans in Ethiopia grows less comfortable with each month that passes. There is little personal rapport between representatives of either nationality and the Ethiopians. The Cuban soldiers are not needed in the Ogaden and apparently will not fight in Eritrea. Their role seems much less essential than in Angola. Mengistu has avoided letting his own security depend on the Cubans, or—for that matter—on the Soviets or East Germans, who are prominent as advisers to the Derg on security and police matters. There are no Cuban military units in the capital. Those stationed an hour away to the west, at the large Tatek Meda camp, have little to do. Cubans continue to train and do support work for Ethiopian military units in other parts of the country. But the time appears near when the number of Cubans in the country could be sharply reduced. Such a reduction would not only ease Ethiopia's budgetary problems; it would also be welcomed by Mengistu's neighbors—the Kenyans and Sudanese—who are hopeful of drawing him into a more genuinely nonaligned position. Further, it could help ease Ethiopia's relations with some of the moderate Arab states.[62]

Without an Eritrean settlement, Mengistu must persuade Moscow to mount a massive aid program—on the scale of Soviet aid to Cuba—to enable "communism" to survive in Ethiopia. How can the Russians—with the burdens of Afghanistan and Poland and with their own stagnant economy—afford it? Only wishful thinking would lay much store on the prospects. Mengistu, in crunches, has shown himself to be anything but a wishful thinker. With time, his well-developed sense of realism may lead him to see the advantages of a Sudanese/Western-facilitated Eritrean settlement as well as of non-Marxist solutions to his country's pressing political and economic problems.

[62] See Said Yusuf Abdi, "Cuba's Role in Africa: Revolutionary or Reactionary," *Horn of Africa*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1978.

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Books

Brinksmanship in Poland

By Tadeusz Szafar

PIOTR S. WANDYCZ. *The United States and Poland.* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1980.

RADIO FREE EUROPE RESEARCH. *The Pope In Poland.* Munich, 1979.

RADIO FREE EUROPE RESEARCH. *August 1980: The Strikes in Poland.* Munich, October 1980.

R. F. LESLIE, Ed. *The History of Poland Since 1863.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980.

PETER J. POTICHNYJ, Ed. *Poland and the Ukraine: Past and Present.* Edmonton/Toronto, The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980.

MAURICE D. SIMON and ROGER E. KANET. *Background to Crisis: Policy and Politics in Gierek's Poland.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1981.

JAN B. DE WEYDENTHAL. *The Communists of Poland: An Historical Outline.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

GEORGE BLAZYNSKI. *Flashpoint Poland.* Elmsford, NY, Pergamon Press, 1979.

ADAM MICHNIK. *L'Église et la Gauche: le dialogue polonais* (The Church and the Left: The Polish Dialogue). Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1979.

WHEN, at the beginning of July 1980, a new wave of "industrial unrest" started throughout Poland, Western public opinion, distracted by the Moscow Olympic games and the less than satisfactory boycott of them, did not pay much attention. By mid-August, with the massive sit-in at the Gdansk shipyard and the appearance of quasi-political demands for free and self-governing trade unions and legalization of workers' right to strike, the strikes were still widely regarded as direct continuations of the "events" of 1956, 1970, and 1976. Even a couple of months later, when the concessions wrested from Communist authorities were taking shape, the main concern of the West was still with the possibility of a Soviet armed intervention along the lines of those carried out previously in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. Today, nearly a year—and four prime ministers—later, the extent and depth of the changes wrought by the peaceful Polish revolution continue to remain relatively unnoticed or—what is even worse—misunderstood.

This state of affairs should cause no surprise. As Professor Edwin O. Reischauer aptly remarked in his foreword to Piotr S. Wandycz's volume on US–Polish relations,

> *Poland has never loomed large in the American mind or in American foreign policy . . . . In fact, during the two centuries of American national existence, Poland has been a fully independent nation for only twenty years.* (p. vii)

The links between Western Europe and Poland go back to the Middle Ages, but in recent times it has become common even in Europe to view Poland as only one component of a much larger Central and East European issue, or even as an element in the Soviet-German balance of power.

IN VIEW OF the significance of the latest Polish developments—their impact has been compared to the Soviet-Yugoslav and Sino-Soviet splits—it is, indeed, a pity that Western politicians, scholars, and general readers will not be adequately served by the recent crop of books on this neglected subject. To be sure, the two collections of day-to-day dispatches and documents on the Pope's visit to Poland and on the August 1980 strikes, put out by Radio Free Europe Research, are absolutely indispensable to all serious observers of the Polish scene; however, they do not pretend to provide any analysis in depth of current events and offer no general conclusions. Given the volatile character of recent developments, such an

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analysis may not yet have become possible. But books and essays written by historians, economists, political scientists, or journalists should at least provide a reader with sufficiently extensive and reliable background information to enable him to follow the news intelligently and to draw his own conclusions. Unfortunately, the reader of many of the books under review is going to be disappointed in this regard.

Relatively speaking, the historians come off best. In addition to the previously mentioned book by Wandycz, which actually tells much more about Poland over the last two centuries than the title promises, the volume of essays edited by R. F. Leslie is an important contribution to the still rather modest body of literature in English on Polish history. However, as often happens in books written by several scholars, the respective chapters are of uneven quality, Jan M. Ciechanowski's treatment of Soviet-Polish relations during and immediately after the Second World War being the least satisfactory. As in his earlier book on the 1944 Warsaw uprising, Ciechanowski bends over backward to give the Soviets all the benefit of the doubt, ignoring even hard evidence of their ill will produced by independent Polish and Western historians.[1] While other contributors present a more balanced picture, a serious shortcoming of the volume is the lack of a synthetic overview.

The Potichnyj symposium on Polish-Ukrainian relations suffers from the latter deficiency as well, but the three concluding essays, by Hugh Seton-Watson, Jaroslaw Pelenski, and Adam Bromke, do try to get the main problems into focus. This reviewer found particularly thought-provoking some of Pelenski's reflections on the relationship between the active resistance of the Poles and the Ukrainians, on the one hand, and the extent of their denationalization inside the Russian empire, on the other. It seems a pity that no one has tried to appraise how, in the more recent period, the separate though limited sovereignty of the Poles and its absence in the Ukrainian case have shaped the intensity and the forms of resistance offered by the two nations respectively to continuing efforts at enforced Sovietization.

Generally speaking, the primary reason that historians have most to offer lies in the useful perspective they provide on recent events. Most observers of the current scene in Poland, for instance, have pointed out the youthfulness of the participants in the opposition movements. The leaders are in their 30's; the rank and file, in their 20's. Of course, revolutions in general are made by young people, but Polish historians have identified a specific kind of regularity in the centuries-old struggle of the Poles for national liberation: defeats breed apathy and incline members of the older generation to find some kind of accommodation with the oppressors in the name of political realism. In his introductory chapter to the collection edited by Maurice Simon and Roger Kanet, for example, Adam Bromke, in line with his general aversion to active national resistance and his belief that such resistance cannot improve the fortunes of the Polish people, contends that "too much pressure . . . could be counterproductive. The demands for a change of the communist system itself play into the hands of

[1] Jan M. Ciechanowski, *The Warsaw Rising of 1944*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1974.

Reviewers in This Issue

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GEORG BRUNNER—Professor of Public Law, Soviet and East European Law, and Political Science, Würzburg University, and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien (Cologne); author of *Politische Soziologie der UdSSR* (Political Sociology of the USSR), 1977, *Einführung in das Recht der DDR* (Introduction to the Law of the GDR), 1979, and *Vergleichende Regierungslehre* (Comparative Government), 1979; coeditor of *Gruppeninteressen und Entscheidungsprozess in der Sowjetunion* (Group Interests and the Decision Process in the Soviet Union), 1975, *Einparteisystem und bürokratische Herrschaft in der Sowjetunion* (The Single-Party System and Bureaucratic Rule in the Soviet Union), 1978, and *Verfassungen der kommunistischen Staaten* (Constitutions of the Communist States), 1980.

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hardliners" (p. 17). This attitude, shaped by the personal experience of a defeated generation, is belied by developments since mid-1980. Again and again in Polish history, it has been the next generation, the one with no recollection of previous failures, that has resumed the struggle. Thus, it would appear that it is no coincidence (to borrow a hackneyed Marxist phrase) that those in the forefront of the present upheavals in Poland cannot remember the Nazi occupation, the tragedy of the Warsaw 1944 uprising, the imposition of a Stalinist political system with its mass terror, or even the post–October 1956 disappointment. Indeed, the nature of the participants is prima facie evidence that historical continuity in Poland has prevailed, that the Communists have failed to raise a new breed of *homo Sovieticus* or to erase whole areas of tradition from the national consciousness.

The postwar period of Communist rule in Poland is covered at length by Z. A. Pelczynski in the *History of Poland since 1863* and by Jan B. de Weydenthal in his *The Communists of Poland*. Both studies were written and published before the present troubles began, although at a time when more perspicacious observers already saw the writing on the wall. Despite their dated aspects, however, both contain a wealth of valuable information on political, economic, and sociological aspects of the Communist system in Poland. They show clearly that the chasm between the society and the rulers in Poland did not emerge in the second half of 1980 or even in the mid-1970's, but is deeply rooted in the forceful imposition of a Soviet-type regime by a foreign military power. When de Weydenthal, for instance, writes about "growing calls for independent and truly representative workers' organizations, for punishment of the officials judged responsible for repressive actions, and for a reform of administrative procedures regarding protest demonstrations" (p. 146), he describes the events of 1970, not 1980. Examples showing the continuous rejection by Polish society of the attempt to implant an alien model could be multiplied at will.

One should not be too harsh on these authors for not having forecast the later turn of events, for even many of the people in Poland who a few years ago began organization of the movement for change evidently did not expect the massive response they came to elicit. When one of the founders of the Committee for the Defense of the Workers (KOR) was asked to explain the unusual degree of tolerance that the Communist authorities had shown toward the political opposition, he answered that it was the society which had been tolerating the Communist regime, not the other way around. Yet even some of his associates loudly derided his words as boastful, irresponsible rumblings of a discontented intellectual with a touch of *manie de grandeur*. History, by an ironic quirk, proved him correct. The present Communist rulers of Poland are painfully aware that they are indeed barely tolerated, and that this degree of tolerance is due only to the dark shadow cast by the USSR.

Nevertheless, Pelczynski and de Weydenthal, along with most writers on Polish affairs, have to a greater or lesser extent succumbed to what the Polish mass media, now at least partly released from the fetters of censorship, dub the "success propaganda" of the Gierek regime. It should be noted that this noisy playing to the gallery—e.g., Edward Gierek's slogan of "building a second Poland"—did not deceive the Poles themselves, for they, after all, had reason to know how hollow were the promises of improved living standards. Westerners proved more gullible, with journalists the worst offenders. A particularly good example is George Blazynski, the author of *Flashpoint Poland*. He is a veteran journalist and broadcaster who over the last decade has visited Poland almost every year. Apparently, however, he relied mainly on official handouts and conversations with high-ranking (though mostly anonymous) party and government officials. He describes the state of affairs under Gierek as "consensus socialism" (p. 127), even referring to Gierek's "economic miracle." Blazynski, it is true, had much company in his judgments. An American commentator (whom Blazynski quotes on p. 229) characterized Gierek as "an outgoing highly practical, political animal, who might have done all right in American politics had his parents moved across the Atlantic," and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was once reported by *Der Spiegel* to have expressed regrets that he could not have a man of Gierek's caliber as a minister in his West German government. For Bromke, too, Gierek was "a cleaver [clever?] politician with a good sense of timing" (Simon and Kanet, pp. 20–21). In light of such comments, some of the erroneous conclusions reached by Pelczynski ("the Poland of today has to a great measure overcome the disadvantages inherited from the partitions"—Leslie, p. 457) and by de Weydenthal (the party's "near future seems relatively secure"—p. 175) appear to be minor lapses—especially since both of them devote most of their efforts to convincing demonstrations of the weaknesses and contradictions of the system.

Economists who deal with Communist-ruled countries should be well aware of the problems posed by the unreliability of available statistical data. Several contributions to the volume edited by Simon and

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Kanet clearly demonstrate the pitfalls awaiting those who tend to forget about it. Not all the economists represented take the official figures at their face value, but since no other data were available, some of them do. Thus, recent events in Poland have rendered obsolete a major part of the Simon and Kanet volume even before its publication.

Dealing with Poland's economic problems is, at best, an unrewarding task, and those engaged in this occupation would do well to remember that among those purged in the first wave of protest in August 1980, even before Gierek's downfall, was the head of the Main Statistical Office in Poland, and Polish media have subsequently revealed some of the arbitrary manipulations of data and figures in which the Office had engaged. However, it seems doubtful whether personnel changes at the top can alone radically improve the situation, for industrial plants or local authorities more often than not falsify the statistics that they provide to their superiors, to make these inputs more palatable to higher authorities.

Lack of adequate source materials cannot, on the other hand, excuse those political scientists, such as many in the Simon and Kanet book, who obstinately refuse to recognize the fundamental distinction between *le pays légal* (the legal country) and *le pays réel* (the real country). Thus, readers eager to understand why, for instance, the political, economic, and social mechanisms in Poland have failed so dismally are hardly likely to find much enlightment in their studies. While the contributions on politics in the Simon and Kanet volume differ in merit, even the best ones are of limited utility—especially in light of recent events in Poland.

Adam Michnik's *L'Église et la Gauche,* originally written in 1976–77, should be required reading for all those who wish to understand the unique character of Polish society and that society's relationship with the Communist-run state in 1981. This thought-provoking essay deals with the fundamental question of the interaction among the Communist rulers; the Roman Catholic Church, the wielder of the highest moral authority; and the political opposition. Composed at a time when a mass organization of workers, self-governing and independent of Communist authorities, was still apparently a utopian dream of a handful of intellectuals, it nonetheless obviously remains pertinent to today's Poland. It is unfortunate that this essay, along with most of the considerable output by opposition scholars and thinkers in Poland, is unavailable in English. Only excerpts are at hand, even though it has been translated into most West European languages.[2]

IN SEEKING to grasp the nature of the current situation in Poland, it is well to bear in mind that Stanislaw Kania, the present head of the country's Communist party, has several times spoken of a "dyarchy," or dual power. For him, and even more for his Politburo colleagues and rivals who accuse him of too conciliatory a posture and urge him to return to a harder line, this is plainly a term of opprobrium. It describes a situation totally unacceptable if the Soviet-style system ("real socialism") is to survive. Nonetheless, the notion itself contains more than a grain of truth.

The upheavals of the summer of 1980, unlike all preceding ones in Poland and other Communist-ruled states, originated outside the party and the establishment. Thus, workers and their leaders, at first in strike committees and then in independent, self-governing trade unions ("Solidarity"), did not, and have not, set out to improve the system, to reform socialism, or to provide it with a "human face." At the same time, they have been realistic enough to recognize that the system, though bereft of even the pretense of popular support, cannot be toppled without provoking a foreign intervention, or at best a civil war. As a consequence, elements of a totally new, unique, and very pragmatic solution have begun to emerge over the last few months. This solution has not as yet been explicitly formulated, and it certainly has not been accepted by either Poland's rulers or their Soviet sponsors. But its rough outline can be deduced from various statements and, even more, from various fragmentary and temporary working agreements. The unveiling in December 1980 of the Gdansk shipyard monument to workers slain in December 1970 reflected the "new order." This monument had been built by the "Solidarity" labor unions and was dedicated by a prelate of the Catholic Church in a ceremony attended by high-ranking government representatives.

For purely realistic, geopolitical reasons, the labor leaders have concluded that political power in Poland has to remain in Communist hands. Hence, they have conceded to the party a monopoly in all matters relating to external and internal security, foreign affairs (this includes the Warsaw Treaty and the alliance with the Soviet Union), and central administration. "Solidarity" has renounced all claims to becoming a political, unavoidably an opposition, party. It wants to remain what it originally started out to be: a trade union representing the workers in their relations with the sole employer, the party-state, and defending their

[2] Excerpts may be found in Adam Michnik, "The Church and the Left: A Dialogue," in F. Silnitsky et al., Eds., *Communism and Eastern Europe,* New York, NY, Karz Publishers, 1979.

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economic and social interests. A similar posture has been adopted by the leaders of the new union for farmers, who, lacking the political clout that industrial workers have in modern societies, have been forced to fight longer and harder for recognition of their union's independent status. The same is true with respect to the other societal groups that have achieved emancipation in the shadow of the new unions, and thereby introduced a measure of pluralism unheard of in other Communist-ruled countries. These include not only brand new organizations but also older bodies (like the United Peasant Party and the Democratic Party) which have sought to regain the status they enjoyed prior to having been emasculated by the Communists and turned into fronts.

The existence of labor unions and other independent societal associations by no means implies sharing of power, for it is based on adversary relations, not on a partnership. Lately, the party and its media have widely touted the notion of "partnership," often under the guise of "workers' self-management." Although the workers once demanded such self-management, the party's definition of this has now totally discredited the idea. Hence, the labor leaders will have none of it. They believe, on the basis of their own bitter experience, that any kind of "partnership" can only evolve into gradual restoration of the Communist dictatorship. Stripped of its pseudo-patriotic and nationalistic slogans and of its implied threats of loss of sovereignty or even of partition, the party program boils down (1) to reintegration of the independent unions (and other social groups born of the recent upheavals) into the old structure and (2) to their subsequent emasculation. If the unions agreed, in the name of overcoming the disastrous economic crisis or saving Poland's independence, to back down from their defense of workers' interests and to assume their traditional (in Communist states) role of instruments for increasing labor productivity, "workers' self-management" would soon become meaningless.

The unions, as the "Solidarity" leader, Lech Walesa, has repeatedly explained to all those who have interviewed him, do not want to share the burden and responsibility of running the country. Instead, they intend to keep tabs on those who do run it.

For the unions to operate in such a fashion, however, the rulers must be ready, if not to share power, at least to agree to meaningful consultations with independent representatives of the society, or social groups, on all issues of immediate concern to those groups. The Communists have always been loath to accept gracefully any kind of restraint on their absolute rule and to consider any interests but their own. Perhaps the best concrete example concerns the controversy over free Saturdays. This issue, which could have been quickly and easily settled in direct negotiations with the unions, was blown all out of proportion because the authorities did not deign to consult the workers, preferring the familiar way of an "ukase." To be sure, particularly since the avoidance at the eleventh hour of a general strike on March 31, 1981, the Communist leaders have declared verbally that they are ready to recognize the new role labor unions and independent associations have to play in present-day Poland. But their obstinate refusal to institutionalize any channels of two-way communication between the government and the society leaves the unions no option but to press their demands by means of strikes or threats of strike. Damage to the economy or exacerbation of the general political climate notwithstanding, the strike remains the only effective weapon the workers have at their disposal. To give it up voluntarily, without iron-clad guarantees of goodwill on the part of the authorities, would amount to unilateral disarmament and capitulation.

As a result of the appearance of genuine labor unions, the Roman Catholic Church has lost its status as the only social force which exercises independence despite all the years of Communist attempts at gleichschaltung. This development, along with the advanced age and recent death of the Primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, and his real fear of a Soviet intervention, has contributed to a certain lack of direction on the part of the Church in the new circumstances. Generally speaking, the Church has consistently put its enormous moral authority behind the workers and the peasants, but it has occasionally supported the authorities in their efforts to "restore order." Such support, apparently, was enough for Polish Communists to revive their old dream of creating a kind of allied Christian Democratic party—a design which the Church hierarchy had hitherto consistently rejected. A Catholic scholar was appointed deputy prime minister, under circumstances open to interpretation that this move had the blessing of the Episcopate, and possibly even the Holy See. Shortly afterward, the media announced the creation of the "Polish Social-Catholic League," with branches all over the country.[3]

However, there seems to be more appearance than substance to these maneuvers. At this writing, the Catholic deputy premier has yet to make his weight felt on the political scene, and the new grouping has failed to extend its membership beyond those milieux traditionally ready to

[3] See *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), Jan. 23, 1981.

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collaborate with the authorities or to reveal its program or the nature of its relationship with various political elements. Although during the Primate's prolonged illness some differences of opinion inside the Church hierarchy became public knowledge, the major portion of the hierarchy continue to mistrust Communist wooing. They fear that the offer to allow a Catholic political party might be another crude attempt to undermine the moral authority of the Church among the population, in particular among members of the labor unions. Such an effort would have as its aim to prevent the Catholic hierarchy and Catholic intellectuals from serving as mediators between the two sides, with enough clout with both to push them toward moderation. In the last few months, the Church and Catholic intellectuals have played this kind of role on occasions. At best, the rapprochement with the Church might be a shrewd move on the part of the Kania-Jaruzelski-Jagielski faction in the Communist leadership to streamline the doctrine of the leading role of the party by introducing a new kind of "partnership." The Communists would function as its senior members; Catholics and unionists, as its junior ones.

Whether or not such a novel solution would be acceptable to party hard-liners and to Moscow and would garner the needed popular support, the sine qua non for its success is the survival of the party. This is by no means assured. It has been estimated that about 1 million party members—one third of the body's total membership, or probably virtually all of its working-class contingent—have joined the ranks of "Solidarity."[4] Estimates of the number of those who have left the party ("mostly workers") vary between 216,000[5] and nearly half a million,[6] and they probably do not include people who did not bother to return their membership cards and "voted with their feet" by not coming to party meetings and failing to pay their dues. The full-time apparatus, especially in the provinces, has been depleted and demoralized by the rank-and-file rebellion, by recent disclosures of widespread corruption among its elements, and by its sheer inability to adapt itself to new circumstances. Only at the level of the province (*wojewodztwo*) committees does the new central leadership seem to have the situation well in hand. At least in some local party organizations, it was unable to prevent secret ballots and multiple candidates during the election campaign preparatory to the Ninth Extraordinary Party Congress, slated for this summer. This state of affairs is convincing proof that the call for "democratization," raised loud and clear in connection with the emergence of independent, self-governing labor unions, has spilled over into the party organizations, in particular those composed of industrial workers and intellectuals. Even the rank-and-file movement for the so-called "horizontal structures" inside the party—though obviously incompatible with the Leninist principle of "democratic centralism"—has, willy-nilly, been accepted by the leadership; its deviant character has been denounced for the record rather than as a guiding rule.[7]

The progressive disintegration of the ruling party and its apparatus, if not checked, might pose the most serious danger to evolutionary trends in Poland. From the Soviet point of view, a loyal party in full command of the country affords, even more than the presence of Warsaw Pact troops on Polish soil, the most reliable guarantee of the status quo in Central Europe. Moscow might well see the disappearance of such a party in Poland as a repeat of Czechoslovak conditions of 1968 and call for tough, decisive action to redress the situation. The responsible leaders of "Solidarity," the Church hierarchy, and the political opposition are all well aware of the facts of life, but their moderation—a far cry from charges of "anarchy" and "chaos" raised both in the East and in the West—is being severely strained, on one hand, by grassroots radicalism and, on the other hand, by the pigheadedness and political blindness of some party leaders.

DOES ALL this mean that the situation in Poland can be stabilized at the present level of de facto social (but not political) pluralism? Such a conclusion would seem at present both premature and overly optimistic. Nonetheless, some chance does exist, if only because Poland, for various reasons of history, has always enjoyed a somewhat exceptional status inside the Soviet bloc. The unique position of the Roman Catholic Church, the continuation of private agriculture, the regime's toleration of more or less openly expressed nationalism are as contrary to Communist doctrines as independent trade unions with the right to participate in the shaping of the party's domestic policies, especially in the economic and social domain.

At the same time, such a stabilization requires the wholehearted implementation of certain preconditions of a more political nature: for instance, unfettered access of labor unions, Catholics, and intellectuals to the mass media; relaxation of

[4] This figure is widely accepted in Poland and in the West. See, for example, *Kultura* (Warsaw), No. 17 (932), Apr. 26, 1981, p. 10, and *The Economist* (London), Apr. 4, 1981, p. 13. But it might be an underestimation. Some press reports from various factories mention that up to 90 percent of party members have joined the "Solidarity" unions.

[5] *The Boston Globe,* Apr. 25, 1981.

[6] *The Financial Times* (London), May 15, 1981.

[7] "Do Ideas Circulate Horizontally?" *Trybuna ludu,* May 12, 1981, p. 3. See also Kania's report to the 10th plenary session of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, ibid., Apr. 30, 1981, pp. 3–4.

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censorship (nobody raises the question of its total abolition!); an end to police harassment of dissident thought; and the like.

All these things the authorities pledged in the fateful Gdansk agreement of August 31, 1980, which prevented a general strike throughout Poland. (In that agreement, the government also promised a lot of other economic and social concessions which are obviously untenable under the present circumstances.) To no one's surprise, the party started to renege on its word immediately after the agreement was signed. Only the existence of strong unions and their ability to stop work prevented a rapid collapse of the "social compact." There are no grounds to believe that this state of affairs is going to change radically in the near future.

It seems, therefore, that Poland is in for a protracted tug-of-war on the brink of disaster. The room for maneuver is extremely narrow, and the limits of the possible are very finely drawn. Moreover, a number of factors—the precarious situation of the Polish economy and the approaching succession crisis in the Kremlin are the two most obvious ones—might suddenly change the whole equation. But there can be no reasonable doubt that what began as a spontaneous workers' protest against arbitrary price hikes has now turned into a different phenomenon and created an entirely new ball game—in Poland, and possibly in other Communist-ruled countries.

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Toward a Political Economy of East-South Relations

By Robert H. Donaldson

RUTH W. ARAD et al. *Sharing Global Resources.* New York, NY, McGraw-Hill/Council on Foreign Relations, 1979.

ALBERT FISHLOW et al. *Rich and Poor Nations in the World Economy.* New York, NY, McGraw-Hill/Council on Foreign Relations, 1979.

ROGER D. HANSEN. *Beyond the North-South Stalemate.* New York, NY, McGraw-Hill/Council on Foreign Relations, 1979.

MAHBUB UL HAQ. *The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World.* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1976.

KENNETH JOWITT. *The Leninist Response to National Dependency.* Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978.

N. I. LEBEDEV. *A New Stage in International Relations.* New York, NY, Pergamon Press, 1978.

ROBERT L. ROTHSTEIN. *The Weak in the World of the Strong: The Developing Countries in the International System.* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1977.

SENIOR SPECIALISTS DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. *The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy?* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977.

DEEPAK NAYYAR, Ed. *Economic Relations Between Socialist Countries and the Third World.* Montclair, NJ, Allanheld, Osmun & Co./New York, NY, Universe Books, 1977.

THE ARAB OIL embargo of 1973 forced the public to pay attention to a basic change that had occurred in the nature of international politics: there was no longer a single international system dominated by strategic concerns. Military security remained an important issue, but the "new" concerns of world trade, energy, food, raw materials, the world monetary system—each one with its own power hierarchy—had crowded onto the center stage. Alongside the military rivalry traditionally arrayed on an axis of East to West, there had emerged a bitter economic conflict between North and South—a division which Henry Kissinger in 1975 forecast "could become as grim as the darkest days of the Cold War." [1]

And yet official and informed public perceptions of the conflicts along the East-West and North-South global axes have seemed strangely unconnected. Observers and analysts of Soviet foreign policy, in assessing the impact on the East-West balance of Soviet behavior in the Third World, have almost wholly ignored the economic dimensions of East-South relations.[2] Conversely, discussions of the North-South dialogue and of the cluster of Third World economic demands aggregated into the platform for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) almost never consider the Soviet role in this relationship. Apart from a random comment on Moscow's deliberate nonparticipation in the North-South dialogue, there has been little effort in the expanding literature on these subjects to explore the point of intersection between the East-West and North-South competitions.

By adamantly refusing to be lumped with the "rich North," Moscow thus far has in effect helped turn the latter into a West-South conflict. Meanwhile, the absence of an East-South dialogue is having an increasingly deleterious effect on both East-West and North-South relations.

THE MOST ambitious and comprehensive effort to study the changing international agenda, with explicit attention to the intersections between security and economic issues and between industrialized and de-

[1] Henry A. Kissinger, "Global Consensus and Economic Development," speech at the United Nations, New York, NY, in *The Secretary of State* (Washington, DC), Sept. 11, 1975, p. 1.

[2] One of the early exceptions was a collection of essays emerging from the 1974 Banff International Slavic Conference. See Roger Kanet and Donna Bahry, Eds., *Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the Developing World,* New York, NY, Praeger, 1975.

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veloping countries, is the 1980's Project of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Several of the volumes produced so far, including three of the books reviewed here, address North-South relations. Together, they reflect a recognition on the part of the project team that many of the assumptions, policies, and institutions dominant in the last 30 years are proving inadequate to the demands of the 1980's. The 1980's Project seeks to identify norms and goals that can guide changing relations between North and South, with an eye toward promoting moderate change, greater equity, and an enlarged sense of participation on the part of the developing countries. The volumes by Ruth Arad et al. and by Albert Fishlow et al. are collections of essays presenting a variety of diagnoses and prescriptions relating these norms to important issues in the North-South dialogue.

Roger Hansen's thoughtful volume, *Beyond The North-South Stalemate,* is one of several core studies that seek to bring together some of the main themes of the 1980's Project. Hansen is one of the few writers on this subject who explicitly justifies the limited attention he gives to the role of the industrialized Communist states in the North-South discussions. He points out that the immediate "wish list" of the developing countries is aimed primarily at the industrialized West, since, for example, the Communist East purchases less than 5 percent of the total exports of the South.

That the Third World negotiators have generally expected very little from the developed Communist countries in the way of concessions or benefits relating to the establishment of the NIEO is indirectly confirmed in Mahbub ul Haq's treatise, *The Poverty Curtain.* Former chief economist for the Pakistan planning commission, a co-founder of the Third World Forum, and now a high official of the World Bank, Haq is well acquainted with the current thinking of Third World officials. But he is no apologist, and his book amply demonstrates that he is capable of assessing the issues dispassionately and critically. Thus, it is all the more surprising that Haq lets the Communist countries off the hook so easily, confining his mention of their role to a single comment:

An effort should also be made to create a framework within which the richer socialist countries start playing a more substantial role in resource transfers than their present limited contribution. However, the basic decision and initiative on this is largely up to the socialist bloc itself. (p. 210)

One possible reason for not taking seriously the contribution that the Soviet Union and its allies could play in forging solutions to global development problems is the belief that Marxism-Leninism is irrelevant as a prescription for Third World economic or political development. Such a conclusion might follow from Kenneth Jowitt's analysis of the development options facing a peasant country, with a social order based on status, that is mired in a state of national dependency. Using the Romanian case as his primary empirical referent, Jowitt assesses Leninism as a historical as well as an organizational syndrome, and he concludes that this particular pattern is no longer available or suitable for most of the Third World.

The irrelevance of the Marxist-Leninist approach to many of the current issues of the international economic order is amply demonstrated in traditionalist run-of-the-mill Soviet publications. The rector of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Ambassador N. I. Lebedev, has produced such a work—a polemical tract of no lasting theoretical significance that, curiously, has been published in a Western edition by Pergamon Press. Lebedev's idea of penetrating analysis is to indulge in ritual quotation of the standard formulae of President Leonid Brezhnev, which he does an average of once every three pages. In his exploration of the issues in this "new stage in international relations," Lebedev devotes fewer than 10 pages to the economic problems of the Third World and the issues of the NIEO. By paying far more attention to the possibilities of expanded East-West trade, Lebedev accurately signals the relative priorities Moscow places on East-West and East-South economic relations.

Much of the space that Lebedev does devote to North-South issues is given over to irate attacks on the efforts of "imperialists and their henchmen" to lump the industrialized capitalist and socialist states together in a "rich North versus poor South" dichotomy. This dichotomy, Lebedev contends, denies that the blame for the conditions of the South belongs solely to imperialist monopolies and substitutes the notion of "equal responsibility." He goes on to maintain that such a tactic is aimed at driving a wedge between the Third World and its natural ally, the "socialist commonwealth," and thereby dooming to failure the cause of restructuring the international economic order (pp. 177–78).

Since the notion of "equal responsibility" is used to justify the Third World's demand that all "rich" nations share in the financial compensation of the less developed states, there are economic as well as ideological motives in the Soviet rejection of the concept. Indeed, the Soviet case for discarding the concept of "rich and poor nations" rests not only upon Moscow's view of the historical cause of Third World poverty

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but also upon the claim that the USSR is already assisting the Third World to the limits of its ability and international obligations.

"Bourgeois theories of interdependence" are also commonly cited by Soviet analysts as subtle masks for the continuation of imperialist exploitation of the less developed countries. "True interdependence," on the other hand, is said to be best exemplified in the "socialist division of labor" within the Communist community, which can also be extended, without any element of exploitation, to the relations between Communist and developing countries. One finds in Lebedev's analysis none of the burgeoning interest in "interdependence" that Elizabeth Valkenier has recently cited as indicative of a partial Soviet reassessment of East-South relations in the context of a single world economy.[3] Rather, he states:

The "interdependence" concept . . . is meant to impress on the governments and national bourgeoisie of the developing countries that their interests are identical with the capitalist West and so to inhibit their cooperation with the Soviet Union. . . . It has nothing in common with the safeguarding of peace and international economic cooperation. (p. 237)

Having removed the NIEO program from the "rich vs. poor" framework and put it in its "proper" global context, Soviet analysts and officials have been willing to give it a very general endorsement. They insist, however, that it must be understood not just as "tinkering" with the world capitalist economy, but rather as a "vote of no confidence in the 'free enterprise system' " and in capitalism's ability to resolve Third World economic problems.[4] Thus defined, the NIEO received the official approval of the Soviet government in a 1976 statement:

The program . . . expresses legitimate aspirations—to extend the process of the liquidation of colonialism to the economic sphere. . . . The Soviet Union takes an understanding attitude toward the broad program of measures which reflects the vital and long-term interests of the developing countries, and it supports its fundamental thrust.[5]

But this qualified endorsement of the NIEO has not translated into firm support, in the form of positive financial commitments, for the concrete proposals embodied therein. Thus, the Communist states have not endorsed or pledged to the common fund for commodity stabilization, they have expressed unwillingness to accept the 0.7 percent GNP target for official development assistance, they have not endorsed the proposal for blanket debt rescheduling, and they have withheld contributions to the special multilateral emergency fund for food assistance. In short, the Soviets have sought to "have it both ways"—acting like a great friend of the "poor South" on the rhetorical level while playing the role of the stingy "rich North" on the level of concrete measures for channeling more funds to the South.

Robert Rothstein's study, in the four pages that it devotes to the position of the Soviet bloc in the North-South debate, suggests two possible reasons that Moscow might wish to play a "waiting policy" in these discussions. One is an emerging sense of "competition between the Soviets and many LDC exporters in attempting to sell raw materials and some cheap consumer goods in exchange for more advanced goods" from the West (p. 327). Preferring to keep the rich Western technology and credit markets to itself, the USSR might simply join the West in more or less ignoring the demands of the South. Even if these potential conflicts between the interests of East and South do not emerge, Rothstein argues, the Soviets might reject the NIEO demands on the grounds that they are essentially "within-system" proposals, which would require the Communist countries, if they are not to be "frozen out," to join a number of international financial and trade institutions, at substantial economic and ideological costs. On balance, this study concludes that Moscow will continue to "sit out" the North-South dialogue, yielding as little as possible, so that the developing countries "probably will not get much more from this direction than they have in the past" (p. 329).

Precisely what the Soviets currently are "yielding" in the way of assistance to the developing countries is amply documented in portions of the study by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, which skillfully blends a description of Soviet positions and practices relating to North-South economic issues into the larger context of the overall Soviet approach to the Third World. The limitations of the current Soviet economic trade and assistance efforts in the Third World are also underscored in a series of detailed case studies, compiled by a presumably more disinterested team of researchers and edited by University of Sussex economist Deepak Nayyar. Careful analyses of Soviet and East European relations with selected countries in the Middle East, Africa, and South

[3] "The USSR, the Third World, and the Global Economy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1979, pp. 17–33.

[4] See K. Ivanov, *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Sept. 1, 1977, p. 4, and E. Obminsky, "Problems of Restructuring Economic Relations," *International Affairs* (Moscow), January 1977, p. 61.

[5] *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 5, 1976, p. 4.

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Asia are summed up as follows in Nayyar's introductory chapter:

Contrary to pronounced objectives, however, trade with the socialist countries has not led to a radical transformation in the pattern of production and trade in the Third World, or to a new international division of labor. (p. 14)

Although close ties with the Communist countries might have benefited Third World states for internal political reasons, the economic effect has been to strengthen state capitalism in these countries, which "may not have been in the interests of the poor . . . [and] probably consolidated the position of the ruling elite." On balance, Nayyar concludes, the socialist countries could perhaps have done little to alter the politics in poor nations, while their presence "probably did give rise to some advantages for the underdeveloped world" (p. 15).

Nevertheless, there are signs that the Soviet Union's relationship with the Third World on issues relating to the NIEO is becoming increasingly frayed. As in the fairy tale of the emperor's new clothes, some voices at the edge of the crowd are shouting out in anger and frustration at the nakedness that they see in Soviet policies. Or, to cite Roger Hansen's use of a different metaphor to illustrate the same judgment:

. . . the Soviet Union's days as a Southern cheerleader without responsibilities would appear to be numbered. . . . Already the developing countries, viewing the Soviet Union as a "have" power, are increasing their criticism of Soviet trade and aid policies that are negligible in their efforts to assist Southern economic development. (p. 6)

WHAT IS happening to the USSR's standing with the majority of Third World states helps point to the handicaps that Moscow suffers as a result of its limited economic capabilities. The Soviets have been able to gain footholds in a number of strategic Third World areas by virtue of their political and military support of leftist movements, backed up with ample supplies of Soviet arms and sometimes with Cuban troops. And yet they have found it exceedingly difficult to *sustain* their influence or to prop up their client regimes through military means alone. Conversely, in areas where the USSR has *not* established a military supply relationship, it has hardly any influence at all. The Soviets' expanding political ambitions in the Third World, initially boosted by the USSR's military instrumentalities, are in the longer run subject to being undermined by Moscow's limited economic capabilities.

Apart from the implications that this situation has for the long-term success or failure of Soviet policies in the Third World, the USSR's overreliance on military instruments has profound consequences for both East-West and North-South relations. The costs of the setback to East-West détente and the revival of US-Soviet zero-sum competition in the Third World are compounded by the danger that domestic stability and the prospects for progress toward development in the Third World will be even further disrupted. As the states of the South have clearly perceived, the heating up of the East-West competition may well doom the North-South dialogue and the prospects for agreement on the New International Economic Order.

One possible conclusion is that this outcome is precisely what the Soviets have sought to achieve—that by refusing to engage seriously in the North-South dialogue and by pursuing their own destabilizing bilateral relationships in the Third World, Soviet policymakers have consciously promoted a breakdown of North-South negotiations on the NIEO. If this is the case, the Soviets would seem to have opted for a policy that threatens them with several adverse consequences. The major spokesmen for the Group of 77 are not likely to regard the Soviets as blameless in the event of such a breakdown, and assuming that the South remains unified, it is difficult to see how Moscow could recoup sufficient prestige or display sufficient economic generosity to allow the USSR to build a viable East-South alliance.

To the extent that an embittered South (including the nations of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) sought to take retaliatory measures against the recalcitrant North—for example, further hikes in prices of raw materials, new embargoes, unilateral defaulting on debts, nationalization of joint enterprises—the Soviet Union would probably not be immune from harmful economic consequences. Even apart from the cost to its own economy that might follow from either economic warfare or economic collapse in the South, the Soviet Union is by now sufficiently dependent on the Western capitalist economies to be economically vulnerable to disruptions that might occur in the West.

To look at the other side of the coin, what implications might there be for the USSR in the event that some form of comprehensive accord were reached in the North-South talks? If such an agreement were concluded without participation of the Communist states it would quite likely result in even greater economic isolation from the international economy for Moscow and its allies.

But if the Communist countries were to join in the North-South dialogue and contribute to a constructive compromise agreement on the NIEO issues, Moscow would by no

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means be immune from risks and disadvantages. On the positive side of the ledger, we might expect that the USSR would share in the benefits of expanded production and trade that would accompany the economic invigoration of the Third World, as well as enjoy the advantages that would accrue from cooperative solutions to the global problems of food supply, overpopulation, and ecological imbalances. Yet to the extent that a cooperative accord would mean that the Soviets would be obligated to expand greatly the level of their economic aid, to reschedule Third World debts (to the detriment of Moscow's own balance of payments), and to help underwrite commodity stabilization agreements, there would probably be—at least in the near term—a substantial direct economic cost for the USSR. Moreover, the realization of some of the goals of the NIEO could bring substantial indirect costs for Moscow as well. As Rothstein notes, the USSR might find itself paying more for raw materials and competing directly with the Third World nations for Western grain, credits, and technology. To a certain degree, then, the short-term growth in North-South trade and resource transfers might well come at the expense of East-West transactions. Added to these economic costs would be the ideological costs that might attend Moscow's greater interdependence with the world capitalist economy, including the adjustments that would necessarily flow from Soviet membership in international economic and monetary institutions.

In fact, there is little evidence that the present Soviet leadership is inclined to run the ideological, political, and economic risks that adoption of a cooperative strategy might entail. However, Western leaders might decide to make the effort to encourage the Soviets to assume such a role, and future Soviet leaders might have the vision that would enable them to take the risks involved in genuine global economic cooperation.

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The Essence of Stalinism

By Georg Brunner

ROBERT C. TUCKER, Ed. *Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation.* New York, NY, W. W. Norton, 1977.

HÉLÈNE CARRÈRE D'ENCAUSSE. *Staline: l'ordre par la terreur* (Stalin: Order Through Terror). Paris, Flammarion, 1979.

ROY A. MEDVEDEV. *On Stalin and Stalinism.* Trans. by Ellen de Kadt. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979.

NIELS ERIK ROSENFELDT. *Knowledge and Power: The Role of Stalin's Secret Chancellery in the Soviet System of Government.* Copenhagen, Rosenkilde and Bagger, 1978.

WILLIAM O. McCAGG, JR. *Stalin Embattled, 1943–1948.* Detroit, MI, Wayne State University Press, 1978.

GEORGES BORTOLI. *Mort de Staline.* Paris, Éditions Robert Laffont, 1973. Published in English as *The Death of Stalin,* trans. by Raymond Rosenthal. New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1975.

WHAT IS THE ESSENCE of Stalinism? Was Stalin really necessary? Questions such as these have haunted many scholars and other observers, including Leon Trotsky and his disciples; former Communists like Isaac Deutscher, Boris Souvarine, and Bertram Wolfe; the Menshevik Boris Nicolaevsky; and early students of totalitarianism like Hannah Arendt, Sigmund Neumann, Carl Friedrich, and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Almost three decades have now passed since March 5, 1953, when the suffocating dictator raised his hand for the last time, pointing furiously at something as mysterious as his "ism," but scholarly interest in the West regarding Stalinism seems to be on the rise. Even dissidents in the Soviet Union have started discussing the USSR's *unbewältigte Vergangenheit.*[1] The 1970's produced a vast amount of varied literature on Stalin and Stalinism, including new publications by Stalin's already well-known former apparatchiki long resident in the West[2] and a new edition of Souvarine's classic Stalin biography enlarged by an epilogue.[3]

What is to explain this fascination? Is it due to our better knowledge of the subject after having read the more or less enlightening revelations of the defunct leader's apolitical daughter,[4] his Brutus-like lieutenant,[5] a Leninist counterhistorian,[6] and a most observant prison-camp inmate?[7] This may in part be the case. The interest may also stem

[1] "Undigested past," a term used in postwar West Germany to suggest the difficulties experienced in trying to come to terms with the Hitler phenomenon.

[2] See A. Avtorkhanov, *Proiskhozhdeniye partokratii* (The Origin of Party Rule), 2 vols., Frankfurt/Main, Posev, 1973; idem, *Zagadka smerti Stalina: Zagovor Berii* (The Mystery of Stalin's Death: The Beria Plot), Frankfurt/Main, Posev, 1976; Boris Bazhanov, "Flight from Night: From the Reminiscences of Stalin's Former Secretary," *Kontinent* (Darmstadt), 1976, No. 8, pp. 253–302, No. 9, pp. 360–64, and No. 10, pp. 235–63; and Boris Baschanow (Bazhanov), *Ich war Stalins Sekretär* (I Was Stalin's Secretary), Frankfurt/Main, Ullstein, 1977.

[3] Boris Souvarine, *Staline: Aperçu historique du bolchevisme* (Stalin: A Brief Historical Survey of Bolshevism), Paris, Plon, 1977.

Other significant works not included in the present review but deserving mention are H. Montgomery Hyde, *Stalin: The History of a Dictator,* London, Hart Davis, 1971; Robert C. Tucker, *Stalin as Revolutionary, 1870–1929: A Study in History and Personality,* New York, NY, W. W. Norton and Co., 1973; Adam B. Ulam, *Stalin: The Man and His Era,* New York, NY, Viking Press, 1973; André Brissaud, *Staline: trente millions de morts pour un empire* (Stalin: Thirty Million Dead for an Empire), Paris, J. C. Lattès, 1974; Ronald Hingley, *Joseph Stalin: Man and Legend,* London, Hutchinson, 1974; Jean Elleinstein *Histoire du phénomène stalinien,* Paris, B. Grasset, 1975, published in English as *History of the Stalin Phenomenon,* London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1976; and Michael Morozow, *Der Georgier: Stalins Weg und Herrschaft* (The Georgian: Stalin's Path and Rule), Munich, Langen-Müller, 1980.

[4] Svetlana Alliluyeva, *Dvadtsat' pisem k drugu,* London, Hutchinson, 1967, published in English translation as *Twenty Letters to a Friend,* trans. by Priscilla J. McMillan, New York, NY, and London, Harper and Row, 1967; idem, *Tol'ko odin god,* New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1969, published in English as *Only One Year,* trans. by Paul Chavchavadze, New York, NY, Harper and Row, and London, Hutchinson, 1969.

[5] Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers,* with an introduction, commentary, and notes by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott, Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Co., 1970.

[6] Roy A. Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism,* ed. by David Joravsky and Georges Haupt, New York, NY, Random House, 1971; also in an enlarged and revised Russian-language edition, *K sudu istorii: Genezis i posledstviya stalinizma,* New York, NY, Alfred A. Knopf, 1974.

[7] Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, *Arkhipelag GULag, 1918–1956: Opyt khudozhestvennogo issledovaniya,* 2 vols., Paris, YMCA Press, 1973/74, published in English as *The Gulag Archipelago, 1918–1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation,* 2 vols., trans. by Thomas P. Whitney, New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1974/75.

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from an unconscious anticipation, yea dread, that a Stalin redivivus might follow Nikita Khrushchev or, later, Leonid Brezhnev. Perhaps the major reason, however, is simply the "mystery" that Stalinism in many ways remains even today.

The desire to fathom this mystery moved Robert Tucker to assemble a number of eminent scholars at beautiful Bellagio, Italy, in July 1975 and later to edit their 13 papers into the impressive volume reviewed here. Although the number of contributions is not a lucky one, the contributors succeed in presenting a most stimulating collection of essays, reflective of the current state of Stalin studies. That the riddle has not been solved completely is quite natural, for a complex phenomenon contains several main points; to grasp its gist is always a matter of evaluation and, consequently, controversy.

SINCE Stalinism is a political phenomenon, a political scientist—depending on his scholarly predilections—would say that its nature may be found in its power structure, in its political goals, or in the means applied to stabilize the structure and to attain the goals. In fact, the various interpretations of Stalinism given in the books under review may be summarized under these three headings.

As to the structure of Stalinist power, probably nobody would hesitate to define it as an absolute one-man dictatorship that was a clear deviation from the concept of party dictatorship evolved by Lenin and propagated by Soviet ideology. The mechanism of this dictatorship has been described many times, but here it is Hélène Carrère d'Encausse who does it most thoroughly and impressively.

Nevertheless, the very heart of Stalinist power, Stalin's personal secretariat, has always remained obscure. Niels Rosenfeldt from Copenhagen University has provided a real service in shedding as much light as possible on this dark institution and its connections with the party's *Sekretnyy otdel* (Secret Department) and *Osobyy sektor* (Special Sector) by putting together all available pieces of information and scrupulously checking their trustworthiness.

Granted Stalin's absolute power, however, in what did it differ from the many tyrannies familiar to history and systematically characterized long ago by Aristotle? [8] A convincing answer is given by T. H. Rigby in his essay in the Tucker volume, where he introduces the concept of a "mono-organizational society." Such a society embraces a set of distinctive features leading to a single system of linked-up organizations and bureaucracies managing, or at least intent on managing, all social activities. So, then, Stalinism is a specific combination of two component parts: "a mono-organizational society ruled by a tyrant" (p. 76).

Rigby's theory might be contested on two grounds: by denying the correctness of his factual premises, or by claiming that the organizational-institutional aspects of Stalinism are not the essential ones. The first point was not raised at the Bellagio conference. Perhaps William O. McCagg might have raised it if he had been there. Although his *Stalin Embattled* deals with a later period of Stalinist rule—i.e., the years 1943–48 (the participants at Bellagio concentrated upon the 1930's)—and tries to solve another problem, McCagg more or less denies that Stalin's power was absolute. McCagg's problem is an alleged "paradox" originating from a contrast between what he views as Stalin's actual statist, antirevolutionary, and peaceful inclinations and the opposite image the outside world had of the Soviet dictator during and after World War II. As far as McCagg's well-documented analysis concerns our problem, it culminates in a rather surprising thesis: Stalin's control in the Kremlin was far from complete! Poor old Joe had to fight four violent battles: against foreign Communist "insurrectionists" misusing their positions in the coalition governments of 1944 for an unwise seizure of power; against military commanders and economic managers at home whose growing power could have led to a military dictatorship or managerial oligarchy; then against his revived party and the threat of restoration of the Bolshevism of the pre-purge years; and, finally, again against insubordinate foreign Communist parties. This picture of a lonely Stalin surrounded by fierce groups of challenging foes is too one-sided and improbable to need further comment.

The second objection to Rigby's theory is implicit in the views of those who think that the very nature of Stalinism should be looked for in its political goals. This approach usually ends up focusing on some concept of radical modernization, perhaps most clearly represented by the term "revolution from above." Among our authors, it is first of all Tucker himself who holds this view, albeit in a particular way, which connects it with the concept of political culture. Tucker conceives of the Stalinist revolution from above as an integral phase of the Russian revolutionary process as a whole. Thus, it is understandable that in a methodological discussion at the outset of his edited volume, he pleads for a "cultural-and-historical approach" to comparative Communist studies (pp. XVI–XX).

[8] Aristotle, *Politics*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1961, pp. 225–27. The passage is cited by T. H. Rigby in the Tucker volume (pp. 62–63) and also referred to in Carrère d'Encausse (p. 242).

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That this approach may yield very useful insights is demonstrated by the essays of Moshe Lewin and Gordon Skilling in the Tucker volume. Lewin's examination of the social background of Stalinism points at striking similarities between pre- and postrevolutionary Russian political culture and characterizes Stalinism as a "hybrid of Marxism and tsarism" (p. 136). It is not difficult, indeed, to discover many political institutions and attitudes sold by Soviet agitprop as fruits of Lenin's genius or as typically socialist achievements that are deeply rooted in backward stages of Russian history and can be adequately explained only in terms of the tsarist triad *samoderzhaviye, narodnost', pravoslaviye* (Autocracy, Nationality, Orthodoxy). Establishment and maintenance of a Stalinist political system under completely different historical and cultural conditions such as those in Eastern Europe pose special problems, as Skilling's study of Czechoslovakian political culture makes clear.

With regard to the means of implementing Stalinist policies, hardly anybody would hesitate to emphasize their extreme brutality and terroristic nature. One may even go a step further and say—as, e.g., do Stephen Cohen in the Tucker collection (pp. 12–13) and Roy Medvedev in *On Stalin and Stalinism* (p. 196)—that excesses and extremism in every respect were the essence of Stalinism. It is one of numerous paradoxes of Soviet history that the task of systematically establishing a legal order was begun only in the second half of the 1930's, just when Stalinist terror was reaching its peak (see Robert Sharlet's chapter in the Tucker volume).

AS SHOULD by now be clear, one cannot rely exclusively on any one of the three approaches—structure, ideology, or means—for the key to understanding Stalinism. Each of them throws light on important stones of a vast mosaic. So, *chto delat'*? Of course, one may combine. And this is what Carrère d'Encausse prefers to do while unfolding the history of Stalinist Russia from the beginning to the end in such a demanding and, at the same time, intelligible way that I would like her book to find its way into the hands of as many beginners in Soviet studies as possible. In a concluding chapter, Carrère d'Encausse describes Stalinism as a system composed of two elements: the total power of one man based on several apparatuses and a radical program of social change, in which Western Marxism and Russian traditions are inseparably intertwined. The use of terror is implied and indicated in the subtitle.

Complexity may lead to other results as well, especially to resignation and resort to intuition alone. This seems to have been the response of Carrère d'Encausse's French compatriot, the journalist Georges Bortoli. His work has no scholarly ambitions but merely draws a colorful, vivid, and realistic portrait of the decisive months preceding and following the despot's death.

AN IMPORTANT issue involved in examination of the nature of Stalinism is the question of whether or not this phenomenon was the necessary outcome of Marxism and/or Leninism. This question evoked considerable controversy at Bellagio. Stephen Cohen argued vehemently that there existed a discontinuity between Bolshevism and Stalinism (Tucker, pp. 3–29). His reasoning focused on matters of policy and the methods of its implementation, as the following sentence may illustrate:

> *No Bolshevik leader or faction had ever advocated anything akin to imposed collectivization, the "liquidation" of the kulaks, breakneck heavy industrialization, and a "plan" that was, of course, no plan at all.* (p. 24)

Such thinking in terms of policy and methods, supplemented by ideological reasoning, also seems to be characteristic of socialist criticism of Stalinism, from Trotskyism—whose development with the conceptual change from "centrism" to "Bonapartism/Thermidor" sometime about 1935 is traced by Robert McNeal in the Tucker volume (pp. 30–52)—to the writings of Roy Medvedev and Mihailo Markovic. Medvedev, whose new book *On Stalin and Stalinism*[9] is a kind of postscript to *Let History Judge*, containing interesting additional material on the subject, agrees with Cohen expressly (p. 196) and reiterates (p. 194) his earlier interpretation of Stalinism as "pseudosocialism."[10]

Markovic, writing in the Tucker volume, starts with a list of six features of Stalinism that characterize, inter alia, a society "in which most forms of economic and political alienation would survive" (p. 300). By this trick, he has no problems in showing that Stalinism is completely different from true Marxism, for Marx always wanted to abolish alienation. Leaving aside purely ideological concepts like "alienation"—which make sense only to a Marxist—I doubt whether it is possible, as Markovic attempts, to comprehend the essential connections between Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism by discussing matters of policy (e.g., "Did Marx/Lenin want to collectivize agriculture as Stalin did it?") and of its implementation (e.g., "How much was Stalin's terror worse than Lenin's coercive meth-

[9] Medvedev's contribution to Tucker's volume is an extract from this book.

[10] *Let History Judge*, pp. 534–56.

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ods?"). In the last analysis, all this is a matter of degree.

In my opinion it is Leszek Kolakowski who makes the essential point, when he refers to the crucial role of an exclusive and utopian ideology as absolutely indispensable for legitimizing a political system based on Marxism-Leninism (Tucker, p. 289). When a utopia leaves the study of its creator for the realm of political practice and the impossibility of its realization thereby grows more and more obvious, its struggling missionaries face a basic choice: either to acknowledge reality, with the consequence of giving up utopia and renouncing their political careers; or to disregard reality and to push on toward utopia at any price, with the consequence that one day utopian faith vanishes and consolation is to be found in sheer power. Of course, how the missionaries act and decide concrete matters and how successful they are in achieving their ultimate aims depend on many factors, among which the historical-cultural setting of the individual countries and the personalities of Communist leaders figure importantly. Therefore, investigation of Stalinism in the "people's democracies" on the assumption that in this comparative way it would be easier to disentangle the Stalinist phenomenon per se from its particular accessories is a basically sound idea. Wlodzimierz Brus, who embarks on this undertaking in the Tucker volume, comes to the conclusion that Stalinism was definitely unnecessary for Eastern Europe. The arguments he presents (pp. 251–54) show that in this more advanced part of Europe, Stalinism was less appropriate and more detrimental to long-term Communist goals than it was in the backward Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Brus misses the main point. It is that the "long-term Communist goals" themselves are most obstructive to their realization, for this is the very nature of any utopia.

In sum, I subscribe fully to Kolakowski's suspicion that "utopias (meaning visions of a perfectly unified society) are not simply impracticable but become counter-productive as soon as we try to create them with institutional means" (p. 297). In this sense, Stalinism was perhaps not an inevitable but nevertheless a highly probable outcome of Marxism-Leninism.

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New Evidence on Kampuchea

By Carlyle A. Thayer

TIMOTHY MICHAEL CARNEY, Comp. and Ed. *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussion.* Data Paper No. 106. Ithaca, NY, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, January 1977.

PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK. *War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia.* Trans. from the French by Mary Feeney. New York, NY, Pantheon, 1980.

PETER SCHIER and MANOLA SCHIER-OUM. *Prince Sihanouk on Cambodia: Interviews and Talks with Prince Norodom Sihanouk.* Hamburg, Institut für Asienkunde, 1980.

JOHN BARRON and ANTHONY PAUL. *Murder of a Gentle Land.* New York, NY, Reader's Digest Press, 1977.

FRANÇOIS PONCHAUD. *Cambodia: Year Zero.* Trans. from the French by Mary Feeney. New York, NY, Pantheon, 1980.

MILTON OSBORNE. *Before Kampuchea: Preludes to Tragedy.* Boston, MA, Allen and Unwin, 1979.

GEORGE C. HILDEBRAND and GARETH PORTER. *Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution.* New York, NY, Monthly Review Press, 1976.

OVER THE LAST decade, the people of Kampuchea (Cambodia) have experienced a series of tragedies whose cumulative dimensions are almost impossible to comprehend fully. These have encompassed fratricide, civil war, repeated invasion, aerial bombardment, a brutal dictatorship, starvation, population dislocation, foreign occupation, and continued fighting.

Prior to 1975, however, little attention was paid in the West to the country's domestic developments, including the conditions which produced a peasant-based Communist movement known popularly as the Khmer Rouge. Most studies tended to concentrate on Cambodia's foreign policies and the background to the March 1970 coup d'état which toppled Prince Norodom Sihanouk from power.

Since the mid-1970's, in contrast, domestic developments have attracted considerable interest. Indeed, a number of works on Kampuchea have been published. Of these, the seven under review here are perhaps the most significant.

Still, it is important to note that none of these studies purports to be a comprehensive account of the Khmer Rouge's rise to power and years in government. Such an account has been difficult to put together because of the nature of the primary source materials available. As Timothy Carney's study implicitly illustrates, Communist Khmer-language publications have been produced for internal distribution, but few have found their way into the hands of Western journalists and scholars. The contrast with Vietnam during the years of US involvement there is startling. Captured Viet Cong documents, testimony of defectors, and even declassified intelligence reports were widely distributed.

This paucity of source materials regarding Kampuchea has had significant effect. Indeed, it has seriously hampered scholarly attempts to evalute the aims, programs, accomplishments, and failures of the Pol Pot regime.[1]

IN THE ABSENCE of much information from domestic publications (unclassified and classified alike) and from party defectors, outside observers have tended to draw upon three main alternative sources for insights. These have been radio broadcasts, refugees, and (rare) eyewitness accounts by diplomats, journalists, relief agency personnel,

[1] The situation may be alleviated at least to some extent by the publication of materials gathered in Kampuchea in 1980 by Australian scholar Ben Kiernan. For preliminary reporting on these, see Ben Kiernan, "Kampuchea's Choices for Survival," *Southeast Asia Chronicle* (Berkeley, CA), February 1981, pp. 27–29; and idem, "New Light on the Origins of the Vietnam-Kampuchea Conflict," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* (Charlemont, MA), October-December 1980, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 61–65.

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or others.[2] Radio broadcasts, of course, are often silent on key matters. The utility of eyewitness accounts depends upon the scope of the experiences of the reporters, and this has almost invariably been exceedingly limited. Even Norodom Sihanouk, whose memoirs and conversations with two Western analysts are among the items under review, had severe restrictions placed on his movements by the Pol Pot regime. Thus, refugees have served as the primary source of evidence for those writing about Kampuchea and the Pol Pot era.

The meticulous and systematic exploitation of refugee testimony can be most worthwhile in efforts to answer questions on which other data are lacking or scarce. Kenneth Quinn's pioneering study of the Cambodian revolution in the 1970–74 period affords a good illustration of this approach.[3] However, even this effort, as we shall see later, is not without flaws, and many undertakings concerning Kampuchea's subsequent history present still greater problems. The books by John Barron and Anthony Paul and by François Ponchaud,[4] undoubtedly the most influential accounts of the early Pol Pot years, fall into this category.

Each of these volumes relies heavily on refugee reports. Ponchaud's data come primarily from 94 important sources, "some hundred written accounts" and "many conversations with . . . refugees" (pp. x–xi). Barron and Paul made two field trips to Southeast Asia. In October-November 1975, they interviewed "more than 100 Cambodians and recorded fifty-nine interviews." Over the course of 1976, they talked with "more than 300 Cambodian refugees . . . and transcribed more than half the interviews" (pp. xiii–xiv). The refugee pool from which the authors of both books drew, it should be stressed, consisted of individuals who had left Kampuchea in the mid-1970's.

On these bases, both Ponchaud and Barron and Paul conclude that Democratic Kampuchea pursued irrational policies and was guilty of extreme brutality, brutality of a dimension which amounts to genocide against the Cambodian people. Ponchaud estimates that more than a million persons had died by as early as 1976 (p. 71). Barron and Paul contend that "at the very minimum more than 1,200,000 men, women and children died in Cambodia between April 17, 1975, and January 1, 1977, as a consequence of the actions of Angkor Loeu . . ." (p. 206).

These findings of the two books, however, are open to challenge.[5] Perhaps the most obvious grounds are their refugee sample. At the time Barron and Paul and Ponchaud undertook their studies, there were about 37,000 Cambodian refugees in Thailand, and arriving at a "scientifically representative" sample of this group was highly difficult, especially in the circumstances under which the refugees lived in Thailand. Therefore, generalizations about the experiences of the entire refugee population—to say nothing of the whole of the population of Kampuchea—on the basis of their samples are open to serious question. This is particularly true because of two other considerations. First, both samples contained an unduly large number of nonpeasant Kampuchean elements—that is, anti-Communist and pro–Lon Nol elements of the urban middle class. Second, most of the reports of the worst atrocities emanated from the Northwest Region of Kampuchea, primarily, though not exclusively, from Battambang and Pursat provinces. As Ben Kiernan, an Australian scholar, noted early on in dealing with refugee testimony, accounts from this region provided a skewed picture of what was going on in the country as a whole.[6]

Since 1979, moreover, Thailand has been flooded with new refugees from Kampuchea. These have increased by a factor of at least four the number of persons theoretically available for research undertakings by outside observers, and a number of investigators—e.g., Kiernan, Stephen Heder, Milton Osborne, and Michael Vickery[7]—have sought to gather evidence from this en-

[2] There has been an increase in the number of eyewitness reports since 1978, when the bulk of the books under review were published. See, for example, Helen Ester, *Vietnam-Thailand-Kampuchea: A First Hand Account*, Canberra, The Australian Council for Overseas Aid, 1980.

[3] Kenneth Quinn, "Political Change in Wartime: The Khmer Krahom Revolution in Southern Cambodia, 1970–1974," *Naval War College Review* (Newport, RI), Spring 1976, pp. 3–31.

[4] References in this review will be to the American edition of the Ponchaud volume, rather than to the earlier (1978) edition by Penguin Books.

[5] For an earlier critique of both books, see Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology*, Vol. 2, *The Political Economy of Human Rights*, Sydney, Hale & Iremonger, 1980, pp. 241–84. It should be noted that this critique of the Ponchaud volume is based on the English/Australian edition. However, the features of the book that Chomsky and Herman mention are the same in the American edition. Concerning errors in translation from Khmer in Ponchaud's volume, see Stephen Heder, "Mistranslations in Counterrevolutionary Propaganda," *News from Kampuchea* (Waverley, Australia), August 1977, Vol. 1, No. 3. pp. 14–18.

[6] Ben Kiernan, "Cambodia in the News: 1975–76," *Melbourne Journal of Politics* (Melbourne), Vol. 8, 1975–76, pp. 6–12; and idem, "Social Cohesion in Revolutionary Cambodia," *Australian Outlook* (Melbourne), December 1976, pp. 371–86.

[7] See the items by Kiernan in fn. 1; Stephen R. Heder, *Kampuchean Occupation and Resistance*, Asian Studies Monograph No. 027, Bangkok, Institute of Asian Studies Chulalongkorn University, January 1980; idem, "From Pol Pot to Pen Sovan to the Villages," paper delivered to the International Conference on Indochina and Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast Asia, Bangkok, Chulalongkorn University, June 19–21, 1980; Milton Osborne, "The Kampuchean Refugee Situation: A Survey and Commentary," unpublished manuscript, Apr. 23, 1980; idem, "The Indochinese Refugee Situation: A Kampuchean Case Study," paper presented to a Symposium on "Refugees: The Challenge of the Future," Canberra, Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, 1980; and Michael Vickery, "Kampuchean Demography—Cooking the Books," unpublished manuscript, Canberra, Nov. 11, 1980.

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larged population. Although their samples, too, fall short of "scientifically valid" representativeness, their studies nevertheless do persuasively suggest that the Ponchaud and particularly the Barron and Paul accounts contain some gross distortions. Indeed, the testimony of new refugees affords a very different view of the nature of the Pol Pot regime, and it tends to refute the contention that the elimination of all "new people" (residents of areas previously under the control of the Lon Nol government) or even the class of military and civil officials of the Sihanouk–Lon Nol eras was an aim of the Democratic Kampuchean government.

It would appear that the Communist forces that seized power in April 1975 were far from a monolithic, centrally-directed movement. The political system that first emerged in 1975 was based on regional administrations (North, Northeast, East, Center, Southwest, West, Northwest, and a special zone around Phnom Penh). Not only did each of these exhibit a degree of difference in the execution of national policy, but there were significant rivalries among them, especially between the Vietnamese-influenced Eastern Region and the Southwest. Furthermore, the central leadership seems to have been divided into at least three major groupings: indigenous radicals (Pol Pot), the so-called Khmer Viet Minh, and an intellectual faction that advocated an independent but nevertheless moderate program of socialist construction.[8] Pol Pot achieved ascendancy by purging the Northwest leadership and by advancing the influence of cadres from the Southwest in other regions, including the Center. In May 1978, there was a revolt by elements of the party in the Eastern Region, but it was crushed, with the remnants of the rebel elements ultimately taking refuge in Vietnam.[9] Throughout the 1976–77 period, regional leaders as well as central party and government officials were ousted. Many of them died after experiencing prolonged torture at the now notorious Toul Sleng prison.[10] Neither Barron and Paul nor any other of the accounts under consideration here gives sufficient weight to the variations in outlook from region to region and to the factional infighting on the situation in the country as a whole.[11] (Even the Quinn study referred to above unfortunately overlooked the importance of regional variations in its treatment of refugee testimony from the Eastern and Southwestern regions.)

By all accounts, conditions in the Northwest were the worst, with a very high incidence of arbitrary execution and, later, hunger, to the point of starvation. After the fall of Phnom Penh, many urban residents were taken to the Northwest. Because Pursat Province was one of the most economically depressed areas, many "new people" died of disease and hunger there.

However, even within the Northwest, conditions were far from uniform. According to refugees interviewed by Michael Vickery, an area known as Region 3 was considered a "good" place to live. Refugee sources from there reported adequate rations and few arbitrary executions. Indeed, there was agreement among them that more persons had been killed during the Sihanouk period than during the Pol Pot era.[12]

The situation varied throughout Kampuchea as well, but it was generally better than that in the Northwest. Several factors explain this state of affairs. Conditions were better, for example, in long-established rice-growing areas than in settlements founded after 1975. Also, conditions were better in areas where the Communist movement had firm roots (cadres were better educated and more disciplined) than in newly "liberated" territory.

In sum, the extrapolations of Barron and Paul and of Ponchaud for the number of deaths in all of Kampuchea do not seem to be anywhere near the correct order of magnitude. To cite one example, Barron and Paul, in calculating the number of deaths which occurred in 1975–76, estimate the number of "new people" who died in the "two waves" of forced migration which occurred in 1975. They thus assumed that the second wave of "new people" into the Northwest was a nationwide phenomenon. The evidence from the later sources cited here indicates that it was not. The "second wave" involved only urban people who had been taken out of Phnom Penh in 1975 and settled in the relatively well-off Southwest. Hence, the Barron and Paul estimates appear highly inflated.

Refugee testimony used by Barron and Paul, and by Ponchaud, establishes beyond doubt that arbitrary executions did take place on a wide scale in Kampuchea. However, these writers convey the impression that such executions were the result of a central policy applied uniformly to all members of the Lon Nol civil and military establishment as well as to intellectuals and others considered a danger to the regime. Re-

[8] See Ben Kiernan, "Conflict in the Kampuchean Communist Movement," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* (Stockholm), Vol. 10, Nos. 1–2, pp. 8–9.

[9] Heng Samrin initially vowed to resist both the Pol Pot regime and the Vietnamese, but pressures from the former forced him into cooperation with the latter.

[10] See Chanthou Boua, Ben Kiernan, and Anthony Barnett, "The Bureaucracy of Death: Documents from Inside Pol Pot's Torture Machine," *New Statesman* (London), May 2, 1980, pp. 669–76.

[11] There is some discussion of this issue in Sihanouk's *War and Hope*, but it is fairly minimal.

[12] Michael Vickery, remarks to a seminar of the Thai Studies Group, The Australian National University, Canberra, Oct. 24, 1980.

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fugee testimony of the later sources cited here, when broken down on the basis of regional references, indicates a wide variation in the pattern and extent of executions. Evidently, plans were drawn up prior to April 1975 to eliminate not only the "seven traitors" of the Lon Nol regime but also the higher ranks of the republican army and bureaucracy. Nevertheless, executions in Cambodia after April 1975 did not result simply from the implementation of this policy; there were many unauthorized revenge killings as well. Excesses were most prevalent in the Northwest, and there is evidence that in October (if not earlier in May) a central directive ordering their cessation was issued.[13] Certainly, as Ponchaud acknowledges, the killings/executions abated in 1976.

In the Northwest, the victims slated for execution by regional authorities included both military personnel down to the rank of noncommissioned officers, and civilian employees of the republican government, teachers, engineers, and doctors. Well-educated refugees from the East and Southwest, by contrast, report that only officers (in some places above the rank of major and in other places above the rank of lieutenant) were killed and that intellectuals were left alone. By 1979, the presence of large numbers of urban middle-class refugees in the Khao I Dang camp in Thailand was evidence that earlier assertions about the fates of at least some of them were in error.[14]

Similar problems arise when one reviews the estimates by Barron and Paul and by Ponchaud of the number of "peace dead"—i.e., persons who died after 1975 as a direct result of the policies of the Pol Pot regime. It is doubtful, to begin with, that responsibility for all these deaths, whatever their magnitude, can be assigned solely to the Democratic Kampuchean government. Several considerations are involved here. First, it is misleading to portray Kampuchea as a "gentle land" until the onset of the Communist period. Writers such as David Chandler and Charles Meyer have correctly pointed out that violence and brutal killings have long been features of Cambodia's peasant society and hence are not alien to traditional culture.[15] Second, although Ponchaud characterizes the colonial era as a time of "peace and order," there are major questions about the accuracy of this characterization. Of the authors whose works are under review here, only Carney takes seriously (yet critically) the studies of rural Cambodian society produced by Khmer Rouge leaders Khieu Samphan and Hu Nim, but other non-Communist accounts have noted widespread peasant violence extending from the French period through Sihanouk's rule.[16] Indeed, the 1967 Samlaut rebellion in Battambang Province involved brutal killings on both sides, and its suppression by government soldiers planted the seeds of desire for revenge.[17] Third, as Milton Osborne (whose book, unfortunately, focuses solely on the year 1966) and others have concluded,[18] the inequities of Sihanouk's rule had tended to polarize Cambodian society along left-right lines long before the March 1970 coup. Even Sihanouk in his memoirs admits to having made mistakes in economic management. Finally, one must not ignore the reported brutality of the Lon Nol government, the barbarity of the Saigon army which invaded Kampuchea, and the massive destruction wrought in some parts of the countryside by US warplanes. As Ponchaud rightly observes, the devastation of this period turned the majority of the peasantry into rootless refugees and a substantial minority into firm supporters of the Khmer Rouge.

Attempts to assess the number of "peace deaths" after 1975 must also take into account the conditions prevailing in Phnom Penh as well as throughout the country. Here the account by George Hildebrand and Gareth Porter, which focuses on the spread of starvation and disease among residents of overpopulated Phnom Penh, provides an indispensable backdrop to the Communists' decision to evacuate all urban areas. Hildebrand and Porter argue persuasively that this decision was a rational one, based on the limited food stocks available. (They cite estimates of six–eight days, while Ponchaud asserts that, with careful rationing, these could have stretched to two months). Although Hildebrand and Porter do not mention this factor, security considerations no doubt entered into Khmer Rouge calculations too. Khmer Rouge officials subsequently admitted that the evacuation of Phnom Penh was designed to disrupt stay-behind anti-Communist resistance fighters. In this respect, it appears to have been successful.[19]

Gruesome accounts of this urban depopulation, given widespread

[13] Vickery, "Kampuchean Demography . . . ," p. 6, and Ben Kiernan, "Conflict in the Kampuchean Communist Movement," p. 51.

[14] Vickery, "Kampuchean Demography . . . ," p. 10, and Osborne, "The Kampuchean Refugee Situation," Section iv.

[15] David P. Chandler, "Transformation in Cambodia," *Commonweal* (New York, NY), Apr. 1, 1977; for a summary of Meyer's views, see Chomsky and Herman, op. cit., pp. 222–25.

[16] Chandler, loc. cit.

[17] Ben Kiernan, *The Samlaut Rebellion and Its Aftermath; 1967–70. The Origins of Cambodia's Liberation Movement*, Parts I and II, Working Papers Nos. 4 and 5, Melbourne, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, c. 1976.

[18] Michael Vickery, "Looking Back at Cambodia," *Westerly* (Perth), December 1976, pp. 14–28.

[19] See, for instance, Frank Snepp, *Decent Interval*, New York, NY, Random House, 1977.

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publicity at the time and recounted in Barron and Paul, have served to cloud the motivations and subsequent policies of the Khmer Rouge government. Barron and Paul, for instance, report claims that scores of dead bodies lined the evacuation routes (although they do not directly address the question of who may have killed those persons[20]), and they quote refugees who received no water, provisions, or medicine during the journey, thus implying that the evacuation was a carefully planned death march. Yet Barron and Paul fail to mention that other witnesses to the evacuation, including Ponchaud, report that they saw no bodies along the routes. By the same token, Barron and Paul do not indicate that refugees other than those they quote say that prestocked rice supplies, water, and medical aid were available during the march. On balance, then, it seems likely that the Khmer Rouge, whatever advance planning they had done, were simply overwhelmed by the unprecedented evacuation effort, which involved movement of nearly 3 million people.

In light of all the foregoing factors, more recent estimates of the number of persons who died during the entire period of the Pol Pot regime, from April 1975 to January 1979, have placed the total number of deaths from all causes at about 500,000, of which roughly 50,000–60,000 resulted from executions by the Pol Pot government.[21] These figures are by no means insignificant. But they are considerably below those normally cited, and they do appear to be more soundly based than earlier estimates.

WHATEVER the correct total for the number of deaths that the Pol Pot regime ultimately produced, it does not logically follow that the figure is an indicator of a lack of popular support for the Khmer Rouge. The initial success of the Khmer Rouge can be attributed, at least in part, to the backing it received from a substantial minority of the rural peasantry.[22] In 1975, Cambodian society consisted of "old people" and "new people." The former were long-term residents of Communist-ruled areas, totaling perhaps 3.2 million persons, or 45 percent of the overall population, and the latter, as already mentioned, were residents of areas previously under the control of the Lon Nol government.

However, rural policies carried out after 1975—cooperativization, construction of irrigation systems, and efforts to boost agricultural production—never attracted the intensity of prewar support. The reasons lay in the depressed conditions of the countryside, the inability of urban residents to adjust to rural life-styles, and the failure of the Communist Party itself to administer these programs effectively. Prior to the Vietnamese invasion of late 1978, it is true, there were signs that a domestic program of austerity, radical egalitarianism, self-reliance, agricultural self-sufficiency, and collective labor were achieving a measure of success in quantitative terms. Indeed, life in the cities slowly revived as small-scale industry was brought back into production.[23] Nevertheless, the regime failed to attract broad support, and large numbers of the Cambodian people welcomed its overthrow by the Vietnamese.

The Pol Pot faction of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) bears the responsibility for the regime's downfall. It did not "reeducate" and "win over" the urban middle-class component of the "new people." Instead of eliciting popular support at the base level, CPK cadres employed harsh discipline, coercion, and even execution in implementing domestic policies. Within the CPK itself, various factions disagreed over the pace and direction of socialist construction, and the radical Pol Pot faction increasingly pushed aside and purged the moderates. It should also be noted that as Kampuchean-Vietnamese relations deteriorated, many party cadres purged for failing to implement the CPK's domestic policies were branded as traitors and agents of the Vietnamese.

Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea quickly toppled the Pol Pot regime, but a divided country has been the consequence. The Vietnamese-backed Phnom Penh administration, for example, consists of a few thousand Khmer Viet Minh, CPK Eastern Region dissidents, and, at the lower levels, remnants of groups and classes identified with the Sihanouk and Lon Nol regimes. This unstable coalition is held together by the presence of 200,000 Vietnamese troops and administrative cadres. It is opposed mainly by Kampucheans still loyal to Pol Pot—members of the Southwest Region and "old" and "new people" who fled with (or who were forced to join) the Khmer Rouge army in its retreat. Its effective military strength is estimated at 40,000–50,000. A variety of Third Force groups have arisen among the refugee communities ensconced along the Thai-Kampuchean frontier. The major one is the 3,000–4,000-man Khmer People's National Liberation Front, commanded by an ex–Lon Nol general, Dien Del, and headed by former Prime Minister Son Sann. Most observers, including Sihanouk, dismiss these groups' capacity for military effectiveness in operations

[20] Some observers have raised the possibility that reports of bodies might refer to victims of the fighting for Phnom Penh.

[21] Vickery, "Kampuchean Demography . . . ," provides a detailed elaboration of these estimates.

[22] See the account of defector Ith Sarin, *Sranaoh Pralung Khmer* (Regrets for the Khmer Soul), reproduced in Carney, pp. 42–55.

[23] Hildebrand and Porter, p. 90.

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against the Vietnamese.

The chief threat to the Vietnamese position in Kampuchea lies in the possibility that the Khmer Rouge and Third Force groupings might create an anti-Vietnamese united front headed by Sihanouk. Establishment of such a united front with Sihanouk as its titular leader would attract support from China and the states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It would also increase pressures on the Vietnamese to consider some variant of Sihanouk's proposed solution to the Kampuchean situation: a cease-fire, disarming of the Khmer Rouge by an international force, the withdrawal of the Vietnamese army, elections under the supervision of a revived International Control Commission, and the formation of a democratic republic headed by Sihanouk.[24]

Prospects for such a united front, however, do not appear good. Sihanouk did invite Khieu Samphan to come to North Korea in March 1981 to discuss such a front. To this degree, Sihanouk has altered his position since April 1979, when he wrote *War and Hope*. At that time, he said categorically that he would refuse to cooperate with Pol Pot ("that would be tantamount to putting a starving and bloodthirsty wolf in with a lamb"—p. 134.) Still, nothing came of the meeting. Sihanouk has indicated that the Khmer Rouge would not agree to be disarmed, and that he would not enter into a cooperative arrangement with them under such circumstances.[25] Indeed, he now appears to realize that an alliance with the Khmer Rouge would discredit him among the non-Communist refugees in Thailand and among the population in Vietnamese-occupied Kampuchea, who fear Pol Pot's return to power more than continued rule by the Hanoi-backed Heng Samrin administration.

Perhaps more important, Sihanouk's proposed solution to the Kampuchean imbroglio seems unlikely to be viable. Sihanouk appears to have overvalued his own role in domestic affairs. In *War and Hope,* he writes (p. 129): "Cambodia's last chance is Sihanouk. I am not boasting when I say this." But as Osborne's account reveals, many of the republican elite had become disenchanted with his rule as early as the mid-1960's. His role with the Khmer Rouge in 1970–75 only intensified their alienation. Moreover, the Khmer Rouge cannot be under any illusion about their ultimate fate if Sihanouk had his personal way.

At the same time, the Khmer Rouge, with or without Sihanouk, cannot hope to achieve military victory over Vietnam. Therefore, in this reviewer's opinion, their strategy will remain one of protracted resistance, in the expectation that Vietnam's determination to stay on will weaken and that Hanoi will seek some sort of face-saving political solution that will allow it to withdraw the bulk of its occupation forces.

Thus, the present UN-sponsored efforts to achieve a settlement are not likely to succeed in the near future. The coming years would seem to hold only continued fighting and further tragedy for the Kampuchean people.

[24] For further details, see Sihanouk, *War and Hope . . .*, and Schier and Schier-Oum, *Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia . . .*, pp. 49–54.

[25] Nayan Chanda, "Sihanouk Calls for Arms," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Apr. 10, 1981, p. 22. Sihanouk's exact position is unclear. Most recently, he wrote in a letter to the editor of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (May 27, 1981) that "I wish to state once again that neither I nor my followers will agree to be a part of the government or of another state apparatus or of the administration of the so-called Democratic Kampuchea." Such a disclaimer, however, does not preclude Sihanouk from lending his prestige to an anti-Vietnamese united front that includes the Khmer Rouge.

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